Commonwealth v. Reid, No. 564 CAP

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Writing for the CourtJustice TODD.
Citation99 A.3d 427,627 Pa. 78
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Anthony REID, Appellant.
Decision Date20 August 2014
Docket NumberNo. 564 CAP

627 Pa. 78
99 A.3d 427

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
v.
Anthony REID, Appellant.

No. 564 CAP

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 20, 2012.
Decided Aug. 20, 2014.


99 A.3d 433

Daniel Silverman, Esq., for Anthony Reid.

Hugh J. Burns, Esq., Philadelphia, Suzan Elena Wilcox, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice TODD.

627 Pa. 88

This is a capital appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying Appellant Anthony “Tone Bey” Reid's petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 – 9546. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.

I. Background

The facts underlying Appellant's sentence are more fully discussed by our Court on Appellant's direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453 (1994). A brief summary of the facts, however, is required for our resolution of Appellant's collateral challenge to his conviction and sentence.

The evidence adduced at trial, and summarized in Reid , provides that on July 9, 1988, Mark Lisby (“the victim”) took approximately $500 worth of crack cocaine capsules (“caps”) from his uncle Terrance Lisby (“Lisby”). The victim informed

627 Pa. 89

Lisby the next day that he had used the caps, but did not have the money to pay Lisby. Lisby worked for Lawrence Boston selling crack cocaine, and both of these individuals were attempting to obtain membership in the Junior Black Mafia (“JBM”), a Philadelphia-based crime syndicate. Boston and Lisby, in turn, worked for JBM member Kevin Bowman. Once the victim understood that Bowman would be upset regarding the missing drugs, he met with Bowman to explain the situation, and offered to make up for the lost income the following week.

Two days later, Boston, who had not been paid by Lisby for the drugs, appeared at the victim's house at 2444 North Stanley Street in Philadelphia. Boston was joined by Appellant, who was a member of the JBM. After a brief conversation, Appellant, Boston, and the victim left the house and began walking west on Cumberland Street. As the men approached the intersection of Cumberland Street and 31st Street, Appellant drew a weapon and shot the victim once in the center of his chest, once in his upper right chest beneath the collar bone, and once in the back of his right leg. The victim died as a result of his wounds. Important for certain

99 A.3d 434

issues discussed below, at Appellant's first trial, Lawrence Boston testified as an eyewitness. At Appellant's second trial, Boston invoked his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, after establishing Boston was unavailable, Boston's testimony from his first trial in which he inculpated Appellant as the shooter was read into the record. Further, Michael Dozier testified that he witnessed the murder and that Appellant shot the victim.

After Appellant's arrest, he was charged with murder of the first degree,1 carrying a firearm without a license,2 possessing an instrument of crime,3 and criminal conspiracy.4 In December

627 Pa. 90

1989, Appellant was brought to trial before Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Albert Sabo and a jury. The jury found Appellant guilty of criminal conspiracy, but was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges. Appellant was retried from December 12, 1990 through January 9, 1991, and convicted of the remaining charges.

During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth provided evidence that Appellant had been convicted of the March 13, 1989 murder of Neil Wilkinson and shooting of Darryl Woods, and the murder of Michael Waters, a 16–year–old boy, who had thrown snowballs at Appellant's car. The jury was also informed of Appellant's prior conspiracy conviction at his first trial in this matter. The record of the guilt trial was incorporated into evidence at the penalty phase. While the trial court refused to allow Appellant to present evidence regarding his specific religion (Muslim), he was permitted to explain that he had embraced a religious philosophy that had endorsed morality and that requires one to change and reform, and that he had become a new person as a result of his religion. He also presented background character evidence and his age at the time of his murder, 20 years old. Appellant did not testify. At the conclusion of the penalty trial, the jury found one aggravating circumstance—Appellant had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person5 —and no mitigating circumstances,6 mandating the imposition of the death penalty. Thereafter, Appellant was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction, 2 ½ to 5 years imprisonment for the possession of an instrument of crime count, 2 ½ to 5 years imprisonment for the carrying a firearm without a license count, to run consecutive to each other and the sentence of death, and 5 to 10 years imprisonment for the criminal conspiracy count from Appellant's first trial, to run consecutive to all other sentences. On direct appeal, Appellant was represented by his trial counsel, Samuel

627 Pa. 91

Stretton, Esquire. This Court affirmed Appellant's judgments of sentence. Reid, 642 A.2d at 463.

Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on December 12, 1996. Collateral review was assigned to the Honorable James Lineberger. Present appellate counsel, Daniel Silverman, was appointed on February 23, 1998. On January 27, Appellant filed an Amended PCRA Petition (“Amended Petition”). Subsequently, Appellant filed a Supplemental Amended

99 A.3d 435

PCRA Petition on April 15, 1999, a Second Supplemental Reproduced Record on May 3, 1999, a Second Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition on July 11, 2000, a Third Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition on February 13, 2001, a Petition to Review Police Archives on September 26, 2002, and an Addendum to the Amended Supplemental PCRA Petition on March 29, 2004. The Commonwealth, on November 21, 2001, filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's petition. As discussed more fully below, there is no indication that Appellant was granted permission to file late petitions or to submit amended petitions.

