Commonwealth v. Rothhaar

• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: KUNSELMAN, J.
• Docket Number: 64 EDA 2024,J-S47041-24
• Decision Date: 27 October 2025
• Citation: Commonwealth v. Rothhaar, 64 EDA 2024, J-S47041-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct 27, 2025)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID MORGAN ROTHHAAR Appellant

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID MORGAN ROTHHAAR Appellant

No. 64 EDA 2024

No. J-S47041-24

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

October 27, 2025

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 29, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003675-2022

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM

KUNSELMAN, J.

I. Introduction

David Rothhaar appeals from the judgment of sentence imposing four to eight years of incarceration, following his convictions for burglary, criminal trespass, and possession of an instrument of a crime.^[1] Rothhaar claims the lower court should have granted his motion to suppress the Commonwealth's evidence or, alternatively, that the Commonwealth witness Russell Mitchell should not have been allowed to testify. Because we find that the suppression claims are waived and that his evidentiary issue has no merit, we affirm.

II. Factual & Procedural Background

On June 28, 2022, around 9:40 p.m., Rothhaar broke into the home of Robert Capriotti. Mr. Capriotti heard Rothhaar making noise in the upstairs rooms and running down the steps. Mr. Capriotti called 911 at 9:46 p.m. Mr. Capriotti never saw Rothhaar in the house, but Rothhaar left his DNA on a windowsill in Mr. Capriotti's garage.

At 9:53 p.m., in response to the 911 call, a police sergeant drove into Mr. Capriotti's neighborhood. He saw Rothhaar crossing the street two doors down from the Capriotti house. Rothhaar was the only person outside at that hour of the night.

The sergeant suspected that Rothhaar might be the burglar, because he carried a backpack in his hand. The sergeant knew, from many prior burglary investigations, that burglars typically carry bags with them to hide their tools and stolen goods. The sergeant stopped Rothhaar to investigate if he was involved with the break-in. Police then learned of a warrant for Rothhaar's arrest, arrested him, and searched his backpack. Inside was a small crowbar, a metal tool, and a pair of gloves. The gloves belonged to Mr. Capriotti.

Once at the police station, Rothhaar provided investigators with a DNA sample, which matched the DNA found on Mr. Capriotti's windowsill. The Commonwealth charged Rothhaar with burglary and related offenses.

Rothhaar filed a motion to suppress the Commonwealth's evidence. He contended that the sergeant detained him "in violation of his rights as secured to him by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States constitution^[2] and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution^[3]." Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion at 2. Critically, the motion did not claim greater protection under Article I, § 8 of the state constitution than the protections that the Fourth Amendment confers. Nor did the motion claim the suppression court should depart from federal jurisprudence in any manner. See id. at 2-3. In other words, Rothhaar's suppression motion treated the federal and state constitutional protections as coextensive.

On January 9, 2023, the suppression court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The Commonwealth presented testimonial and video evidence revealing the above facts. A week later, the suppression court ruled that the sergeant lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Rothhaar for an investigative detention. It entered an order suppressing the Commonwealth's evidence, as well as Rothhaar's various statements to the police.

The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration. Among other issues, the prosecution contended the attenuation doctrine, as defined and applied in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016)^[4], allowed for admission of the evidence, even if the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Rothhaar.

Rothhaar filed nothing in opposition to the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration. The suppression court granted reconsideration. On January 31, 2023, the court conducted a second suppression hearing, where it received additional testimony and evidence.

At the close of the second hearing, the parties argued over admissibility of a video from the sergeant's dashboard camera, which the sergeant did not realize existed until a day before the second hearing. See N.T., 1/31/23, at 73-81. The suppression court deemed the dashboard video to be inadmissible under the discovery rules.

The Commonwealth also claimed that, even if there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Rothhaar, the suppression court should refuse to exclude its evidence, based on the attenuation doctrine and Strieff. See id. at 82-87. The Commonwealth argued that the facts of Strieff were identical to this case. Because Rothhaar had a valid arrest warrant when the sergeant detained him, the Commonwealth suggested the warrant attenuated whatever constitutional taint the evidence suffered from the unreasonable investigative detention.

