Commonwealth v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 16 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1274-14-3 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. JAMES GERARD PHILLIPS, JR. |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Huff, Chafin and Decker
Argued by teleconference
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
Elizabeth C. Kiernan, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.
George P. Hunt, III (Davis, Davis, Davis, & Davis, on brief), for appellee.
James Gerard Phillips, Jr. (the defendant), stands indicted for possession of methamphetamine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-398 and -400, the Commonwealth appeals a pretrial ruling granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered as a result of a search of a container seized from his automobile during a routine traffic stop. The Commonwealth contends that probable cause supported the search of the container and, thus, that the trial court erred in suppressing the container's contents. Because the facts found by the trial court, viewed objectively, provided probable cause for the search, we reverse the order suppressing the evidence and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1
Shortly after 10:00 p.m. on December 13, 2013, Sergeant K.B. Pruett of the Franklin County Sheriff's Office stopped a vehicle for failing to display a front license plate. The defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant. As Pruett spoke with the defendant, he noticed that the defendant was "very fidgety." Initially, the defendant was sitting upright and produced his driver's license at Pruett's request. However, when Pruett asked if "anything illegal" was in the vehicle, the defendant "started to be evasive," turning his back toward Pruett and placing his hands out of Pruett's view.
Investigator Nick Shockley responded as backup within five seconds of the stop. Shockley approached the vehicle on the passenger's side. He was traveling that night with Sergeant David Lyle, who was the Narcotics Supervisor for the Sheriff's Office. Prior to Shockley's participation in the traffic stop, Lyle told Shockley that he had received information that night about the defendant from an informant. Lyle also told Shockley that the informant had related that the defendant "was heading to a residence in Truvine to cook methamphetamine." Shockley had "been in [the defendant's] presence before."
While Shockley stood on the passenger's side of the vehicle and shone his flashlight through the window, he saw that the defendant had "his right hand closed and . . . stuffed . . . under his leg, . . . between his knee and his hip as though he was almost sitting on his hand." Shockley called Pruett's attention to the defendant's actions because he thought the defendant had something in his hand and "felt it was an officer safety issue." Pruett testified that the defendant's "disappearing"hands also made him "uncomfortable" and "concerned" for his safety. In response, Pruett opened the vehicle door and tried to grab the defendant's hands "[s]o he couldn't reach back," but Pruett succeeded in "get[ting] . . . [only] his left hand." Pruett then asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle.
As the defendant got out, Shockley saw him throw an object onto the seat. At Shockley's request, Pruett retrieved the object and gave it to him. Shockley described the object as an opaque white plastic container with a lid. The court examined the item and found that it was one-and-one-half to two inches in diameter and about one inch deep.
Shockley testified that he had training and experience concerning the detection and storage of methamphetamine, cocaine, and other controlled substances. He said that he had not seen a container of that particular type before but that it was "not uncommon to have containers like this that are used to carry [drugs]." He added that in "a lot of cases" he had found drugs "in containers very similar to [the one seized]." Shockley acknowledged that such a container could also hold entirely "innocent things," but he explained that he "had really strong information" indicating that the container at issue held drugs. Shockley noted the defendant's "obvious effort to hide [the container] from Sergeant Pruett's view," which involved "stuffing it under his leg . . . [with] a closed fist." He further pointed to the fact that when the defendant got out of the vehicle, "he threw [the container] in the seat." Shockley considered these facts in combination with "all the information that [the officers] received that night . . . about the defendant."
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial judge noted that Pruett and Shockley "really [did not] testify the same way," but he also observed that "there is nothing unusual about" the variance in the testimony. He concluded, "I don't think either one of them is lying."3 The judgeruled that the traffic stop was legal based on the absence of a front license plate on the defendant's vehicle. Additionally, he concluded that Sergeant Pruett was justified in removing the defendant from the vehicle for safety reasons based on furtive movements including the hiding of his hand. The judge also found that Investigator Shockley saw the defendant conceal something in his fist beneath his leg and that Shockley "did have information that . . . an informant had told [Sergeant] Lyle that the defendant may be headed to . . . a location where they were manufacturing methamphetamine." The judge further reasoned, however, that the container Shockley saw in the defendant's hand could have concealed something other than drugs. The court concluded that Shockley's action of opening the container was a search and that although he "probably [had] a reasonable suspicion based on what [Sergeant] Lyle said, . . . [t]here [was] no reason why . . . the officers couldn't have gotten a search warrant at that point if they thought there was enough evidence." The court ruled that the question "should have been presented to the magistrate and a search warrant obtained." On that basis, the court held that the search was illegal and granted the defendant's motion to suppress.
On appeal of a ruling granting a defendant's motion to suppress, the Commonwealth has the burden to show that the trial court's ruling constituted reversible error. See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002). "'Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search' involve questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)). However, this Court is "bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them[,] and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261.To the extent that the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we view the evidence and the inferences deducible from it in the light most favorable to the defendant, who prevailed below. See Satchell v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 641, 648, 460 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1995) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Ramey, 19 Va. App. 300, 301, 450 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1994).
The trial court concluded, and the defendant concedes, that the stop of his vehicle and the accompanying brief detention were lawful because no front license plate was displayed. See, e.g., McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 550, 553, 659 S.E.2d 512, 514, 516 (2008). It is also undisputed that an officer may lawfully require the driver and any passengers to exit the vehicle for the duration of the stop. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 281 Va. 582, 590, 709 S.E.2d 139, 142 (2011). The question before the Court in this appeal is whether the evidence supports the trial court's ruling that during the course of the lawful traffic stop, Investigator Shockley violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by searching the container that he first secreted beneath his leg and then threw behind him onto his seat when asked to get out of the vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008). Whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is a question to be determined from all the circumstances and is viewed under an objective rather than subjective standard. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 267, 273-74, 701 S.E.2d 87, 90-91 (2010). "A search is considered reasonable when it is either supported by a warrant, or when an exception to the warrant requirement has been met." Buhrman, 275 Va. at 505, 659 S.E.2d at 327.
A warrantless search is generally constitutional when supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Royal v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 360, 365, 558 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2002). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that exigent circumstances arepresumed when an operational automobile is involved. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (per curiam); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam); see Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179, 684 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2009). As long as probable cause exists to search the automobile, no additional exigency need be proved. Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67. Therefore, "if an officer stops a vehicle and has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, then a warrantless search of that vehicle is permissible under the automobile exception." Duncan, 55 Va. App. at 179, 684 S.E.2d at 840.
This authority to search a vehicle upon a showing of probable cause, without a warrant or exigent circumstances, also...
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