Commonwealth v. RUSS R., A JUVENILE

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: COWIN, J.
• Citation: Commonwealth v. RUSS R., A JUVENILE, 433 Mass. 515, 744 NE 2d 39 (Mass. 2000)
• Decision Date: 10 November 2000
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. RUSS R., a juvenile.

433 Mass. 515

744 NE 2d 39

COMMONWEALTH v. RUSS R., a juvenile.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

November 10, 2000.

March 20, 2001.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & SOSMAN, JJ.

Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Scott P. Curtis for the juvenile.

COWIN, J.

General Laws c. 233, § 20E, authorizes Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appeals Court, and the Superior Court to issue an order granting immunity to a witness.¹ General Laws c. 119, § 56 (d), provides that judges presiding over jury sessions in the Juvenile Court Department² "shall have and exercise all the powers and duties which a justice sitting in the superior court department has and may exercise in the trial and disposition of criminal cases."³ The present case requires us to determine whether § 56 (d) provides Juvenile Court judges with the authority to grant immunity to a witness pursuant to the immunity statute. This question arises because in one statute the Legislature has enumerated three courts that have the authority to grant immunity, including the Superior Court but not the Juvenile Court; yet, in another statute, the Legislature provided Juvenile Court judges with all the powers of Superior Court judges in criminal proceedings. These two statutes appear to be in conflict. We therefore must decide whether the Legislature intended to confer on the Juvenile Court the Superior Court's power to grant immunity to a witness. We conclude that the Legislature did not so intend.

1. Background. We briefly summarize the relevant facts and proceedings. The juvenile was indicted as a youthful offender for breaking and entering with the intent to commit a felony, larceny of a firearm, possession of an unlicensed firearm, possession of a firearm with a defaced identification number, and receiving stolen property. Prior to trial in the juvenile session of the Quincy Division of the District Court Department, a judge in that court denied the Commonwealth's application for a grant of immunity to a witness, who was scheduled to testify for the Commonwealth.⁴ The judge denied the Commonwealth's application for immunity, ruling that § 20E "limits the authority to immunize witnesses to those `criminal proceedings . . . IN the superior court'" (emphasis in the District Court's order).

The Commonwealth appealed to a single justice of this court, who, after a hearing, reserved and reported the matter to the full court. We affirm the District Court judge's order denying the Commonwealth's application for an order granting immunity to the witness.

2. 1996 amendments to G. L. c. 119. In 1996, the Legislature made significant changes to the law governing juvenile offenders. See St. 1996, c. 200 (youthful offender act). These changes were designed primarily "to reduce or to eliminate certain protections previously available to all juvenile offenders in an effort to address growing concern about violent crimes committed by juveniles." Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 641 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Clint C., 430 Mass. 219, 227-228 (1999).

One of the changes wrought by the 1996 amendments was the repeal of the two-step transfer provision, G. L. c. 119, § 61, which provided that a case could be transferred from the Juvenile Court to the Superior Court in order to try a child fourteen years of age or older as an adult.⁵ Under the new law, the Commonwealth may proceed against a child by indictment in a Juvenile Court⁶ if the child is considered a "youthful offender."⁷ See G. L. c. 119, §§ 52, 54. The 1996 legislation permits Juvenile Court judges to treat violent juvenile offenders more severely than juveniles who commit less serious crimes, including sentencing such offenders to a State prison or house of correction. G. L. c. 119, § 58. See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 3, at 13 (Supp. 1999). In addition, the Legislature reaffirmed⁸ that a Juvenile Court judge has "all the powers and duties which a justice sitting in the superior court department has and may exercise in the trial and disposition of criminal cases."⁹ G. L. c. 119, § 56 (d), as appearing in St. 1996, c. 200, § 4 3. 1998 amendments to G. L. c. 233. In 1998, the Legislature "significantly broadened ... the procedural circumstances in which witnesses may be granted immunity." Commonwealth v. Dalrymple, 428 Mass. 1014, 1015 (1998). See St. 1998, c. 188, § 4. Prior to the 1998 amendments, only a Justice of this court could issue an order granting immunity to a witness and only at the grand jury stage of the proceedings. See G. L. c. 233, §§ 20C-20H, inserted by St. 1970, c. 408. Pursuant to the amended law, a Justice of this court, the Appeals Court, or the Superior Court "shall ... issue an order granting immunity to a witness, provided that such justice finds that the investigation or proceeding before the grand jury or the criminal proceeding in the supreme judicial court, appeals court or superior court involves an offense listed in section 20D[¹⁰] and that the witness did validly refuse, or is likely to refuse, to answer questions or produce evidence on the grounds that such testimony or such evidence might tend to incriminate him." G. L. c. 233, § 20E (a).

