Commonwealth v. Rankinen, 403 MDA 2021

Decision Date07 December 2021
Docket NumberJ-A22045-21,403 MDA 2021
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. JOSEPH SCOTT RANKINEN Appellant
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 5, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-18-CR-0000429-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM

KING J.

Appellant Joseph Scott Rankinen, appeals from the order entered in the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. In May 2011, Appellant raped and sexually assaulted Victim during a 4-H program at the Clinton County Fairgrounds. At the time, Appellant was sixteen (16) years old, and Victim was twelve (12) years old. Victim did not report the crimes until 2015, when she realized the gravity of Appellant's actions.

Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse ("IDSI"), indecent assault, and terroristic threats. On September 18, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years' imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on May 31, 2019, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on February 19, 2020.

On June 8, 2020, Appellant timely filed a counseled PCRA petition, raising various claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2020. Appellant's trial counsel was the only witness presented at the hearing. After supplemental briefing, the court denied PCRA relief on March 5, 2021.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March 25, 2021. That same day, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on April 12, 2021.

Appellant now raises the following issues for our review:

Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's argument of [ineffective] assistance of counsel where counsel failed to object at trial to the testimony by Trooper Sweet to Appellant's post-arrest and post-Miranda[1] silence?
Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's argument of [ineffective] assistance of counsel where counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the lack of prompt complaint for the eleven (11) month time period of May of 2014 to April of 2015?
Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's argument of [ineffective] assistance of counsel where counsel failed to move pretrial to dismiss the charge of [IDSI]?

(Appellant's Brief at 3).

"Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court's determination and whether its decision is free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, __ Pa.__, 218 A.3d 850 (2019). This Court grants great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Howard, 249 A.3d 1229 (Pa.Super. 2021). "[W]e review the court's legal conclusions de novo." Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021).

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth presented trial testimony from Corporal Matthew Sweet, the state police officer who questioned Appellant following his arrest. Appellant asserts that: 1) the prosecutor asked Corporal Sweet about Appellant's post-arrest statements; 2) Corporal Sweet testified that he questioned Appellant about his attitudes towards sex and sexuality; and 3) when Corporal Sweet asked Appellant about whether he thought that sexual abuse was normal, Appellant did not respond. Appellant notes that trial counsel failed to object to this testimony, and the prosecutor subsequently exploited the testimony by referencing Appellant's post-arrest silence during closing arguments.

Appellant argues that Corporal Sweet's testimony violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Appellant maintains that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to object to Corporal Sweet's testimony, and trial counsel misapprehended the relevant law regarding post-arrest silence. Appellant also complains that he suffered prejudice due to trial counsel's inaction, where "[c]ounsel's error was compounded by the fact that the District Attorney later used that specific prejudicial evidence against Appellant in his closing arguments to the jury." (Appellant's Brief at 17). Appellant concludes that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Corporal Sweet's testimony regarding Appellant's post-arrest silence. We disagree.

"Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance." Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, __Pa.__, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

"The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]" Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175, 179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). "Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim." Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).

"Once this threshold is met we apply the 'reasonable basis' test to determine whether counsel's chosen course was designed to effectuate his client's interests." Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. Counsel's decisions will be considered reasonable if they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with other efforts he may have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

"To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding." Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "[A] criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

"It is axiomatic that a defendant enjoys a Constitutional right to remain silent and that it is a violation of that right where reference is made to the accused's post-arrest silence." Commonwealth v. Messersmith, 860 A.2d 1078, 1093 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 688, 878 A.2d 863 (2005).

To protect an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has held that, before an individual in police custody may be interrogated, he must first be informed, in clear and unequivocal terms, that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, and that he has the right to consult with counsel and to have counsel present during interrogation, and, if he is indigent, counsel will be appointed for him. If an individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease, and any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.

Commonwealth v. Frein, 651 Pa. 635, 661-62, 206 A.3d 1049, 1064 (2019), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 844, __ L.Ed.2d__ (2020) (internal citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted).

"It is the Commonwealth's burden to establish whether [a defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In order to do so, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the proper warnings were given, and that the accused manifested an understanding of these warnings." Commonwealth v. Baez, 21 A.3d 1280 1283 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 614 Pa. 699, 37 A.3d...

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