In response, counsel for Rothhaar said, "I don't think Strieff affects this court's ruling." Id. at 87. "[A]lthough [Strieff] is a United States Supreme Court case, Pennsylvania typically provides greater protection for its citizens. And it's clear that Strieff has not yet been adopted in Pennsylvania." Id. But, instead of analyzing the multifactor test of Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), and asking the suppression court to depart from the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as articulated in Strieff, defense counsel argued that Strieff was distinguishable on its facts from Rothhaar's case. See id. at 87-91.

Furthermore, defense counsel never discussed Edmunds during her argument to the suppression court. Instead, she referred the court to Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule when executing search warrant does not require suppression of evidence discovered during the unannounced search). See id. at 88. Hence, like his Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, Rothhaar's post-hearing argument on the attenuation doctrine treated the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8 as coextensive.

The Commonwealth then rebutted defense counsel's implication that Pennsylvania courts needed to adopt Strieff in order for it to apply. In doing so, the prosecutor made the only reference to Edmunds. He did so to explain how the defense could have made a departure argument to the suppression court, if she desired to present such a claim. The prosecuting attorney said:

in terms of the Strieff case . . . the Fourth Amendment of the United States constitution is adopted by Pennsylvania. There would need to be a specific finding that Utah v. Strieff is not applicable under the Pennsylvania constitution, not that it does not apply. It has to be the other way around.

Their [i.e., the Supreme Court of the United States'] logic does not apply under the Pennsylvania constitution . . . that would implicate Commonwealth v. Edmunds . . . where, essentially, the court would have to go through an extensive analysis to find that under the Pennsylvania constitution, and based off of an extensive analysis looking at other states and other jurisdictions, and [rule that] under the Pennsylvania constitution you're entitled to greater rights. It's a substantial analysis. But, again, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is adopted by Pennsylvania. Your Honor can say, yes, I believe that [the] logic from Utah v. Strieff applied here. And the reason behind it, I think, is also reflected in other Pennsylvania cases where the analysis comes down to privacy interests versus reasonableness.

Id. at 91-92.

The Commonwealth then provided the suppression court with a case from this Court, which the prosecutor believed was similar to Strieff. See id. at 93 (citing Commonwealth v. Mullen, 267 A.3d 507 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that parole agents had probable cause to enter the residence of a third party to execute an arrest warrant against a defendant, notwithstanding the heightened privacy interest of the third party in the residence)).

The hearing then ended. Neither party submitted a post-hearing brief. Thus, Rothhaar made no argument that the heightened protections of Article I, § 8 or the multifactor test of Edmunds required the suppression court to depart from the holding of Strieff on any independent, state-constitutional ground.

On February 8, 2023, the suppression court issued an order vacating its prior order and denying the motion to suppress. While the suppression court reiterated its original conclusion that the sergeant lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Rothhaar, the court ruled that Strieff exempted the evidence from the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment.

Admittedly, the suppression court mentioned Edmunds in its opinion denying the motion to suppress, but the court did not analyze the Edmunds factors. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5/1/23, at 7. Instead, it merely observed that "appellate courts have neither expressly accepted nor rejected the ruling in Strieff" as it relates to Edmunds. Id. The suppression court did not consider whether there were adequate and independent state grounds under Article I, § 8 that compelled it to depart from Strieff. Hence, the suppression court, due to the lack of a departure argument by Rothhaar, treated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8 as coextensive and naturally applied the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as articulated in Strieff.

Eight months later, the Commonwealth tried Rothhaar by jury.

During the defense's opening statement, Rothhaar's counsel attempted to concoct reasonable doubt as to why Rothhaar's DNA was on Mr. Capriotti's windowsill. "More specifically, counsel argued to the jury in his opening statement that [Rothhaar] helped a friend do construction work on Mr. Capriotti's home...