Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company

• Decision Date: 23 May 1911
• Docket Number: 222
• Citation: 81 A. 148,232 Pa. 141
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

81 A. 148

232 Pa. 141

Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company, Appellant

No. 222

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 23, 1911

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Argued April 10, 1911

Appeal, No. 222, Jan. T., 1911, by defendant, from decree of C.P. Luzerne Co., Oct. T., 1909, No. 16, on bill in equity in case of Commonwealth upon the application of David T. Davis, Inspector of Mines of the Ninth District of the First Anthracite Coal Inspection District of Pennsylvania, acting in behalf of the Commonwealth, v. Plymouth Coal Company. Affirmed.

Bill in equity for an injunction.

FERRIS, J., filed the following opinion:

The Anthracite Mining Act of June 2, 1891, P.L. 176, is entitled, "An act to provide for the health and safety of persons employed in and about the anthracite coal mines of Pennsylvania and for the protection and preservation of property connected therewith."

Section 10 of art. III of this act reads as follows:

"It shall be obligatory on the owners of adjoining coal properties to leave, or cause to be left, a pillar of coal in each seam or vein of coal worked by them, along the line of adjoining property, of such width, that taken in connection with the pillar to be left by the adjoining property owner, will be a sufficient barrier for the safety of the employees of either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water; such width of pillar to be determined by the engineers of the adjoining property owners, together with the inspector of the district in which the mine is situated, and the surveys of the face of the workings along such pillar shall be made in duplicate and must practically agree. A copy of such duplicate surveys, certified to, must be filed with the owners of the adjoining properties, and with the inspector of the district in which the mine or property is situated."

The bill avers that the plaintiff, being the mine inspector for the proper district, gave notice to the defendant company of a meeting to be held, at which the said company was notified to instruct its engineer to be present and meet the engineer of the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company, the owner of an adjoining mine, for the purpose of determining the width of a barrier pillar to be left by the said two coal companies between their properties as required by the mining act, but that the defendant company refused to permit its engineer to attend such meeting, and, generally, refused to leave any barrier pillar between its workings and those of the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company.

The prayers are (1) for an injunction enjoining the defendant from working its mines or coal property adjoining the mines or coal property of the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company without leaving a barrier pillar of coal of the thickness or width of at least seventy feet in each vein; (2) requiring the defendant to file with the mine inspector a certified copy of a survey as required by law, and (3) for general relief.

To this bill the defendant has filed an answer admitting the plaintiff's averments of fact to be true, but (1) denying the necessity for such a barrier pillar, and (2) averring that sec. 10 of art. III of the mining act is unconstitutional.

If the constitutionality of this provision be conceded for the purpose of discussion, and if the question of the necessity for any barrier pillar at all between these properties may be regarded as an open one, the decision of that question would seem to be committed by the statute to the tribunal of experts thereby constituted, viz., the mine inspector and the engineers of the owners of the adjoining coal properties. The purpose of the enactment is to secure the safety of the workmen in the mines. The law declares that "it shall be obligatory" on the mine owners to leave such a barrier pillar as the tribunal of mine experts referred to shall determine to be sufficient for that purpose. It is for them to fix its width. Until they say that none at all is needed for the safety of the men, the obligation imposed by the statute remains.

It might, perhaps, be well argued that the legislature did not intend to impose upon the owners the burden of leaving a boundary pillar of unmined coal where it clearly appears to be unnecessary for the safety of the employees. If none at all were needed it would seem idle for the inspector and engineers to fix a width of, say, one foot, for the sake, merely, of literal compliance with the statutory obligation of leaving a pillar of some width. If, therefore, we may apply the maxim that the law does not require a vain thing, there is room for the construction that, in vesting in the inspector and engineers the power to determine how wide the barrier pillar should be to secure safety, the intent of the lawmaking power was to also empower them to say, if such be the fact, that the safety of the men does not require a barrier pillar of any width at all. But, be that as it may, it is evident that the act does not warrant a mine owner in refusing to permit his engineer to participate in determining the question of the width of, or the need for, a barrier pillar simply because he, the mine owner, does not consider one necessary. In our opinion, the law requires such a pillar to be left, unless the inspector and engineers, after due examination of the premises and consideration of the subject, determine that none is needed to secure the safety of the men employed in either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water.

The constitutionality of the boundary pillar provision of the act is attacked upon two grounds, (1) because it is said to violate sec. 10 of art. I of the Pennsylvania constitution, which provides that private property shall not be taken or applied to public use without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured; and (2) because it is claimed to be in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, which provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The defendant contends that, by requiring adjoining mine owners to leave a barrier pillar of coal between their workings, the act deprives them of a property right (viz., the right to mine such coal) without compensation therefor and without due process of law.

Both the right of eminent domain and the police power of the state are attributes of sovereignty. They are inherent rights of the supreme power, founded upon the social compact and essential to any form of government.

In our jurisprudence the right of eminent domain is defined to be "the power of the state to apply private property to public purposes on payment of just compensation to the owner:" 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 1047. The provision for payment of compensation, however, is no part of the power itself but a limitation upon its use imposed by the constitution: United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (3 S.Ct. Repr. 346).

"The police power of the state," says Judge ORLADY in Com. v. Beatty, 15 Pa.Super. 5, 15, "is difficult of definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which does not encroach on a like power vested in congress or state legislatures by the federal constitution, or does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it has been expressly held that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power by the state (citing Powell v. Penna., 127 U.S. 678 (8 S.Ct. Repr. 992, 1257); Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265). Its essential quality as a governmental agency is that it imposes upon persons and property burdens designed to promote the safety and welfare of the public at large. The principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, was embodied, in substance, in the constitutions of nearly all, if not all, of the states at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and it has never been regarded as incompatible with the principle, equally vital, because equally essential to the peace and safety of society, that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owners' use of it shall not be injurious to the community (citing Boston Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U.S. 25) . . . (at page 17) 'The State still retains an interest in his (the wage earner's) welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all its parts, and when the individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed, the State must suffer.' This declaration was adopted by the United States supreme court in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (18 S.Ct. Repr. 383), invalidating a state statute which limited the employment of men in underground mines, smelting works, etc., to eight hours a day."

By the decision from which we have just quoted, it was held that the Act of April 29, 1897, P.L. 30, forbidding the employment of adult women for more than twelve hours a day, etc., was not in conflict with the constitution of Pennsylvania nor with the federal constitution, but was a valid exercise of the police power in the interest of the public health, even though it referred to a particular class of the public, viz., adult women engaged in the kind of employment mentioned in the act, and even though it did indirectly restrain the employee's freedom of contract.

So also, in Com. v. Brown, 8 Pa. Superior Ct. 339, it was said by Judge RICE (pp. 351, 352) that "in the exercise of the police power of the state, it (the legislature) may enact laws in the interest of public morals,...