Commonwealth v. Reyes

Decision Date29 January 2013
Docket NumberSJC–11270.
Citation464 Mass. 245,982 N.E.2d 504
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Amaury REYES.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Michael Anton Laurano, Boston, for the defendant.

Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Keith G. Langer, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

CORDY, J.

The defendant, Amaury Reyes, was convicted of improperly carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131C ( a ) (carrying statute), and unlawfully storing a firearm (after leaving it in his motor vehicle) in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131L ( a ) and ( b ) (storage statute). On appeal, the defendant argues that the storage statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of his right to due process of law. He also contends that if the storage statute requires that a firearm stored in a locked motor vehicle be rendered further inoperable by locking it in an additional container or through the use of a tamper-resistant trigger lock, it unlawfully hinders his right to use the firearm in self-defense. Additionally, the defendant posits that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions under both the storage and carrying statutes. Finally, he asserts that the judge's jury instruction on the elements of the storage statute was deficient in that it failed to provide guidance on what qualifies as a “locked container.” Based on these errors, the defendant asserts that he is entitled to either directed verdicts in his favor or a new trial.

We conclude that the defendant's arguments with respect to the constitutionality of the storage statute are without merit: the statute is neither impermissibly vague nor violative of his right to self-defense under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We also conclude, however, that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction under the carrying statute and he is entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty on that charge. Further, because the judge did not adequately instruct the jury regarding what qualifies as a “locked container,” we reverse his conviction under the storage statute and remand the case to the District Court for a new trial with directions to the trial judge to instruct the jury in a manner consistent with this opinion.

1. Background. The jury could have found the following facts.1 The defendant was a correctional officer at the Essex County house of correction in Middleton. He had a class A license permitting him to carry a firearm for all lawful purposes. See G.L. c. 140, § 131 ( a ). On April 10, 2010, the defendant drove from his home to work, during which time he carried his personal firearm with him in a holster. There was no one else in the automobile when he drove to work. When the defendant arrived at the house of correction, he parked his motor vehicle in the employee parking lot directly in front of the entrance to the facility. He proceeded to an exterior window where one could obtain a gun locker key for the storage of his firearm during his work shift. All the lockers were full. He returned to his vehicle, removed the firearm and holster from his person, placed them in the glove box, and locked the vehicle.2

On returning to the facility, the defendant was confronted by internal affairs officers, who asked if they could search his vehicle. The defendant agreed to the search. The officers asked the defendant whether there was anything in his vehicle about which they should be concerned. The defendant replied that his firearm was in the glove box of his vehicle. They asked if the firearm was outfitted with a cable locking device. The defendant replied that it was not. The officers and the defendant then walked back to the parked vehicle where the defendant unlocked it with a remote opener. The officers entered the vehicle from the passenger side, opened the glove box, and retrieved the firearm in its holster. The firearm contained a loaded magazine, but no round in the chamber.

On April 26, 2010, complaints issued from the Salem District Court, charging the defendant with violating the carrying and storage statutes. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on April 15, 2011. The motion was heard and denied immediately prior to the defendant's jury trial on April 26, 2011. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for required findings of not guilty. His motion was denied. Thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We transferred the defendant's appeal to this court on our own motion.3

2. Discussion. a. Void for vagueness. The storage statute provides:

It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm, rifle or shotgun including, but not limited to, large capacity weapons, or machine gun in any place unless such weapon is secured in a locked containeror equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized user. For purposes of this section, such weapon shall not be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user.” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant argues that the statute fails to make clear what qualifies as being “secured in a locked container,” leaving gun owners without guidance on how to store their firearms properly and law enforcement officials without criteria for knowing when the statute has been violated. Consequently, it is void for vagueness. We are not persuaded. The text, legislative history, related statutory and regulatory provisions, and other secondary materials reflect a common understanding at least as to a core set of containers that when used properly ensure gun owners that they are properly storing their firearms.

The principles of the vagueness doctrine are well settled in our law. A basic tenet of due process requires that a criminal statute be sufficiently clear to give notice of the prohibited conduct. See Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368, 371–372, 372 N.E.2d 1381 (1978). “Penal statutes must ‘define the criminal offense with sufficient definitiveness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.’ Commonwealth v. Zubiel, 456 Mass. 27, 30, 921 N.E.2d 78 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 123, 617 N.E.2d 609 (1993).

Due process also mandates that no statute have such a standardless sweep that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police and the courts is permitted. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 Mass. 580, 595 n. 15, 334 N.E.2d 617 (1975). “It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974), quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875).

Proscribed conduct, however, is not always capable of precise legal definition. Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 439, 442, 120 N.E.2d 189 (1954). Accordingly, legislative language need not be afforded “mathematical precision” in order to pass constitutional muster. Commonwealth v. Bohmer, supra at 372, 372 N.E.2d 1381. See Grayned v. Rockford, supra at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294. A statute is not vague “if it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.” Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734, 359 N.E.2d 310 (1977). Its language will be adequate if it “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270, 450 N.E.2d 149 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 496–497, 269 N.E.2d 657 (1971). Uncertainty as to whether marginal offenses are included within the coverage of a statute does not render it unconstitutional if its scope is substantially clear. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jarrett, supra. Moreover, a law is not vague if its meaning is ascertainable by reference to similar or related statutes, and “even a vague statute may be made constitutionally definite by giving it a reasonable construction.” Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Mass. 840, 851, 874 N.E.2d 1089 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Arthur, 420 Mass. 535, 539, 650 N.E.2d 787 (1995).

We begin by acknowledging that the term “secured in a locked container” is not further explicated by the statute. However, even in the absence of further definition, the statute can be “interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all [the statute's] words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.” Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934).

Massachusetts courts have consistently noted that the underlying purpose of firearms control legislation is to assuage “the societal concern with weapons reaching the hands of unauthorized users,” Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 154, 849 N.E.2d 829 (2006), and “to prevent the temptation and the ability to use firearms to inflict harm, be it negligently or intentionally, on another or on oneself.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 518, 523, 409 N.E.2d 1311 (1980). See Ruggiero v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 18...

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