Commonwealth v. Perfetto
| Decision Date | 26 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 7 EAP 2018,7 EAP 2018 |
| Citation | 207 A.3d 812 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Marc PERFETTO, Appellant |
In a published opinion, a splintered, en banc panel of the Superior Court concluded that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of Pennsylvania's compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii), does not preclude the Philadelphia District Attorney (the "Commonwealth") from prosecuting Marc Perfetto ("Appellant") on pending misdemeanor criminal charges that arose from the same criminal episode that resulted in Appellant also being charged with a summary traffic offense, despite the fact that the Commonwealth already had prosecuted Appellant for that summary traffic offense. Commonwealth v. Perfetto , 169 A.3d 1114 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc ). We granted allowance of appeal to assess the propriety of this conclusion. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute bars the Commonwealth from further prosecuting Appellant on his pending charges. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse the Superior Court's judgment and reinstate the trial court's order, which granted Appellant's motion to dismiss his pending charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii).
Before examining the facts of this case, recounting a brief history of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute will be helpful in understanding the issues presently before the Court. This Court first announced the compulsory joinder rule in Commonwealth v. Campana , 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), vacated , 414 U.S. 808, 94 S.Ct. 73, 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand , 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974). In short, the Campana Court held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a ‘single criminal episode.’ " Campana , 304 A.2d at 441 (footnote omitted).
The Legislature subsequently codified this rule in the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. Prior to 2002, Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute barred the Commonwealth from prosecuting a defendant when: (1) a former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution; (3) the prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the former prosecution commenced; and (4) all of the charges were within the jurisdiction of a single court. See , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Bracalielly , 540 Pa. 460, 658 A.2d 755, 760 (1995) (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 ). Regarding the fourth prong of this standard, this Court interpreted the phrase "within the jurisdiction of a single court" to mean that all of the charges relevant to the compulsory joinder analysis must have been capable of adjudication in one court. See , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Geyer , 546 Pa. 586, 687 A.2d 815, 817 (1996) ().
In 2002, the Legislature amended Subsection 110(1)(ii) by changing the fourth prong of the statute. Specifically, the Legislature removed the phrase "was within the jurisdiction of a single court" and replaced it with the phrase "occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution." Thus, the current version of Subsection 110(1)(ii) provides as follows:
18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Fithian , 599 Pa. 180, 961 A.2d 66 (2008), this Court interpreted the phrase "occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution." In so doing, the Court first concluded that the Legislature intended "judicial district" to mean "the geographical area established by the General Assembly in which a court of common pleas is located."
Fithian , 961 A.2d at 75 (footnote omitted). As to the entirety of this phrase, we ultimately held that, in amending Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute, the Legislature "intended to preclude from the reach of the compulsory joinder statute those current offenses that occurred wholly outside of the geographic boundaries of the judicial district in which the former prosecution was brought, even though part of a single criminal episode." Id. at 77. Consequently, under the present version of Subsection 110(1)(ii), a current prosecution is prohibited if: (1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution; (3) the prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the former prosecution commenced; and (4) all of the charges occurred within the same judicial district. Thus, Subsection 110(1)(ii) no longer speaks to whether all of the charges are "within the jurisdiction of a single court."
The factual background underlying this appeal is undisputed. On July 3, 2014, Appellant was operating a motor vehicle in the City and County of Philadelphia when a Philadelphia Police Officer stopped him. The officer issued Appellant a citation for the summary offense of driving without lights when required, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4302(a)(1). The officer also charged Appellant with three counts of driving under the influence ("DUI"), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (d)(1), and (d)(2).
On September 4, 2014, a hearing officer in the Philadelphia Municipal Court - Traffic Division ("Traffic Division") tried Appellant in absentia solely on the summary traffic offense, finding him guilty. As to Appellant's pending DUI charges, after a preliminary hearing that resulted in the charges being held over for trial, Appellant filed in the trial court a motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum, invoking Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute. Specifically, Appellant argued that, because he already had been convicted of the summary traffic offense, the compulsory joinder statute prohibited the Commonwealth from subsequently prosecuting him for the DUI charges, as all four prongs of the current version of Subsection 110(1)(ii) were met: (1) Appellant's former prosecution on his summary offense resulted in a conviction; (2) the DUI prosecution arose from the same criminal episode as the summary offense prosecution - a single traffic stop; (3) the prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the summary offense prosecution commenced; and (4) all of Appellant's charges occurred within the same judicial district - the First Judicial District, i.e. , Philadelphia.
On July 13, 2015, the trial court entertained oral argument on Appellant's motion to dismiss. Appellant's argument largely tracked the contentions that he presented in his memorandum supporting his motion to dismiss, as discussed above. The theme of the Commonwealth's argument was that the compulsory joinder statute was inapplicable in this case because the Commonwealth allegedly was required to try Appellant for his summary offense in the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, which lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant's DUI charges. The trial court ultimately agreed with Appellant, granting his motion and dismissing the DUI charges.
The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court subsequently authored an opinion in support of its decision. The court concluded that all of the elements of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute were met with respect to Appellant's DUI charges, requiring the court to dismiss Appellant's DUI charges. Regarding the Commonwealth's jurisdictional argument, the court explained that, prior to 2013, Philadelphia had a specially designated Traffic Court that "had no authority to hear misdemeanor cases, and bifurcation of summary and misdemeanor offenses was permissible." Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/2015, at 3-4 (citing, inter alia , Commonwealth v. Masterson , 275 Pa.Super. 166, 418 A.2d 664, 666 (1980) ). The court noted that, in 2013, the Legislature amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121, which resulted in the Philadelphia Traffic Court merging into and becoming a division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court.1 According to the trial court, following this merger, conduct resulting in charges under both the Crimes Code and the Motor Vehicle Code are within the jurisdiction of the same court, i.e. , the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Id. at 4.
A fractured, en banc panel of the Superior Court reversed the trial court's order in a published opinion. Perfetto , supra . The court's decision consisted of a five-judge majority, a two-judge concurrence, and a three-judge dissent.2 The issue before the Superior Court was "whether the trial court erred when it dismissed DUI charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the prior adjudication of [Appellant's] summary traffic offense." Perfetto , 169 A.3d at 1117. While the trial court resolved this issue with a relatively straightforward application of ...
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Wagner v. N. Berks Reg'l Police Dep't
...former charges; and (4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution,"1 Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 207 A.3d 812, 821 (Pa. 2019) (citationomitted); see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(1)(ii). The Pennsylvania state trial court granted the motion and dismis......