Commonwealth v. Quinones

Citation95 Mass.App.Ct. 156,122 N.E.3d 543
Decision Date10 April 2019
Docket NumberNo. 17-P-1435,17-P-1435
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Eliezer QUINONES.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Andrew S. Crouch, Boston, for the defendant.

Catherine P. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Wolohojian, Hanlon, & Ditkoff, JJ.

DITKOFF, J.

The defendant, Eliezer Quinones, appeals from Juvenile Court adjudications as a youthful offender on charges of armed assault with the intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b ), and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b ). We conclude that, for Miranda purposes, a juvenile's age must be considered in determining whether the juvenile was subjected to the functional equivalent of police questioning. Concluding that the police officer's advice to the defendant would not be perceived as interrogation by a reasonable juvenile of the defendant's age in the same circumstances, we determine that the judge properly denied a portion of the defendant's motion to suppress. Further concluding that there was sufficient evidence to find that the defendant was the shooter and that he had the requisite intent to murder, we affirm the adjudications.

1. Background. On the evening of July 21, 2015, the victim was shot in the leg while walking down the driveway of his friend's house in Lynn. He did not see the shooter. A witness from the neighborhood, who watched the scene unfold from the porch of his home, "[s]aw a kid ride up on a bike, drop the bike and pull a gun out." The individual disappeared behind a building, and the witness heard gunshots. The witness was unable to see the individual's face, but he described him as average build, shirtless, and riding a small, green bicycle.

Surveillance video footage (video) from a nearby convenience store revealed an individual whom the jury could have identified as the defendant riding his bicycle past the convenience store. That individual, wearing a black shirt, gray shorts, white socks, and black shoes, rode out of the video frame. Less than two minutes later, an individual wearing the same shoes, socks, and shorts emerged biking in the opposite direction. He appeared to have a black shirt tied around his head, covering his face. He rode his bicycle across the street, in the direction of the driveway where the victim was shot. At the base of the driveway, the individual dropped his bicycle on the ground and briefly disappeared out of the video frame. Seconds later, the individual reappeared and ran away, but returned again to retrieve the bicycle.

After promptly arriving at the scene of the shooting, several police officers began searching the surrounding area. On Chase Street, the officers found the defendant, who was sixteen years old at the time, and another male inside a vehicle with the rear window "fogged up." The defendant was lying down "in the backseat of the car, kind of crunched down." He was wearing gray shorts underneath blue jeans, a black shirt, and black shoes. A bicycle was on the ground near the vehicle.

The officers asked the defendant and the other male what they were doing and where the owner of the vehicle was, and they stated that they knew the owner but that he was not there. After an officer confirmed with the owner of the vehicle that the defendant and the other male were not authorized to be in it, police arrested both of them and brought them to the Lynn police station for booking. The defendant was neither questioned further nor read his Miranda rights.

After spending over one hour at the police station in booking, the defendant was transported to an alternative lockup in Lowell. Before leaving the station, the defendant asked the transporting officer why he was being locked up. The officer answered and gave the defendant advice about "the negative things that the streets bring to people." The officer advised the defendant to "clean up his act," as otherwise "he's going to wind up in serious trouble." The defendant said "something in the lines of people are going to feel sorry when he comes out, relating t[hat] he had been proving himself." The officer then advised the defendant "to just get out completely. There's nothing positive about the life path that he had chosen." The officer did not ask the defendant what he meant by his statements.

The motion judge granted the portion of the defendant's motion to suppress related to his statements made at the vehicle prior to his arrest, but the judge denied so much of the motion as sought to suppress the statements the defendant made during transport to Lowell. Although the Commonwealth conceded that the defendant was in custody at the time of the transport, the motion judge found that the defendant's statements were not made in response to interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation.

At trial, the defendant's statements made during transport were admitted in evidence. Ultimately, a jury adjudicated the defendant as a youthful offender on both indictments, and he was sentenced to two concurrent terms in State prison. This appeal followed.

2. Motion to suppress statements. a. Standard of review. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we "accept[ ] the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, give[ ] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but independently review[ ] the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Commonwealth v. Lujan, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 100, 99 N.E.3d 806 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 384, 668 N.E.2d 339 (1996). Accord Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 301, 4 N.E.3d 1236 (2014).

b. Custodial interrogation. "Statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation absent appropriate Miranda warnings ordinarily are inadmissible at trial." Martin, 467 Mass. at 308, 4 N.E.3d 1236.1 "Custodial interrogation occurs when a defendant is subject to ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent.’ " Id., quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The "functional equivalent" of express questioning means "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 738-739, 73 N.E.3d 246 (2017), quoting Innis, supra. See Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 429, 431 n.4, 708 N.E.2d 674 (1999) (officer's advice to defendant to "get the matter off his chest by making a statement" was functional equivalent of interrogation). The functional equivalence test requires "an objective assessment as to whether the police statements and conduct would be perceived as interrogation by a reasonable person in the same circumstances." Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 675-676, 991 N.E.2d 1036 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 797, 678 N.E.2d 847 (1997). The subjective intent of the officer has no impact on this analysis. See Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 799, 54 N.E.3d 495 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 220, 796 N.E.2d 1284 (2003) ("Whether an interrogation is custodial depends on the ‘objective circumstances of the interrogation, and not on the subjective views of either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned’ ").

Before applying the test, however, we examine whether to consider how the police statements would be perceived by a reasonable person in the abstract or by a reasonable juvenile of the defendant's age. In doing so, we are guided by J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a child's age must be considered as a factor in determining whether the child was in custody for Miranda purposes.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that, "even where a ‘reasonable person’ standard otherwise applies, the common law has reflected the reality that children are not adults." J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274, 131 S.Ct. 2394. Likewise, we recognize this reality in the context of interrogation. See In re S.W., 124 A.3d 89, 104 (D.C. 2015) (emphasizing role of juvenile status in custodial interrogation). "A child's age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ " J.D.B., supra at 272, 131 S.Ct. 2394, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Instead, "[i]t is a fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.’ " J.D.B., supra, quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Just as "children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave," children will likely perceive the questions, statements, or conduct of the police differently from how adults would. J.D.B., supra at 264-265, 131 S.Ct. 2394. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275, 277, 521 N.E.2d 1368 (1988) ("On the question whether the juvenile was in custody, the test is how a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would have understood his situation"). Much like applying the reasonable juvenile standard to the custody analysis, accounting for the difference between juveniles and adults in the context of interrogation does not do "any damage to the objective nature" of the analysis. J.D.B., supra at 272, 131 S.Ct. 2394. Unlike other more idiosyncratic traits, a juvenile's age yields objective information about the juvenile's susceptibility to influences that are directly related to the interrogation analysis. See id. at 275, 131 S.Ct. 2394.

We have implicitly recognized this reality before. In Commonwealth v. Clark C., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 545-546, 797 N.E.2d 5 (2003), we concluded that the officer's statement, ...

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