Commonwealth v. Padilla

• Decision Date: 15 December 2021
• Docket Number: 1463 MDA 2020
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Adrian Carlos PADILLA, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

270 A.3d 1143 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Adrian Carlos PADILLA, Appellant

No. 1463 MDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: December 15, 2021

Reargument Denied February 15, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

Appellant, Adrian Carlos Padilla, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County on September 28, 2020, imposing a split sentence of three (3) to six (6) months’ incarceration and an aggregate eighteen (18) months of probation for his convictions of one count each of simple assault, harassment, and disorderly conduct¹ following a jury trial.² We affirm.

The trial court summarized the pertinent facts here in as follows:

On August 2, 2019, [Appellant] was arguing with his girlfriend at the intersection of Court Street and Madison Avenue in Reading, Berks County, PA. When [Appellant] slapped his girlfriend across the face, a male teenage bystander who was crossing the street with his grandmother, verbally confronted [Appellant]. [Appellant] responded by telling him not to get involved and not to ‘make me pull this out’ while reaching into his pocket or waistband. [Appellant] then repeated his threat to ‘pull this cannon out’ at which point the teenager backed away into a nearby church.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/20, at 2.

Appellant was sentenced on September 28, 2020, and he filed a post-sentence motion on October 6, 2020. The trial court denied the post-sentence motion on October 8, 2020, and this timely appeal followed.³

In his brief, Appellant presents the following three questions for this Court's review:

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict for simple assault by physical menace?

Were the verdicts contrary to the weight of the evidence.

Whether the refusal to have witnesses unmask their faces during their testimony, over the expressed objection of the defense was reversible error, as it was a clear violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and Article § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

Brief for Appellant at 13 (unnumbered).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently set forth the relevant standards of review of challenges to the sufficiency and to the weight of the evidence as follows:

[W]e find it necessary to delineate the distinctions between a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that challenges the weight of the evidence. The distinction between these two challenges is critical. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) ; Commonwealth v. Vogel , 501 Pa. 314, 461 A.2d 604 (1983), whereas a claim challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would permit a second trial. Id .

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Karkaria , 533 Pa. 412, 625 A.2d 1167 (1993). Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. Commonwealth v. Santana , 460 Pa. 482, 333 A.2d 876 (1975). When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Chambers , 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630 (1991).

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Whiteman , 336 Pa.Super. 120, 485 A.2d 459 (1984). Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 38 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 2211. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Brown , 538 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177 (1994). A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Thompson, supra . A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that "notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice." Id .

Commonwealth v. Widmer , 560 Pa. 308, 318–20, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000) (footnote omitted).

A simple assault occurs where the defendant "attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3). Serious bodily injury is injury which "creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. The act of pointing a gun at someone is sufficient to sustain a conviction of simple assault by physical menace. Commonwealth v. Reynolds , 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa.Super. 2003).

In this case, Appellant did not point a gun at the victim Kai Jackson, the teenaged bystander who intervened, or at Stephanie Ann Brown, his grandmother. Rather, he reached for his waist and threatened to "pull this cannon out." When Appellant uttered these words in conjunction with his action, Mr. Jackson believed he was reaching for a gun.

Appellant posits this scenario is similar to that presented in Commonwealth v. Fry , 491 A.2d 843, 844 (Pa.Super. 1985). There, an eighteen-year-old boy approached a ten-year-old girl from behind, picked her up, and began to carry her. When the girl screamed, the defendant said, "shut up, you're coming with me." Id. The incident occurred on the campus of a school, and the girl surmised that the defendant was carrying her toward a locker room. Id. The defendant put the girl down when two youngsters serving as safety patrol approached. Id. This Court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for simple assault under § 2701(a)(3).

In doing so, this Court found that the only evidence of physical menace was that Fry had put his arms around the child and picked her up. Significantly, Fry did not strike or attempt to subdue her by physical means, nor did he threaten to inflict bodily injury upon her. Also, there was no evidence that serious bodily injury was imminent or that Frye intended to put the child in fear thereof. Id .

This Court acknowledged the evidence did show that Frye had told the girl to "shut up" and that he was taking her with him. The child speculated that Frye intended to take her toward the steps leading to the locker room, which was likely alarming and frightening to a young child. However, that is not the conduct which was made criminal by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3), for the statute required a specific intent on the part of Frye to put the child in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, and the Commonwealth failed to prove such intent. Id. at 845 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

In the matter sub judice, Appellant stresses that he was found in possession of pepper spray but not a gun, and that the "cannon" reference could have been to the pepper spray. However, Appellant's argument ignores the standard of review under which we must draw inferences in favor of the Commonwealth. The evidence before us, read in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, clearly supports an inference that Appellant threatened the Mr. Jackson with imminent serious bodily injury. As the trial court wrote:

Contrary to the assertions of [Appellant], more than just words were involved. It was not merely a verbal threat. There was testimony that [Appellant] placed his hand in his pants physically implying that he had a gun while making a verbal statement about not having to pull ‘this’ out and referencing "this" as a "cannon." The actions coupled with the statements were intended to intimidate the victim into stopping his intervention on behalf of [Appellant's] girlfriend whom he had just slapped in the face. The threat was effective as the victim did in fact disengage and proceed to a church with his grandmother.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/20, at 3.

Appellant argues that because the evidence was insufficient in Fry it is insufficient here. Appellant's Brief at 30. Finding a significant distinction between Fry and the instant case, we disagree. The Fry Court noted the defendant never threatened bodily harm, whereas Appellant expressly threatened to pull a gun on Mr. Jackson while reaching for his waistband, thus intentionally putting Mr. Jackson in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

Appellant next challenges the weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Before we consider the merits of this issue, we first must determine whether Appellant has preserved it four our review. In this regard, we are guided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis:

In all events, it bears noting that the purpose of Rule 1925 is to facilitate appellate review and to provide the parties and the public with the legal basis for a judicial decision. See Commonwealth v. Parrish, ––– Pa. ––––, ––––, 224 A.3d 682, 692 (2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus , 581 Pa. 632, 638, 868 A.2d 379,

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