4. Discussion. Mindful of the history of the statutes and the subsequent amendments, as well as long-standing principles of statutory construction, we consider the relationship between G. L. c. 119, § 56 (d), and G. L. c. 233, § 20E. We acknowledge that the statutes at issue may be interpreted in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one. See Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 582-583 (1994), and cases cited. Thus, we presume that the Legislature was aware that § 56 (d) provided Juvenile Court judges with the authority of Superior Court judges in the trial and disposition of criminal cases when it amended the immunity statute to empower Superior Court judges to immunize witnesses in criminal proceedings. If the Legislature were aware that § 56 (d) gave the Juvenile Court the same powers, there was no need to refer specifically to the Juvenile Court in the immunity statute.

However, other canons of statutory construction lead us to a different conclusion, namely that the Legislature did not intend to grant immunity power to Juvenile Court judges. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we interpret it according to its ordinary meaning. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775 (2000), citing Victor V. v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 793, 794 (1996). "Of course, this meaning must be reasonable and supported by the purpose and history of the statute." Wright v. Collector & Treasurer of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996), citing Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839 (1986). Here, looking only at the language of § 20E, the statute provides that the Justices of this court, the Appeals Court, and the Superior Court have the power to immunize witnesses. The statute makes no reference to Juvenile Court or District Court judges.¹¹ See 1997 House Doc. No. 2044 (in letter to Senate and House of Representatives Governor William Weld wrote that proposed legislation would amend immunity statute to "grant this power to the justices of the Appeals Court and Superior Court as well" but did not mention judges of any other court). We are not permitted to add words to a statute that "the Legislature did not see fit to put there." General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 803 (1999), quoting King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 425 (1914). See Commissioner of Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 79, 82 (1999) ("Where, as here, the language of the statute is clear, it is the function of the judiciary to apply it, not amend it"). In addition, "a statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute." Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000), quoting Harborview Residents' Comm., Inc. v. Quincy Hous. Auth., 368 Mass. 425, 432 (1975), and cases cited. The Legislature enumerated three courts in the immunity statute, but did not include the Juvenile Court. Accordingly, the Legislature's actions suggest that it intended to exclude the Juvenile Court.

Further, where two statutes conflict, the later statute governs. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 398 Mass. 715, 718 (1986), citing Doherty v. Commissioner of Admin., 349 Mass. 687, 690 (1965). In this case, the immunity statute was amended two years after § 56 (d) was enacted. Similarly, where "a general statute and a specific statute cannot be reconciled, the general statute must yield to the specific statute." Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 118 (1973). See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992), citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) ("it is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general"); Morey v. Martha's Vineyard Comm'n, 409 Mass. 813, 819 (1991) (general language must yield to more precise language); Hennessey v. Berger, 403 Mass. 648, 651 (1988) (same). Section 56 (d) confers a general power on Juvenile Court judges in jury sessions ("all the powers and duties which a justice sitting in the superior court department has"), whereas § 20E provides the Justices of the enumerated courts with the specific power to immunize witnesses.

When rules of statutory construction produce conflicting results, we must discern, as closely as possible, what the Legislature intended. See Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934) (canons of statutory construction apply to ascertain meaning of statute, but if one canon does not effectuate purpose of statute as whole, it yields to "the wider view in order that the will of the legislature shall not fail"); ...