Commonwealth v. Quinn

Decision Date18 April 1941
Docket Number314-1940,313-1940
Citation19 A.2d 526,144 Pa.Super. 400
PartiesCommonwealth v. Quinn, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Argued March 10, 1941.

Appeals from judgments of Q. S. Delaware Co., Sept. Sessions 1940, Nos. 446 and 474, in case of Commonwealth v. Patrick J Quinn.

Indictments charging defendant and others with larceny, fraudulent conversion, blackmail, extortion and conspiracy. Before Crichton, P. J., specially presiding.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Verdict of guilty of larceny on a number of indictments, and judgments and sentences on two of the indictments. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned, among others, were various rulings on evidence.

Judgments affirmed.

Thomas D. McBride, with him Mervyn R. Turk, for appellant.

Guy G. deFuria, Assistant District Attorney, with him Wm. B. McClenachan, Jr., District Attorney, for appellee.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Stadtfeld, Rhodes and Hirt, JJ.

OPINION

Stadtfeld, J.

Patrick J. Quinn, appellant, was tried, together with one Dominick Litz and one Peter S. Kochan, on some fifty bills of indictment consolidated for trial charging larceny, fraudulent conversion, blackmail, extortion and conspiracy, and in the case of Kochan, who was a justice of the peace, failure to keep a docket. Not all of these three men were defendants in each indictment, although Quinn and Litz were defendants jointly in most of the indictments charging larceny, fraudulent conversion, blackmail, extortion and conspiracy. At the trial, twenty-one of the indictments were submitted by the trial judge to the jury. Quinn and Litz were found guilty of larceny on a number of these indictments, and Kochan, was found guilty of failure to keep a docket. Kochan was immediately sentenced. Quinn and Litz filed motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, which motions were denied by the court in banc, Broomall and Crichton, JJ., sitting. Sentences were thereupon imposed upon both Quinn and Litz on the indictments at Nos. 446 and 474. These were convictions for larceny. On the other indictments, sentence was suspended. From these sentences, appeals were taken by Quinn but not by Litz. Kochan was a justice of the peace in the Borough of Eddystone, and Quinn and Litz were private detectives, one licensed in Monroe County and one in Philadelphia, but both operating in Delaware County.

In all of the indictments, appellant Quinn was involved, and in most of them Kochan and Litz also were involved.

In the so-called "Sheeley" case (No. 446), Quinn and Litz went into a diner in East Lansdowne and seized several pinball and other machines. They had a "John Doe" warrant issued by Magistrate Kochan. Quinn took the machines away in his automobile. No hearing was ever held in this case. The indictments submitted to the jury in this case charged Quinn and Litz with the larceny of the machines, as well as fraudulent conversion. Verdicts of guilty on the charge of larceny were returned by the jury on this indictment.

In the so-called "Kurtzman" part of the case (No. 474), Quinn and Litz went to a drugstore in Upper Darby with a warrant issued by Kochan. They had a warrant charging "John Doe" with violation of the gambling laws. They took from Kurtzman, a pinball machine, eight boxes of candy and a radio. Kurtzman was notified to appear before Magistrate Kochan, but no hearing was ever held. The pinball machine was found by its owner in another drugstore a few days later. Here, likewise, Quinn and Litz were charged with larceny. The only indictments submitted to the jury in this part of the case charged Quinn and Litz with larceny of the pinball machine, candy and merchandise. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on this indictment. The lower court sentenced Quinn on indictment No. 474, charging larceny of a pinball machine, candy and merchandise from Kurtzman. Quinn has also appealed from this sentence.

In the opinion of the trial judge, the testimony in the several cases is correctly epitomized as follows: "Their method was to select some business place in which punch boards or other paraphernalia intended or possibly used for gambling purposes had been installed, obtain warrant or a search warrant from Kochan, raid the place, and take and keep the boards and machines. In at least one case they acted without a warrant. No hearings or other proceedings were held, Kochan made no entries on his docket, and the parties raided in most cases never recovered their property . . . . The theory of the Commonwealth was that the raids were made for the purpose of extortion, or to make profit from the property seized, or to prevent the operation of certain machines and implements in favor of those owned by others. Evidence of these transactions was introduced, involving eight business places. In two of these instances, Quinn acted alone. In the others he and Litz acted together. In one instance they obtained a warrant from a magistrate other than Kochan, but when they failed to appear against the defendant this magistrate dismissed the case. The goods seized, however, were not returned."

Quinn's car was invariably used to carry away the stuff seized by Quinn and Litz. Quinn had the "John Doe" warrants and appears to have been the leader in practically all the cases.

On each of the two indictments referred to the sentence of the court was the same, but the imprisonment was made consecutive and not concurrent.

