Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer
| Decision Date | 01 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | SJC-12431 |
| Citation | 482 Mass. 110,121 N.E.3d 1130 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Melissa PFEIFFER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.
Colby M. Tilley, Assistant District Attorney (Julie S. Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.
Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the Norfolk district & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
Following an argument with her boyfriend, the defendant set a bag of his clothes on fire inside their apartment, then fled the building without calling for help or warning the occupants of other units. One person died in the resulting two-alarm fire. Three others, including two firefighters, were injured. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of arson of a dwelling house, G. L. c. 266, § 1 ; felony-murder in the second degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1 ; and two counts of injuring a firefighter, G. L. c. 265, § 13D1/2. The defendant appealed, and we granted her application for direct appellate review.
The defendant raises several challenges to the arson conviction, which served as the predicate for the other charges: that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she specifically intended to set the apartment building on fire; that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in instructing the jury on an "alternative theory" of arson, namely, that she also could be found guilty if she accidentally or negligently set the fire and then wilfully and maliciously failed to extinguish or report it; and that the Commonwealth expressly waived the right to pursue that alternative theory by its response to her pretrial motion for a bill of particulars. Moreover, she challenges the conviction of felony-murder in the second degree on the ground that the judge declared, as a matter of law, that arson is an inherently dangerous felony, rather than letting the jury determine whether her conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for the risk to human life. Finally, the defendant argues that the verdicts should be vacated and the indictments dismissed because the Commonwealth declined her request to instruct the grand jury regarding the elements of the offenses.
The parties, both in the trial court and on appeal, have treated the charge of arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1, as a specific intent crime. As discussed herein, however, arson under § 1, which is derived from the common law, is a crime requiring general intent with malice. We accordingly provide an appendix containing a model jury instruction for arson of a dwelling house under G. L. c. 266, § 1, which has been unanimously approved and recommended by this court.1
Concerning the defendant's claims on appeal, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish that she specifically intended to burn the apartment building. The court unanimously agrees that the instruction on the alternative theory of arson was erroneous, and a majority concludes that the error, whether it is viewed for prejudice or for a substantial miscarriage of justice, does not warrant overturning the verdicts. As there also is no merit to the defendant's other arguments, the verdicts are affirmed.
Background. The facts developed at trial are as follows. On December 24, 2010, the defendant was living in a ground-floor unit of a two-story apartment building in Chelsea with her boyfriend, William Brewer, and their two year old son. Early that evening, the defendant dropped their son off to spend the night at a relative's home, arriving back at the apartment at approximately 9 P.M. Immediately upon the defendant's return, she and Brewer engaged in a heated argument that resulted in Brewer leaving for a nearby bar. Approximately one hour later, he returned and found that the defendant, still angry, had locked him out of the apartment. From the sidewalk outside, Brewer spoke to the defendant through a window and attempted to calm her down and persuade her to let him in. Being unsuccessful in both regards, Brewer departed again, this time looking to buy marijuana.
Approximately fifteen minutes later, Brewer returned again. This time, as he approached the building, he observed the defendant running out of the building. When he asked her what she was doing, she responded that his clothes were on fire. The defendant had lit a piece of paper on fire and tossed it on a duffel bag full of Brewer's clothes, which was sitting on the floor in a corner of the apartment. She had then changed out of her night clothes and left, locking the exterior door of the building behind her,2 and without calling for help or alerting other occupants. As she then stood outside arguing with Brewer about what she had done, flames were already visible inside through one of the apartment windows.
As the two argued, a passing car came to a halt, and a woman and three men jumped out. The woman immediately used her cellular telephone to call 911. She then asked what had happened, and the defendant replied that she had set Brewer's clothes on fire. Meanwhile, one of the men, believing that Brewer had said there were children inside, attempted to enter the building. He broke down the locked exterior door, only to find that the fire had already become so intense that it was not safe to go inside.
While this was occurring, a man and a woman who occupied the unit directly above that of the defendant attempted to leave the building using the interior staircase, but the fire had already rendered it impassable. Trapped on the landing at the top of the stairs, they began shouting for help and taking turns trying to breathe through a small window. The man, his upper body already covered in burns, squeezed through the window and jumped to the street below, suffering a broken ankle and spinal fracture
in the process. The woman, meanwhile, remained trapped on the second floor until firefighters located her, unconscious; she died of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries. Two firefighters also were injured.
The woman who had called 911 confronted the defendant. The defendant again stated that she had set Brewer's clothes on fire, and added that she was angry that he had left without her to purchase drugs.3 She also stated that it was not the first time she had done something like this. She destroyed personal items belonging to Brewer on several prior occasions after the two had argued. She had even set a bag of his clothes on fire once before, but Brewer quickly managed to extinguish the fire.
Through the cross-examination of witnesses at trial, the defendant challenged whether the Commonwealth could prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that she set the fire or, if she did, that she did so with the specific intent to burn the dwelling. She also called one witness, a forensic psychologist, who opined that the defendant suffered from low cognitive functioning and posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD)4 that "quite likely" impaired her ability to fully appreciate and understand the consequences of her acts as compared to the average person. He further opined, however, that she had the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law at the time she set the fire (i.e., she was, in his opinion, criminally responsible for her conduct).5
At the close of evidence, the jury considered charges of arson of a dwelling house; felony-murder in the second degree; murder in the second degree based on malice; involuntary manslaughter; and two counts of injuring a firefighter.6 As to all charges, the jury were instructed on the options of finding the defendant not guilty or not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility. The jury found the defendant guilty of arson, felony-murder in the second degree, and injuring the two firefighters.7
Discussion. 1. Intent necessary to prove arson. "Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). As the present case makes clear, this is true for the crime of arson of a dwelling house under G. L. c. 266, § 1, concerning at least whether a conviction requires proof of specific or general intent and whether a conviction can be secured against someone who accidentally or negligently sets a fire and then wilfully and maliciously fails to extinguish or report it. We use this opportunity to clarify those issues.
The "venerable distinction at common law between general and specific intent has been the source of a good deal of confusion" (citations and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 268, 692 N.E.2d 515 (1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017, 924 N.E.2d 687 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480, 945 N.E.2d 386, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868, 132 S.Ct. 218, 181 L.Ed.2d 119 (2011). As noted, the parties here have treated arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1, as a specific intent crime, requiring proof that the defendant not only "consciously intended to take certain actions, but that [s]he also consciously intended certain consequences." Id. at 268, 692 N.E.2d 515. See id. at 268-269 & n.12, 692 N.E.2d 515 (). To date, we have not had occasion to address squarely whether G. L. c. 266, § 1, requires proof of specific intent.
(citations and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633, 1...
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