Commonwealth v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 05 January 1953
• Citation: 372 Pa. 223,93 A.2d 455
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. PHILLIPS.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

93 A.2d 455

372 Pa. 223

COMMONWEALTH v. PHILLIPS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 5, 1953

Defendant was convicted in the Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery of Westmoreland County, at No. 1 August Term, 1952, Richard D. Laird, P. J., and Edward O. Bauer, and John M. O'Connell, JJ., of first degree murder, and the death penalty was imposed, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, at No. 20 March Term, 1953, Bell, J., held that Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery did not abuse its discretion in imposing the death penalty.

Judgment and sentence affirmed.

John W. Pollins, Avra N. Pershing, Jr., Greensburg for appellant.

L. Alexander Sculco, Dist. Atty., Joseph M. Loughran, Asst. Dist. Atty., Greensburg, for appellee.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

BELL Justice.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of murder and the trial court, consisting of three Judges, unanimously found him guilty of murder in the first degree and fixed death as the penalty. The only question involved in this appeal is whether the lower court abused its discretion by imposing the death penalty instead of life imprisonment.

These are the facts. At about 1:40 P.M. on April 4, 1952, the defendant, Phillips, and two accomplices were lying in wait for the purpose of robbing a man named Crain who was carrying the payroll money of the McFeeley Brick Company. The plans for this robbery were carefully made several months prior to the attempted robbery. The night before the robbery defendant and his accomplices ‘ stole a car to pull a holdup’ . Defendant was to be the holdup man; Geter was the look-out man and driver of the stolen ‘ get-away’ car; Maloy was the driver of the ‘ pick-up’ car which was to pick up the robbers after the stolen car had been abandoned. According to the plan defendant and Geter were to precede Crain to the brick company's office and park their automobile next to the space where Crain's automobile would be parked. Defendant and Geter did not see Crain in time to carry out their preconceived plan. When defendant saw Crain turning his automobile into the driveway of the brick company, defendant decided to follow and rob him. Crain stopped his car in front of the office and got out with the box containing the payroll. Just at this moment defendant and Geter drove up in their stolen car and stopped twenty feet behind Crain's car. Defendant, wearing a burlap hood, fully armed with gun to kill and pepper to throw into an officer's fact to aid (if necessary) his escape, got out and ran toward the porch of the office calling to Crain to stop. When Crain did not stop defendant fired one shot which hit just to the right of the office door. Crain ran into the office carrying the payroll with him, and slammed the door behind him. Defendant when only a few inches from the glass (part of the) door and only 3 to 5 feet away from Crain fired a second shot through the glass door hitting Crain in the back. Crain died 45 minutes later as a result of hemorrhage and shock caused by this gunshot wound.

Defendant testified that he fired the first shot while Crain was outside the office building in order to frighten him and compel him to stop and surrender the payroll money; when Crain did not stop but turned left into a corridor inside the building, defendant fired the second shot through the glass so that he could safely escape.

He then ran back to Geter's automobile and drove to a point about three miles from the scene of the crime where he and Geter met Maloy who was waiting for them by prearrangement. The stolen car was abandoned; the defendant and his accomplices, Geter and Maloy, drove back to the brick company, according to previous plans, in order to establish an alibi. Shortly thereafter defendant was driven to his home where again according to prearranged plans, he was to be seen in order to further support an alibi. Shortly thereafter defendant learned from a news broadcast that Crain had been killed.

Defendant and his accomplices were apprehended by the police on April 11. After being arrested defendant signed a written confession admitting his part in the attempted robbery and the shooting of Crain and thereafter defendant cooperated with the authorities in the solution of the crime and the conviction of his accomplices.

Defendant was a man of unusual intelligence; the robbery was long and very carefully planned; the killing was not the result of a sudden impulse but, it is apparent from the facts, a wilful, deliberate, premeditated and cold-blooded murder. Defendant contends that the mitigating circumstances impelled the imposition of a penalty no higher than life imprisonment.

Defendant gives his version of the killing in a light most favorable to him and then the mitigating circumstances. Defendant first contends that the killing was unintentional and that he shot first to scare the decedent and the second time merely to discourage pursuit. The facts themselves clearly show how implausible this part of his testimony is. There is no requirement that either the jury or a Court must believe the accused. The sole requirement is that there be sufficient evidence to justify the jury's verdict. Commonwealth v. Logan, 361 Pa. 186, 191, 63 A.2d 28.It has become customary for a defendant in...