The first two assignments of error in both of these appeals urge that the learned trial judge erred in refusing to grant the motion of the appellant for a severance. This motion is rather ambiguous. In form, it is a motion for a severance, but the grounds stated are: "These are different and separate offenses, the same parties are not involved in all of them."

The opinion of the lower court points out that there is a considerable difference between a motion for a severance which seeks separate trials for defendants jointly indicted, and an objection to the consolidation for trial of separate indictments.

The Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, sec. 40, (19 PS § 785), provides that in all cases in which two or more persons are jointly indicted for any offense other than felonious homicide, it shall be in the discretion of the court to try them jointly or severally. As has already been pointed out, Quinn was indicted in each of the eight separate parts of this case. In two of these parts, he was the sole defendant, and in the remaining six, he was jointly indicted with the defendant Litz. Also, Quinn, together with Litz and Kochan, were jointly indicted for conspiracy, except in the two cases where Quinn acted alone, and except for the one case where the warrant was obtained from justice of the peace Dupille instead of justice of the peace Kochan. Considering the motion as one requesting a separate trial for Quinn, the trial judge was clearly within his right in refusing to grant a severance. As found by the court below, the testimony showed a general course of conduct pursued by Quinn in conjunction with Litz, and all tending to the same general end. No matters were presented to the jury in which the appellant Quinn was not directly charged and he scarcely could have been harmed by the refusal of the lower court to grant his motion. To have granted his motion would have necessitated two very lengthy trials in which the same evidence would have been presented.

Treating the motion as one objecting to the consolidation of the indictments for the purpose of a single trial, this was entirely a matter in the discretion of the trial judge. In the consolidated cases of Commonwealth v. McCord and Commonwealth v. Waggy, 116 Pa.Super. 480, 176 A. 834, the learned opinion by Parker, J., stated, at p. 486; "The true rule would now appear to be that just as in cases where a defendant is charged in one indictment by separate counts with different offenses, or where one defendant is charged in separate indictments with different offenses, so likewise where two defendants are indicted for the same misdemeanor growing out of the same matters and circumstances so related that the proofs received in one would be competent in the other, even though the defendants demand separate trials, whether either will be prejudiced by a joint trial and they are therefore entitled to a severance is a matter for the trial court to determine in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the appellate courts will not reverse except for a clear abuse of such discretion." See also, Com. v. Danaleczk et al., 85 Pa.Super. 253; Com. v. Reilly, 125 Pa.Super. 340, 189 A. 768; Com. v. Valotta, 279 Pa. 84, 123 A. 681. In the instant case, Quinn was directly charged and involved in each of the transactions which were submitted to the jury. These assignments of error are overruled.

Under the 4th, 11th, 12th and 13th assignments of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of larceny.

Larceny has been defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Thomas v. Kessler et al., 334 Pa. 7, 5 A.2d 187, as "the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another", and as "the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right, with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent."

In both the cases from which appellant appeals, he admittedly took and carried away the goods of another and converted them to his own use. One of the pinball machines which he took from one drugstore, turned up in another drugstore, but with the cash box empty. A thorough search for the other machines failed to locate them. What his intent was in taking the machines was a question of fact for the jury. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Evans
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 10 Agosto 1959
    ...A.2d 811; Com. v. Novak, 1949, 165 Pa.Super. 576, 69 A.2d 186; Com. v. McCord, 1935, 116 Pa.Super. 480, 176 A. 834; Com. v. Quinn, 1941, 144 Pa.Super. 400, 19 A.2d 526. The proof the false pretense case would not support the allegations set forth in the other two indictments. As a result, m......
  • Com. v. Evans
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 10 Agosto 1959
    ...instances to support also the conspiracy indictment. See Com. v. Dixon, supra, 179 Pa.Super. 1, 5, 115 A.2d 811; Com. v. Quinn, 144 Pa.Super. 400, 404, 405, 19 A.2d 526. But the novel question raised here by Torrance is whether the converse is true, that is, whether the evidence admissible ......
  • Commonwealth v. Kloiber
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 1954
    ...applicable to both defendants. Com. v. Mulroy, 154 Pa.Super. 410, 36 A.2d 337; Com. v. Valotta, 279 Pa. 84, 123 A. 681; Com. v. Quinn, 144 Pa.Super. 400, 405, 19 A.2d 526. There was no manifest abuse of discretion prejudicial error in trying these two defendants together on all of the afore......
  • Commonwealth v. O'Neil
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 20 Enero 2015
    ...inflammatory evidence of Gosnell's murder and abortion crimes was not related to the charges against Appellant.In Commonwealth v. Quinn, 144 Pa.Super. 400, 19 A.2d 526 (1941), denial of severance was upheld in a case involving three individuals: a magistrate, Quinn, and Dominick Litz. The c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT