Commonwealth v. Palermo
| Decision Date | 27 June 1951 |
| Citation | 368 Pa. 28,81 A.2d 540 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. PALERMO. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Joseph Richard Palermo was convicted in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Beaver County at No. 19, September term, 1950 Morgan H. Sohn, J., of voluntary manslaughter, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Ladner, J., at No. 86, March term, 1951, held that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction.
Judgment affirmed.
Thompson Bradshaw, Oran W. Panner, Jr. and Bradshaw & Panner, all of Beaver, for appellant.
William Coghlan, Dist. Atty., Midland, J. Wilmer Martin, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaver Falls, for appellee.
Before DREW, C. J., and STERN, STEARNE, JONES, BELL, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.
On July 15, 1950, Camille Colodanato died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by the defendant, Joseph Palermo, who was his brother-in-law. Defendant was charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied by the court below and defendant was sentenced four to twelve years in the Western State Penitentiary. Defendant appeals.
The first contention of the appellant is that the evidence produced by the Commonwealth does not support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Saturday morning July 15, 1950, the defendant went ground-hog hunting. He armed himself with a shot gun and a revolver. When he returned in the afternoon he sat on the front porch of his home, situate on Beaver Road, Monaca, Beaver County. The home of the deceased Camille Colodanato, who was married to the defendant's sister Virginia, was across the street. Between five and six o'clock in the afternoon defendant was sitting on the porch eating his supper when his sister was heard crying in her home on the opposite side of Beaver Road. The defendant threw his dishes out in the front yard, went inside his house, came out and went over to the Colodanato home. Various witnesses for the Commonwealth testified that they heard the sounds of fighting in the Colodanato home and about ten minutes later a shot.
Defendant came out of the Colodanato house and said, ‘ I know I will get the electric chair for this but, by God, he had it coming to him.’ The police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and the defendant came to the police car, placed his revolver on the seat and said, ‘ I shot a man, Chief, there is the gun.’ Later on the way to the office of the magistrate the defendant said, ‘ I didn't mean to, but I shot him like a dog.’ The Commonwealth also produced evidence that during the altercation in the Colodanato home the firing pin of the revolver struck one cartridge which was not discharged before it fired the fatal bullet.
It is true that defendant and his witnesses testified in such a manner that the jury could have found that the killing was in self-defense or accidental during the fight which occurred. However, the jury refused to accept this version of the incident and it cannot therefore be taken into consideration here.
‘ Voluntary manslaughter is a homicide intentionally committed under the influence of passion.’ Commonwealth v. Colandro, 1911, 231 Pa. 343, 350, 80 A. 571, 574; Commonwealth v. Cargill, 1947, 357 Pa. 510, 513, 55 A.2d 373. The evidence produced by the Commonwealth, although circumstantial, was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer a crime which falls within the definition of voluntary manslaughter. The jury could well have found that the defendant hearing his sister crying, went into his house and obtained his revolver. Further, the evidence supports inferences that the defendant went across the street and seeing his sister in tears became so incensed that he shot Camille Colodanato intentionally but in the heat of passion. The acts of the defendant before the shooting and the statements which he made after it occurred lend considerable credence to the plausible and reasonable conclusion reached by the jury.
The second argument of the defendant is that the trial judge should not have granted the request of the defendant's counsel which asked that the judge withdraw from the consideration of the jury the charge of involuntary manslaughter. The trial judge in his opinion states, ‘ Counsel were advised by the court, before argument that the charge of involuntary manslaughter would not be submitted to the jury.’ Counsel for the defendant in addition to requesting the trial judge to so act, took no exception to the charge when it complied with his request. Under the circumstances there is no ground for complaint, even assuming that there was evidence of involuntary manslaughter (a question which we rule it is unnecessary to decide).
At the argument...
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