Commonwealth v. Parham

• Docket Number: 551 EDA 2023,J-S04026-24
• Decision Date: 24 April 2024
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SHAHID PARHAM Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SHAHID PARHAM Appellant

No. 551 EDA 2023

No. J-S04026-24

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 24, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 2, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0015369-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM

STABILE, J.

Shaid Parham (petitioner) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA court) denying his petition for postconviction relief.^[1] We affirm.

This case began in 2013, when petitioner was involved in a fatal shooting. Petitioner and his cousin, Muhammad Munson, held themselves out as prospective buyers of a watch that belonged to Dwayne Davis. Both petitioner and Munson ostensibly appeared at the home of Davis to examine the merchandise.

However, upon arriving through the front door, petitioner drew a firearm on Davis. Petitioner told Davis, "You know what time it is, old head." N.T. Trial, 4/9/2015, at 63. Despite being outnumbered and taken by surprise,

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Davis was able to wrest away control of the weapon, and he then used it to shoot both petitioner and Munson while they fled. Munson succumbed to his wounds moments later, and he passed away while still in Davis' backyard.

Petitioner survived, but he only managed to run a block away from the home before collapsing to the ground. Police found petitioner and provided him with medical attention. He was taken into custody and charged with several counts relating to the attempted robbery of Davis.

In 2015, at a non-jury trial, one of the legal issues put before the trial judge was whether petitioner could be convicted of burglary when force had not been used to enter the victim's home. The Commonwealth argued in part that since petitioner entered the home with the intent to commit a robbery, and he did so under the false pretense of buying a watch from the victim, the evidence of burglary was legally sufficient.

Another issue was a factual dispute as to how the firearm was discharged. In the victim's account, petitioner first fired the gun while in the home, striking a wall, at which point petitioner dropped it to the ground, enabling the victim to pick up the weapon and use it against petitioner.

The defense argued that the evidence was more consistent with a struggle between petitioner and the victim over the weapon before it was discharged, making it unlikely that petitioner had ever shot a round into the wall. The trial judge accepted the defense's argument in that regard, and as a result, the portion of the victim's testimony concerning petitioner's use of

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force was found to be not credible; the rest of the victim's account was found to be credible, including petitioner's method of gaining entry into Davis' home.

There is no dispute that petitioner was convicted of robbery, conspiracy, possession of a firearm without a license, possession of a firearm prohibited, possessing a firearm as a minor, and possessing an instrument of a crime. He was found not guilty of aggravated assault because the trial court determined that there was no evidence that he intended to cause the victim serious bodily injury. This portion of the verdict was consistent with the trial court's factual finding that petitioner had never attempted to shoot the victim.

After announcing the verdict, the trial judge indicated that he would "reconsider" the burglary conviction if petitioner was able to find any legal authority that would support an acquittal. See id., at 183. The docket entry for the date of the verdict indicates that petitioner was found guilty of the following offenses: Count 2 (Robbery), Count 3 (Burglary), Count 4 (Conspiracy), Count 5 (Carrying Firearm Without a License), Count 7 (Possession of Firearm by a Prohibited Person), Count 9 (Possession of a Firearm by a Minor), and Count 10 (Possession of an Instrument of Crime). The docket further reflects that the trial court found petitioner not guilty only as to Count 1 (Aggravate Assault), and the remaining charges (Counts 6, 8, 11, and 12) were nolle prossed.

At the sentencing hearing held on June 18, 2015, defense counsel suggested that petitioner had been found not guilty of burglary. In response, the trial court clarified that petitioner had been in fact been found guilty of

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that count, and that the defense had only been invited to "find something to the contrary, and bring it up again and I'll reconsider [the guilty verdict]." N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 6/18/2015, at 16-17. The trial court pointed out that it would not have made sense for it to reconsider a verdict of "not guilty" because double jeopardy principles would have precluded such reconsideration. See id.

The defense then presented argument on the issue of legal sufficiency on the burglary count, asserting that there was no evidence that petitioner had planned to commit a crime in the victim's house prior to entering. See id., at 17-18. The defense also emphasized that the victim had been found not to be credible as to the circumstances in which he recovered the weapon that petitioner had brought into the house, preventing the Commonwealth from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had the requisite criminal intent prior to entry. See id. The trial court rejected the defense's argument and reiterated that petitioner was "guilty of burglary." Id., at 20.

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 32-64 years. Months after his sentencing, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the notes of testimony from the trial had indicated a verdict of not guilty on the burglary count. The motion was denied on October 22, 2015, following a hearing.

Petitioner then sought extraordinary relief based on a similar ground. This time, he asserted that he had been found not guilty of burglary, and that trial counsel had not been prepared to litigate the sufficiency of the evidence

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of burglary at the hearing on petitioner's post-sentence motion. The motion for extraordinary relief was never ruled upon.^[2]

Petitioner appealed his convictions on two occasions. The first appeal was denied for being untimely...