Commonwealth v. Phinney

Citation448 Mass. 621,863 N.E.2d 496
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Roland Douglas PHINNEY, Jr.
Decision Date28 March 2007
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

David R. Yannetti, Boston, for the defendant.

David W. Cunis, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & CORDY, JJ.

IRELAND, J.

In Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 843 N.E.2d 1024 (2006), we affirmed an order of a judge in the Superior Court granting the defendant's postrescript motion for a new trial in this capital case. We noted in the opinion, id. at 168 n. 17, 843 N.E.2d 1024, that while the appeal was pending, the defendant had filed a motion for appellate attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 30(c)(9), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). We deferred acting on the motion at that time, so as to give both sides the opportunity to submit additional material on the matter of fees and costs. Id. The matter is now ripe for decision.1

1. Rule 30(c)(9) was inserted into to the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1995. 420 Mass. 1502 (1995). It was one of several changes made simultaneously to the rules in response to this court's decision in Latimore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 805, 633 N.E.2d 396 (1994), and the decision of a single justice of this court at an earlier stage of that case. Following those decisions, and at the court's request, our standing advisory committee on the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure reconsidered the various rules governing the payment of reasonable attorney's fees to defendants, to ensure that they were consistent. See Reporters' Notes to Mass. R.Crim. P. 30, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure at 1600, 1606-1607 (LexisNexis 2006). Specifically, at the same time rule 30(c)(9) was added, changes were also made to Mass. R.Crim. P. 15(d), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996); Mass. R.Crim. P. 25(c)(2), as appearing in 420 Mass. 1502 (1995); and Mass. R.Crim. P. 30(c)(8), as appearing in 420 Mass. 1502 (1995). These rules authorize awards of appellate fees and costs to defendants in those situations where the Commonwealth is entitled to appeal, or seek leave to appeal, from trial court rulings in a defendant's favor. Rule 15(d) applies in the context of interlocutory appeals by the Commonwealth from suppression rulings; rule 25(c)(2) applies where the Commonwealth appeals from a required finding of not guilty or a reduction of a verdict; rule 30(c)(8) applies generally where the Commonwealth appeals from an order granting a new trial; and rule 30(c)(9) applies specifically where the Commonwealth appeals from an order granting a new trial in a capital case.2

Rule 30 (c)(9) expressly governs the defendant's motion for appellate fees and costs in this case. It provides:

"(9) Appeal under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. If an appeal or application for leave to appeal is taken by the Commonwealth under the provisions of Chapter 278, Section 33E, upon written notice supported by affidavit, the Supreme Judicial Court may determine and approve payment to the defendant of the costs of appeal together with reasonable attorney's fees to be paid on order of the trial court after entry of the rescript or denial of the application."

This rule plainly authorizes an award of appellate fees and costs in the situation before us. Here, after the defendant prevailed in the trial court on his motion for a new trial, the Commonwealth both applied to a single justice for leave to appeal, see G.L. c. 278, § 33E (last sentence), and, once its application was granted, then prosecuted its appeal before the full court. Having prevailed on his new trial motion, the defendant — who was not entitled as of right to court-appointed counsel at that stage, see Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261, 446 N.E.2d 383 (1983) — was put in the position of having to expend private funds, which he may not have had, to defend the judge's ruling in his favor, and his counsel was facing a potentially "untenable position of either volunteering his services on the appeal or abandoning the defendant." Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 613, 617, 739 N.E.2d 1100 (2000), S.C., 437 Mass. 1020, 771 N.E.2d 790 (2002), and 441 Mass. 1007, 804 N.E.2d 910 (2004). We are satisfied that the letter and spirit of rule 30(c)(9) warrant an award to the defendant of his reasonable appellate fees and costs in these circumstances, and the Commonwealth does not claim otherwise.3

2. The Commonwealth raises two points in response to the defendant's request for fees and costs. First, it claims that we should not make any award because the defendant failed to serve his motion on a necessary party, the Administrative Office of the Trial Court (AOTC).

