Commonwealth v. Randal, 2003 PA Super 465 (Pa. Super 12/1/2003), 523 WDA 2001.
| Decision Date | 01 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 523 WDA 2001.,523 WDA 2001. |
| Citation | 2003 PA Super 465 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM JESSE RANDAL, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 4, 2000 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division at No. 199908779.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed upon William Jesse Randal (Appellant) after he pled guilty to two counts of Driving Under the Influence (DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1) and (4), one count of Receiving Stolen Property (RSP), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925, and the summary offense of Windshield Obstructions and Wipers, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524. Appellant challenges the constitutionality of what is known as Act 63 of 2000 (Act 63), Ignition Interlock Devices, codified at 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7001-7003.1 For the reasons that follow, we vacate that part of Appellant's sentence requiring the installation of an approved ignition interlock system on each of his motor vehicles as a condition precedent to the restoration of his operating privileges by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Department).
¶ 2 On October 4, 2000, Appellant was sentenced on the first DUI count to serve a period of incarceration of not less than thirty days nor more than two years, less one day. No further penalty was imposed for the second DUI count. On the RSP count, Appellant was sentenced to a two-year period of probation, consecutive to the sentence on the first DUI count. For the summary offense, the court imposed a fine. Additionally, pursuant to Act 63,2 the sentencing court ordered Appellant Trial Court Order, 10/4/00.
¶ 3 On October 16, 2000, Appellant filed a Petition to Modify Sentence, alleging, inter alia, that Act 63 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. Consequently, Appellant requested that the sentencing court vacate the requirement that he use the ignition interlock system. Appellant's Petition to Modify Sentence was denied on February 12, 2001, and he filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Appellant's appeal was consolidated with two other appeals, Commonwealth v. Harris, 521 WDA 2001, and Commonwealth v. McManus, 479 WDA 2001, both of which also raised constitutional issues with regard to Act 63. Initially, a panel decision was entered affirming the judgments of sentence in the three cases. However that decision was withdrawn and on October 29, 2002, this Court granted reargument en banc.
¶ 4 Contemporaneously with our en banc review in the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was also entertaining cases that involved the constitutionality of Act 63. In Mockaitis, the Supreme Court reasoned that:
Act 63's delegation to the judiciary of the executive function necessary to effectuate issuance of an ignition interlock restricted license — i.e., ordering installation of the interlock system(s) as a condition to applying to the Department for a restricted license, verifying compliance, and apprising the Department of the court's determinations — impermissibly violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Id. at *29. The Court went on to hold that this improper delegation of executive responsibility to the judiciary was unconstitutional.
In summary, we hold that the provisions of Act 63 which delegate to the courts the executive responsibility, more properly vested in the Department of Transportation, of regulating whether and when repeat DUI offenders are entitled to conditional restoration of their operating privileges, are unconstitutional, but severable. Accordingly, those provisions are invalidated. The remaining provisions of Act 63 still authorize the Department to impose an ignition interlock restriction upon serial DUI offenders who seek restoration of their operating privileges at the expiration of the one-year mandatory suspension of their licenses, and the Commonwealth has available to it ample means of enforcing that provision.
Id. at *43. In short, the Supreme Court determined that subsections 7002(b), 7003(1), and 7003(5) of Act 63 were unconstitutional, but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving DUI offenders, who seek restoration of their driving privileges, to apply to the Department for an ignition interlock restricted license as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 7003(2).
¶ 5 Also with regard to any equal protection arguments,3 the Mockaitis court "offered no view on the merits of these claims because it is apparent that, with the constitutionally infirm provisions removed from the Act, the bases for these challenges disappear." Id. at *42. The Supreme Court recognized that these equal protection challenges could recur, but that the proper point in time to address these issues would be when a serial DUI offender would be aggrieved "by an actual determination made by the Department in enforcing the remaining provisions of the Act, [in] the administrative setting...." Id. at *43.
¶ 6 Here, in the context of allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel,4 Appellant argues that Act 63 violates the equal protection provisions, and the due process and ex post facto protections of both the federal and state constitutions.5 Because the portions of Act 63, which required the sentencing court to order the installation of the ignition interlock system, verify compliance, and certify the installation to the Department, have been found unconstitutional in Mockaitis, we are obligated to correct the sentence imposed upon Appellant.6
¶ 7 Our Court's "authority to review a sentence is governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781." Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc). "If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction." Commonwealth v. Alexander, 811 A.2d 1064, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 822 A.2d 703 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Syno, 791 A.2d 363, 365 (Pa. Super. 2002)). Moreover, challenges to "[a]n illegal sentence can never be waived and may be reviewed sua sponte by this Court." Archer, 722 A.2d at 209. "An illegal sentence must be vacated." Alexander, 811 A.2d at 1066.
¶ 8 In light of the decision in Mockaitis, it is clear that a sentencing court does not have the statutory authority to impose the requirement that a DUI offender install an approved ignition interlock system(s) on his or her motor vehicle(s). Accordingly, without that authority, we conclude that the sentencing court imposed what amounts to an illegal sentence, which we hereby vacate to the extent that Appellant's sentence imposes the requirement that Appellant install an ignition interlock system on all vehicles that he owns. Because we may amend a sentence directly, Commonwealth v. Huckleberry, 631 A.2d 1329, 1334 (Pa. Super. 1993), we need not remand for any revisions to Appellant's sentence.
¶ 9 Judgment of sentence imposing the installation of the ignition interlock system is vacated. Judgment of sentence in all other respects is affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
¶ 1 I join the disposition of the majority and its opinion except for footnote 4. In my view, as Appellant received consecutive sentences of imprisonment and probation totaling four years less a day, his case is governed not by our decision in Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. 2003), but instead by our more recent decision in Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991, 994-995 (Pa. Super. 2003). Millward concluded that the rule followed in Salisbury was inapplicable where the appellant was sentenced to a term of three years probation. However, because this case is before us in a timely appeal from a judgment of sentence, we may resolve Appellant's sentencing question for, as the majority quite properly points out, we may correct an illegal sentence sua sponte. Opinion, at 7.
¶ 2 I write separately also to express my understanding of the majority's reliance on Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc), for the proposition that "[a]n illegal sentence can never be waived and may be reviewed sua sponte by this Court." Opinion, at 7.
¶ 3 I agree with the validity of this statement in the procedural posture of this case as it is before us in a timely direct appeal from a judgment of sentence. We explained Archer in Commonwealth v. Edrington, 780 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. 2001), saying, In Edrington, we also directed the reader to "[s]ee generally Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999) (). Edrington, 780 A.2d at 723. We further explained that challenges to the legality of a sentence "can be raised sua sponte by this Court, where our jurisdiction is firm." Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 4 Here, there is no question that our jurisdiction is firm to decide this timely filed direct appeal. Accordingly, since we can raise this issue concerning the legality of the imposition of the ignition interlock sentence sua sponte, it is inconsequential that Appellant raised it in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Edrington, 780 A.2d at 723 (...
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