Commonwealth v. Reid

Decision Date14 February 2022
Docket Number20-P-1176
Citation182 N.E.3d 341 (Table),100 Mass.App.Ct. 1124
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Nathan R. REID.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Nathan Reid, was convicted by a jury of assault and battery on a family or household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a ) ; assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b ) ; assault and battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D ; and resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress arguing that, when the police entered his home to execute arrest warrants, they lacked a reasonable belief that the residence was his or that he was present at the time of the entry. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant testimony elicited at the suppression hearing.2 At approximately 1:55 A.M. on January 27, 2018, Officers Thomas Kelly and John Kelley3 of the Arlington police department were dispatched to the Arlington fire headquarters after receiving a radio call that a woman had just been assaulted. The officers drove separate vehicles and when they arrived, a woman was standing in front of the headquarters, and she appeared to be "extremely upset" and had "swelling around her mouth," as well as blood on her face and clothing. The woman (hereinafter, victim) reported to the officers that she was just assaulted by her boyfriend, the defendant, in his apartment at 9 Palmer Street. She stated that, when she left the apartment, the defendant followed her until he heard her call 911, which made him retreat in the direction of his apartment. In addition to his address, the victim also informed the officers that the defendant was wearing blue jeans, brown work boots, and a gray hooded sweatshirt at the time of the assault. Based on that conversation, several officers, including Officers Kelly and Kelley, reported to "9 Palmer Street to the basement apartment," while another officer remained with the victim, and eventually accompanied her to the hospital.

Officer Kelly described 9 Palmer Street as a multifamily house, almost like a "rooming house," with a basement apartment unit and multiple upstairs apartment units. Upon arriving, he and a fellow officer of the Arlington police department, Sergeant Flavin, went to the rear of the house where there was a stairway and door that accessed the basement apartment. Officer Kelly knocked on the door leading to the basement, announced his presence and agency, and asked for the defendant. While Officer Kelly "could hear things being moved around inside the basement," nobody came to the door. Officer Kelly repeatedly knocked on the door and asked for the defendant but received no response. He, however, continued to "hear things being shuffled or somebody moving around inside th[e] basement apartment."

Simultaneously, Officer Kelley was knocking on the front door of the house and was eventually let into the common area hallway by one of the first-floor tenants. Officer Kelley asked the tenant where the basement was, and she directed the officer to a doorway at the end of the hallway that led to a stairway to the basement. From the top of the stairway, Officer Kelley could not see beyond the staircase and he did not know the layout of the basement apartment. Officer Kelley could, however, see lights being turned on and off inside the basement apartment. He could also hear music coming from the basement apartment. He testified that, over the course of time, he could hear the music's volume being turned up and down, and this, in conjunction with the fact that other officers could hear items being shuffled around, raised concerns that the defendant was barricading himself inside. As a result, the officers contacted the State police for a K-9 unit to respond to the residence.

At approximately 2:05 to 2:10 A.M. , in anticipation of the K-9 unit's arrival, the officers established a perimeter around the residence. Around 2:18 A.M. , the officers received a call from dispatch notifying them that the defendant had a lengthy criminal record including violent crimes, as well as two outstanding arrest warrants, one of which was for a prior domestic incident. After receiving that information, the officers continued to wait for the K-9 unit to arrive. While they were waiting, they were informed by the officer who accompanied the victim to the hospital that the defendant had sent the victim text messages stating that he was in a parking lot outside the Regent Theater and that he would like to speak with her. As a result, several officers reported to the parking lot where the defendant claimed to be and conducted a thorough search of that location and the surrounding area, but were unable to locate the defendant.

At that point, after approximately one hour of waiting, the State police K-9 unit arrived at the residence. When it did, Officer Kelly remained at the rear door while Sergeant Flavin, Officer Kelley, and the State trooper walked down to the basement via the stairway in the common hallway to conduct a protective sweep. Officer Kelley testified that, because the residence appeared to be a rooming house, the officers were not certain whether anyone else was in the basement, and the protective sweep was to ensure that no other tenants were present that could potentially be injured by the canine. When the officers reached the bottom of the stairs and took a right, they observed at least three, but possibly four bedrooms, two of which had doors that were partially open. The officers were not sure which door led to the defendant's bedroom, but were informed by the officer who was still with the victim that the first room on the right was the defendant's. They entered the first room,4 and in that room, located the defendant hiding in a closet. The defendant was then placed under arrest and taken into custody.

Thereafter, the officers took photographs of blood stains they observed on paper towels and on bedding located in the room. Later, during booking at the police station, officers recovered the boots that the defendant was wearing. The defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the officers’ entry, including the photographs and the boots. The motion was denied. Following a jury trial, where the photographs and boots were admitted as evidence, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a family or household member, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, assault and battery on a police officer, and resisting arrest.5 This appeal followed.

Discussion. On appeal, the defendant now argues that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress because: (a) the officers did not have a reasonable belief that the basement apartment, or the room he was in, was his residence; and (b) the officers did not have a reasonable belief that he was present when they sought to execute the outstanding arrest warrants. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 778 (2004). To be clear, the defendant did not assert this as a basis for his motion to suppress in the trial court. There, as grounds for his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the entry into his home was improper because it was warrantless and executed without a valid exception to the warrant requirement. He neither acknowledged nor addressed the claim that the police had outstanding warrants for his arrest. Importantly, the judge's denial of his motion rested on the rule that the police may enter a suspect's residence to execute an arrest warrant, without obtaining a separate search warrant. See id. at 776, quoting Commonwealth v. Nova, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 634-635 (2000) ("An arrest warrant ‘encompasses the power to enter a [suspect's] residence for the purpose of executing the warrant.’ ... A separate search warrant is not required"). Accordingly, the defendant's argument before us is waived, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004), and our review is limited to whether there was any error that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 795 (2019). We discern no error, and therefore no such risk.

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require that police who enter an individual's residence to execute an arrest warrant ‘have [(1)] a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the arrestee's residence, and [(2)] a reasonable belief that the arrestee is in his residence at the time the arrest warrant is executed.’ " Commonwealth v. Gentile, 466 Mass. 817, 817-818 (2014), quoting Silva, 440 Mass. at 778. "[T]he ‘reasonable belief’ standard is ‘less exacting than probable cause.’ " Gentile, supra at 818, quoting Silva, supra at 776-777. It allows "officer[s] who ha[ve] already secured a valid arrest warrant to determine, while on the scene, and based on the information available at the time, whether the suspect is within his residence," and "prevent[s] a person for whom an arrest warrant has issued from using his own residence as a haven." Silva, supra at 778-779.

1. Reasonable belief of residence. Here, the officers possessed a reasonable belief...

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