Commonwealth v. Ripka
| Decision Date | 09 February 1940 |
| Docket Number | 1441 |
| Citation | 37 Pa. D. & C. 315 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Ripka |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
September sessions, 1935,
Petition for parole.
Maurice Mordell, for petitioner.
In considering this petition for parole, it is important to determine not only the length of time petitioner has been imprisoned under the sentence upon which the parole is sought, but also the period which, under the law, he will be required to serve if he is not again released until the expiration of his maximum sentence. We accordingly asked the authorities of the county prison for information upon this subject, as a result of which we have learned that they have been computing the running of sentences in such circumstances in a manner which, in our opinion, is not authorized by law. We, therefore, held an additional hearing in the case, at which the acting superintendent of the prison appeared at our request, and stated that it is the regular practice of his institution, in computing the running of sentences of prisoners committed for violation of parole, to give them credit for the time during which they were at liberty under parole, and to release them on the date on which they would have been released if no parole had been granted and they had been compelled to serve the entire maximum sentence originally imposed. Thus, in the present case, the prisoner was sentenced by us to a term of not less than one, nor more than five years, to date from September 28, 1936. The maximum sentence, therefore, would have expired, and he would have been released, had he not been paroled, on September 28, 1941. He was paroled, however, at the expiration of his minimum sentence, or on September 28, 1937, and was at liberty until arrested for robbery and assault and battery, of which he was convicted and sentenced by our brother Heiligman on March 19, 1938, to not less than one, nor more than four years. On the same date, we revoked his parole and recommitted him to the county prison to serve the balance of the sentence imposed by us. In this situation, the superintendent of the county prison advises us that, unless otherwise directed, and assuming petitioner will be paroled at the expiration of the minimum sentence imposed by Judge Heiligman, the prison authorities will give credit to petitioner for the year he was at liberty under our parole, and will release him on September 28, 1942. On the other hand, if no such credit is given, he will not be entitled to release until September 28, 1943, or five years from the beginning of his service of the latter sentence. It is important, therefore, not only to the present case, but also to the future administration of the law at the county prison, that the correct manner of computing the running of sentences in such cases shall be determined and uniformly followed by the prison authorities.
So far as sentences to the penitentiary are concerned, this question is settled by express legislative enactment, and the decisions of both the Supreme and Superior Courts thereunder. Section 10 of the Act of June 19, 1911, P. L. 1055, section 1 of the Act of June 3, 1915, P. L. 788, and section 1 of the Act of June 22, 1931, P. L. 862, which deals with parole of prisoners sentenced to a penitentiary, provides that a parolee, on conviction of crime during his parole period, shall " in addition to the penalty imposed for such crime committed during the said period... be compelled... to serve... the remainder of the term (without commutation) which[he]... would have been compelled to serve kit for the commutation authorizing" his parole. This language was first interpreted in the case of Commonwealth ex rel. v. Smith, Warden, 118 Pa.Super 250, 255, in an opinion by Judge Baldrige in which, after 'reviewing the authorities in other States, it was definitely held that a prisoner whose parole is revoked for the commission of another crime must serve " the remainder of the time not served, without diminishing his imprisonment by substituting therefor time on parole." " In construing this statute," said the learned judge who wrote that opinion,
This interpretation of the Act of 1911, supra, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth ex rel. v. Smith, Warden, 323 Pa. 89. In it, Mr. Justice Maxey, quoting at length from Judge Baldrige's opinion, said, in referring to it:
" In that case Judge Baldrige... interpreted section 10 of the Act of June 19, 1911, P. L. 1055, as amended by the Act of June 22, 1931, P. L. 862, as meaning that where the parole of a prisoner sentenced to a state penitentiary has been revoked for the commission of another crime, he may be imprisoned for another period equaling the remainder of the maximum sentence not served when the parole was granted, without allowance of credit for the time he was out on parole and not delinquent."
These cases settle the law of Pennsylvania on this subject...
To continue reading
Request your trial