Commonwealth v. Reid
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 784 CAP,No. 784 CAP |
| Citation | 280 A.3d 929 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Albert E. REID, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Shawn Nolan, Esq., Leor Veleanu, Esq., Federal Community Defender Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Ronald Eisenberg, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Philadelphia, Laura Jeanette Kerstetter, Esq., Franklin County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.
OPINION
A jury convicted Albert Reid ("Appellant") of two counts of first-degree murder for the killings of his estranged wife, Carla Reid, and her fourteen-year-old daughter, D.M. He received two death sentences, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Reid , 571 Pa. 1, 811 A.2d 530 (2002) (" Reid I "). Appellant subsequently filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 - 9546. The PCRA court denied the petition, and Appellant appealed to this Court, which affirmed in part the PCRA court's order but remanded the matter, while retaining jurisdiction, directing the PCRA court to provide a supplemental opinion addressing why it denied relief on the following issue: "Was the defendant incompetent to proceed to trial and represent himself; were prior counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and effectively litigate this issue before trial and failing to raise it on appeal?"1
Commonwealth v. Reid , ––– Pa. ––––, 259 A.3d 395, 444 (2021) (" Reid II ") (quoting Appellant's Initial Brief at 3).
The PCRA court complied with our directive, and we have received the parties’ responses to the PCRA court's supplemental opinion. Thus, this remaining matter is ripe for review. As explained in detail infra , we respectfully find that the PCRA court erred in the manner in which it assessed Appellant's claim that he was incompetent to stand trial, as the court's reasoning, inter alia , failed to account for new, post-conviction evidence that potentially demonstrates that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate in part the PCRA court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A thorough recitation of the factual and procedural backgrounds underlying this matter is unnecessary. We, however, recount that Appellant's competency to stand trial was litigated prior to his murder trial. On April 9, 1998, a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Abraham Martin Hostetter, conducted an in-court competency examination of Appellant. As part of this examination, Dr. Hostetter questioned several persons, including Appellant, regarding Appellant's mental health. Appellant's expert, psychiatrist Dr. Neil Blumberg, and the Commonwealth's expert, psychiatrist Dr. Robert Davis, participated in the examination. Notably, the trial court appointed special counsel, Michael Toms, Esquire, for the purpose of representing Appellant during the competency examination. Notwithstanding his appointment, Attorney Toms was not present during Appellant's examination.
On May 13, 1998, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether Appellant was competent to stand trial. At the beginning of that hearing, Attorney Toms stated that he did not receive notice of the aforementioned in-court competency examination and that his absence from that examination violated Appellant's right to due process. The court nonetheless continued with the hearing, where Dr. Hostetter diagnosed Appellant with paranoid personality disorder but ultimately concluded that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Davis also diagnosed Appellant with a personality disorder and, consistent with Dr. Hostetter, determined that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Blumberg diagnosed Appellant with delusional disorder and stated his belief that Appellant was not competent to stand trial.
To assure that Appellant received the process he was due, the trial court ordered Appellant to undergo another in-court competency examination, followed by a competency hearing, both of which were held on July 14, 1998. Attorney Toms was present for these proceedings. The examination again was led by Dr. Hostetter, and Drs. Davis and Blumberg participated. During the course of the examination and the subsequent hearing, it was revealed that Appellant refused to undergo any additional physical testing, including a neurological examination and an MRI. At the competency hearing, Drs. Hostetter and Davis again stated that Appellant was competent to stand trial, but Dr. Blumberg continued to disagree. On August 27, 1998, the trial court entered an order finding Appellant competent to stand trial.
Around this same time, Appellant requested to represent himself. After conducting a colloquy, the trial court entered an order on September 4, 1998, allowing Appellant to proceed pro se but with standby counsel. Appellant represented himself at a September 15, 1998 evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of, inter alia , photographs that the Commonwealth wished to present at trial. We note, however, that soon after this hearing, Appellant decided to allow his standby counsel to represent him moving forward. As noted supra , in due course, a jury eventually found Appellant guilty of murdering his estranged wife, Carla Reid, and her fourteen-year-old daughter, D.M. Appellant received two death sentences.
After this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, Appellant filed a PCRA petition and several supplements, raising a multitude of issues. Among those issues and relevant to this opinion, Appellant "launched a multifaceted, complex, and somewhat confusing, challenge to his competency to stand trial and represent himself." Reid II , 259 A.3d at 424. Two of Appellant's claims were most prominent: (1) a substantive claim that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial ("substantive competency claim"); and (2) a claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present a more robust pretrial claim that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial and to represent himself.
The focus of Appellant's substantive competency claim concerning his ability to stand trial centered on newly discovered historical aspects of Appellant's physical, social, and mental health. For example, Appellant averred that, during the course of investigating his PCRA claims, PCRA counsel discovered that Appellant suffered head injuries earlier in his life, which led to brain damage. Dr. Hostetter, the court-appointed psychiatrist that previously found Appellant competent to stand trial, was informed of this fact during the PCRA process.
Dr. Hostetter provided Appellant with a declaration, which Appellant attached to one of his PCRA filings. In that declaration, Dr. Hostetter stated that he previously was unaware of Appellant's history of head injuries and that, upon learning of this background, he believed that that the organic nature of Appellant's brain damage precluded him "from fully cooperating with his counsel and participating in preparations for his own trial[.]" Second Supplement to Appellant's PCRA Petition, 2/19/2010, Exhibit L at ¶9. Thus, Dr. Hostetter dramatically altered his previous conclusion, stating in his PCRA declaration that Appellant, in fact, "was not competent to stand trial under the applicable legal standard." Id.
Appellant's related claim regarding trial counsel's stewardship generally alleged that counsel were ineffective for failing to discover and present the background evidence uncovered by PCRA counsel, such as Appellant's history of head injuries. In other words, Appellant contended that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present the substantive competency claim that his PCRA counsel raised in his PCRA petition.
Along with Appellant's other claims, the PCRA court rejected Appellant's substantive competency claim, as well as his related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court, however, did not provide a rationale for doing so, and Appellant raised this failure in the brief that he filed in this Court in support of his appeal from the PCRA court's order. While we rejected Appellant's other PCRA claims, given the circumstances, we remanded the matter to the PCRA court, directing the court to provide a supplemental opinion addressing why it rejected the substantive competency claim and related claims.
The PCRA court subsequently submitted to this Court an opinion outlining its reasons for denying Appellant relief on this issue. Unfortunately, as we will explain below, the court's rationale for rejecting Appellant's substantive competency claim is inadequate, as it, inter alia , failed to account for the new, post-conviction evidence, such as Appellant's prior head injuries and Dr. Hostetter's revised opinion, that potentially demonstrates that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. We now will summarize the court's supplemental opinion.2
Initially, the PCRA court reported that Appellant's competency was litigated vigorously before the trial judge, the Honorable John R. Walker. After detailing the history of that litigation, the PCRA court stated that Judge Walker only explained his reasons for finding Appellant competent to stand trial in his May 27, 1999, opinion addressing Appellant's post-sentence motions. In short, Judge Walker found Appellant competent to stand trial primarily based upon the competency hearing testimony of Drs. Hostetter and Davis. According to the PCRA court, Judge Walker allowed Appellant to represent himself after conducting a lengthy colloquy and concluding that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
After summarizing Judge Walker's opinion, the PCRA court embarked on an independent review of Appellant's claims and the certified record. In so doing, the court, inter alia , reiterated that Judge Walker found Appellant to be competent to...
To continue reading
Request your trial