Commonwealth v. Scott

• Decision Date: 27 June 1925
• Docket Number: 111
• Citation: 284 Pa. 159,130 A. 317
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Scott, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

130 A. 317

284 Pa. 159

Commonwealth v. Scott, Appellant

No. 111

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 27, 1925

Argued May 25, 1925

Appeal, No. 111, March T., 1925, by defendant, from judgment of O. & T. Westmoreland Co., Nov. T., 1924, No. 276, on verdict of murder of the first degree in case of Commonwealth v. James Scott, alias James Allen. Affirmed.

Indictment for murder. Before DOM, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict of murder of the first degree upon which sentence was passed. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were various rulings and instructions, quoting record.

The judgment is affirmed and the record is ordered remitted for the purpose of execution.

James L. Colbert, with him Adam B. Shaffer and Patrick McKague, for appellant, cited: as to the remarks of the district attorney Com. v. Burner, 11 Pa. C.C.R. 428; Hager v. State 133 P. 263.

Nevin A. Cort, District Attorney, with him P.K. Shaner, Special Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE WALLING:

This appeal by defendant is from sentence on conviction of murder of the first degree. George Rea, the chief of police of the Borough of West Newton, Westmoreland County, and its only police officer, while on duty as such at about three o'clock on the morning of September 16, 1924, met the defendant, James Scott, and another young colored man named Evans and two colored girls. Attracted by their conversation he stopped them, to ascertain if they had any "moonshine." Satisfying himself that Evans had not, the officer turned to Scott and asked him, inter alia, if he had any "moonshine"; at which the latter drew a 38 calibre revolver and saying "This is what I have for you," shot him through the abdomen, inflicting a mortal wound. Defendant fled but was apprehended eight days later in West Virginia, where he was known by another name and at first denied his identity. Defendant set up self-defense to the effect that before he shot, the officer reached for his gun and said, "I will fix you"; but this defense was supported only by his own testimony and was disproved by that of his three companions and by other witnesses.

While a Commonwealth's witness was on the stand the district attorney said to defendant's counsel, "You have a vivid imagination" and, "We cannot even tell the truth." To which defendant excepted and requested the withdrawal of a juror. The trial judge refused the request, but cautioned the jury to entirely disregard the matter. This action was proper; while the remarks might well have been omitted, they were apparently harmless and certainly not of such gravity as to cause a mistrial. The effect of such incidents depends largely on the atmosphere of the trial and is for the discretion of the presiding judge, which here was wisely exercised.

Defendant denied knowledge of the official character of Rea and on that ground objected to evidence showing he was in fact a police officer. There was ample evidence, however, that defendant possessed such knowledge, including his own admissions, the fact that he lived and worked near-by and that the officer wore a badge and knew the defendant. Therefore, it was proper to show that Rea was a police officer and to refuse to strike out such testimony.

Defendant was not harmed by the Commonwealth's proof that a reward of $1,000 had been offered for his apprehension. At most it was immaterial. The case was such as to justify offering a reward and no harm was done in allowing that fact to appear. It could not well prejudice a defendant and under some circumstances might help him by tending to show a motive for the prosecution.

No exception was taken to the charge or request that it be reduced to writing and filed of record, hence it is not properly before us for review. Impelled, however, by the gravity of the defendant's situation, we have carefully examined the charge and find it entirely free from error and eminently fair to him. Of course a charge cannot be judged by a single sentence removed from its context.

We have also examined the entire record as is our duty under the Act of February 15, 1870, P.L. 15, to determine if, assuming the truth of the...