We have noted, as to fee awards made pursuant to rule 15(d), that the AOTC has sometimes paid these awards in the past, and "[t]o the extent that AOTC has appropriated funds to pay these bills, it should continue to pay these claims. If AOTC funds are exhausted or if the Legislature has not appropriated funds to AOTC for this purpose, then prosecutors must bear these costs." Commonwealth v. Murphy, 423 Mass. 1010, 1011, 668 N.E.2d 349 (1996). See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 441 Mass. 1007, 1007-1008, 804 N.E.2d 910 (2004); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 613, 617-618 & n. 5, 739 N.E.2d 1100 (2000). Thus there is an historical basis for the AOTC being mentioned in fee awards under rule 15(d). It does not necessarily follow, however, that the AOTC had to be made a party to the requests for fees and costs pursuant to rule 15(d)—indeed, historically it was not—let alone a request for fees and costs pursuant to rule 30(c)(9).4

The Commonwealth points out that in the State budgets for fiscal year 2006 (during which the gatekeeper proceeding and appeal before the full court occurred) and fiscal year 2007, the Legislature has specified, in the general line item appropriations for the AOTC, that the AOTC will be required to pay from its appropriations "50 per cent of all fees payable pursuant to Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 15(d) and 30(c)(8)." St.2005, c. 45, § 2, line item 0330-0300. See St.2006, c. 139, § 2, line item 0330-0300. The Legislature made no reference in the line item to rule 30(c)(9), and we cannot conclude that the Legislature nevertheless intended the budget for the AOTC to cover the situation here. The Commonwealth does not address the point but simply cites the budgetary language for the proposition that "the AOTC has been legislatively directed to pay half the costs of appeals under Rules 15(d) and 30(c)(8)." As we read that language, the Legislature did not intend the AOTC to pay one-half of the fee awards in capital cases. If that is what was intended, we would expect to find a reference in the budgetary language to rule 30(c)(9), as rule 30(c)(9) is the one and only rule that particularly and expressly applies to capital cases. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended fee awards in capital cases to be covered, where it cited a rule of general application, rule 30(c)(8)(B), but did not cite the only rule that is expressly on point, rule 30(c)(9). We are not persuaded, therefore, by the Commonwealth's suggestion that these budget provisions apply here. We therefore reject the Commonwealth's argument that the AOTC had to have been served with the fee request and given an opportunity to be heard in these circumstances.5

3. The Commonwealth's second argument in response to the defendant's request is that any award of appellate fees should be calculated at the hourly rate paid to court-appointed counsel. We disagree.6

The defendant's attorney was not court appointed; he was privately retained. The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee in this case must therefore be measured according to what would be reasonable for private counsel to charge in the circumstances. The Commonwealth's claim that the statutory rates for court-appointed counsel "reflect[ ] the community's view of a reasonable fee," misses the mark. It is widely recognized and accepted that the rates set by the Legislature for the representation of indigent defendants do not equal the rates that privately retained counsel can and do reasonably charge for their representation. The Legislature's setting of rates for court-appointed counsel takes into account societal, economic, and political considerations that are not necessarily applicable when determining the reasonableness of rates under a market-based approach. While the Legislature must set rates that are sufficient to ensure a constitutional system for the representation of indigent defendants, its rates need not, and do not, mirror private market-based rates. Cf. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 239, 812 N.E.2d 895 (2004) (stating proposition, rooted in earlier cases, that attorneys ordered to represent indigents "are entitled to compensation at a rate more modest than can be expected in the marketplace").

The language of the rule and the policy behind it would be frustrated if a defendant represented by private counsel were limited to an award of fees at the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel. To fulfil the meaning and purpose of the rule, the award of "reasonable attorney's fees" must be determined according to what is reasonable in the circumstances of each case. Here that means awarding fees that are reasonable for privately retained counsel.

4. The defendant's counsel filed a motion requesting an award of appellate fees in the amount of $24,325 and costs in the amount of $766.62. The Commonwealth does not challenge these amounts, except as above.

To support his motion, counsel filed a detailed affidavit setting forth an hourly rate of $250, which he represented to be his usual billing rate for all criminal and civil matters. He described his credentials and experience, which include...

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