On May 6, 2005, the PCRA court entered a Notice to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, finding Appellant's PCRA petition to be without merit. Appellant objected, and, as explained more fully below, on July 8, 2005, the Commonwealth by letter agreed to a hearing on certain issues.7 On August 19, 2005, the PCRA court entered an order scheduling a hearing, so limited, but Appellant opposed the Commonwealth's proposal, and no hearing was conducted. Subsequently, Judge Lineberger retired, and the appeal was reassigned to Judge William Mazzola. Thereafter, Appellant filed additional motions, inter alia, for recusal, expert funds, and discovery regarding his Batson claims. The Commonwealth filed a response, in addition to a motion to dismiss. By order dated October 17, 2007, the PCRA court denied the request for a hearing and expert funds. Two days later, the court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. Thereafter, the PCRA court formally dismissed Appellant's petition.

627 Pa. 92

On August 28, 2009, Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, followed by a Supplemental Statement on September 10, 2009, and a Final Statement on October 1, 2009.8 On March 8, 2011, the PCRA court filed an extensive 260–page opinion addressing Appellant's claims in both this appeal and Appellant's collateral appeal regarding the Waters murder.9

II. Analysis

In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court's determination is “supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 593 Pa. 67, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (2007). Counsel is presumed to be effective, and a petitioner has the burden to establish counsel was ineffective. Commonwealth v. Miller, 572 Pa. 623, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (2002). To overcome this presumption, and to be entitled to PCRA relief, a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) ; his claims have not been previously litigated or waived; and the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel. Id. § 9543(a)(3), (a)(4). An issue is previously

99 A.3d 436

litigated if “the highest appellate court in which [the appellant] could have had review as a...

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41 practice notes
  • Commonwealth v. Laird, No. 683 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • July 20, 2015
    ...(2014). However, prosecutorial misconduct may also be grounded on other asserted violations. See Commonwealth v. Reid, ––– Pa. ––––, ––––, 99 A.3d 427, 456 (2014). Here, the prosecutorial-misconduct allegation considered on direct appeal related to the principle that it is improper for pros......
  • Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 728 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • October 17, 2018
    ...one, merely because a witness was uncertain about, or inconsistent with, certain details of the crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reid , 627 Pa. 78, 99 A.3d 427, 449 (2014) ("[T]he need for a Kloiber charge focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the defendant.") (emphasis in origin......
  • Commonwealth v. Reid, No. 752 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • August 18, 2020
    ...L.Ed.2d 186 (1994). Furthermore, we set forth the pertinent history concerning appellant's first PCRA petition in Commonwealth v. Reid , 627 Pa. 78, 99 A.3d 427, 434-35 (2014) (" Reid II "), wherein we affirmed the November 19, 2007 order denying PCRA relief.2 Significantly, Chief Justice C......
  • Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 701 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • June 20, 2016
    ...to be instructed that they must view eyewitness testimony with caution when it meets the specified criteria. Accord Commonwealth v. Reid, 627 Pa. 78, 113, 99 A.3d 427, 448 (2014) (“A Kloiber charge is appropriate where there are special identification concerns: a witness did not have the op......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
41 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Laird, No. 683 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • July 20, 2015
    ...(2014). However, prosecutorial misconduct may also be grounded on other asserted violations. See Commonwealth v. Reid, ––– Pa. ––––, ––––, 99 A.3d 427, 456 (2014). Here, the prosecutorial-misconduct allegation considered on direct appeal related to the principle that it is improper for pros......
  • Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 728 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • October 17, 2018
    ...one, merely because a witness was uncertain about, or inconsistent with, certain details of the crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reid , 627 Pa. 78, 99 A.3d 427, 449 (2014) ("[T]he need for a Kloiber charge focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the defendant.") (emphasis in origin......
  • Commonwealth v. Reid, No. 752 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • August 18, 2020
    ...L.Ed.2d 186 (1994). Furthermore, we set forth the pertinent history concerning appellant's first PCRA petition in Commonwealth v. Reid , 627 Pa. 78, 99 A.3d 427, 434-35 (2014) (" Reid II "), wherein we affirmed the November 19, 2007 order denying PCRA relief.2 Significantly, Chief Justice C......
  • Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 701 CAP
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • June 20, 2016
    ...to be instructed that they must view eyewitness testimony with caution when it meets the specified criteria. Accord Commonwealth v. Reid, 627 Pa. 78, 113, 99 A.3d 427, 448 (2014) (“A Kloiber charge is appropriate where there are special identification concerns: a witness did not have the op......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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