Commonwealth v. Peralta

• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.
• Citation: Commonwealth v. Peralta, 311 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024)
• Docket Number: 291 MDA 2023,No. 291 MDA 2023
• Decision Date: 08 February 2024
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Juan Evangalist PERALTA, Appellant

311 A.3d 1

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Juan Evangalist PERALTA, Appellant

No. 291 MDA 2023

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted July 31, 2023

Filed: February 8, 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 21, 2022, In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004236-2021, Patrick T. Barrett, J.

Kimm Montone, Assistant Public Defender, Reading, for appellant.

Kenneth W. Kelecic, Assistant District Attorney, Reading, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

Juan Evangalist Peralta, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 45 to 90 days of incarceration following his conviction for illegally operating a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock.

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was required to only drive vehicles that contained such equipment. After careful review, we determine that the Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant had adequate notice of his obligations, as the statute required the Department of Transportation ("Penn-DOT") to inform Appellant of his ongoing obligation to drive with an interlock device unless and until he obtained an unrestricted license. We thus reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate his judgment of sentence for that offense. We affirm, his judgment of sentence in all other respects.

On August 17, 2021, Sergeant Mark McCreary was monitoring traffic when his license plate reader triggered an alert that a passing vehicle’s registration was expired.¹ After confirming the result, Sergeant McCreary stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Appellant. Appellant handed over an expired registration, expired insurance cards, and his driver’s license, which "indicated the ignition interlock requirement." N.T., 11/16/22, at 22. The Commonwealth introduced photographs and body camera footage showing the interior of the vehicle, which did not contain an ignition interlock device.

The Commonwealth entered into evidence a copy of Appellant’s certified driving history provided by PennDOT to the Commonwealth. That document showed that Appellant refused breath testing on July 21, 2018, resulting in a one-year suspension effective September 7, 2018. The history further states that his operating privileges were restored on January 14, 2020. Additionally, there is a section with a header line of "interlock limited license (II LL)." Below this heading, the following fields are listed, each of which is blank: II LL License Class; II LL License Issued; II LL License Expires; II LL License Status. Id. at 62 (Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-2) (some capitalization omitted). However, at a different part of the same page, below Appellant’s date of birth and sex, the following text appears; "Record Type: Ignition Interlock License." Id.

The trial court questioned Sergeant McCreary about these entries, observing that the document "just says restoration of operating privileges January 14, 2020. So that would indicate that … his operating privileges were restored. Now, that may mean that he still was under this additional requirement of the interlock[,] but his operating privileges are restored. It doesn’t say that." Id. at 48. The officer replied, "I would agree with you. That was how I interpreted it." Id. The trial court additionally remarked, "Okay. Explain to me why it would … appear that … according to the first page[,] there’s no information about an interlock limited license. And then at the bottom of the second page it says that he is restored in January of ‘20." Id. at 49. Sergeant McCreary pointed out that the first page of the document indicated that Appellant had an ignition interlock license, and he reiterated that Appellant was in possession of a driver’s license that had an interlock designation.

Appellant was convicted of one count of illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3808, as well as the summary offenses of unlawfully operating a vehicle without an emission inspection sticker and unlawfully operating a vehicle without a certificate of inspection. The trial court imposed the above-stated sentence on Appellant. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied, and a timely notice of appeal from that order. Appellant then filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, and we now review Appellant’s two appellate claims:

1. Whether the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the verdict in that the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock?

2. Whether the verdicts of guilty of illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock, unlawful operation of vehicle without emission inspection, and operation of vehicle without official certificate of inspection was contrary to the weight of the evidence presented at trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (footnotes omitted).²

[1–3] Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of the interlock offense. Our standard of review is well-settled:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted).

Before discussing the parties’ arguments, for ease of disposition, we first set forth the relevant statutes and Appellant’s obligations under those provisions. As a prefatory matter, the definition section of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 102, defines the term "ignition interlock limited license" ("IILL") as follows:

A driver’s license issued to an individual whose operating privilege is suspended or revoked for one or more violations under section 1547 (relating to chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance) or 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or under former section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or a violation substantially similar to a violation under section 3802 or former section 3731 in another jurisdiction, requiring the individual to operate only motor vehicles equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system.

75 Pa.C.S. § 102.

Next, Section 3808(a) of the Vehicle Code codifies the criminal offense at issue, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--

(1) An individual required to only drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock system under any of the following who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle within this Commonwealth without such a system commits a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $300 and not more than $1,000 and to imprisonment for not more than 90 days:

(i) Section 1556 (relating to ignition interlock limited license).

(ii) Section 3805 (relating to ignition interlock).

(iii) A requirement by another jurisdiction to operate only a vehicle with an ignition interlock system.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3808(a).

Sections 3808(a)(1)(i) and (ii) govern when an individual must obtain an IILL. For ease of discussion, we begin with the first four subsections of Section 3805:

(a) General rule.-- Except as provided under subsection (a.1), if a person violates section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or has had their operating privileges suspended pursuant to section 1547 (relating to chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance) or 3808(c) (relating to illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock) and the person seeks a restoration of operating privileges, the department shall require as a condition of issuing a restricted license pursuant to this section that the following occur:

(1) Any motor vehicle to be operated by the individual has been equipped with an ignition interlock system and remains so for the duration of the restricted license period.

(2) If there are no motor vehicles owned or to be operated by the person or registered to the person that the person so certify to the department in accordance with the department’s regulations.

(a.1) Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall not apply to an individual who meets all of the following:

(1) Is subject to the penalties under section 3804(a)(1) (relating to penalties) or subject to mandatory suspension of operating privilege under section 3807(d) (relating to Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition).

(2) Has not had a prior offense, as defined under section 3806 (relating to prior offenses).

(b) Application for a restricted license.--A person subject to this section shall apply to the department for an ignition interlock restricted license³ under section 1951 (relating to driver’s license and learner’s permit), which shall be clearly marked to restrict the person to only driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of motor vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock system. Upon issuance of an ignition interlock restricted license to any person, the department shall notify the person that until the person obtains an unrestricted license the person may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of...