Commonwealth v. Scouton

• Decision Date: 10 July 1902
• Docket Number: 19-1902
• Citation: 20 Pa.Super. 503
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Scouton, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

20 Pa.Super. 503

Commonwealth v. Scouton, Appellant

No. 19-1902

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 10, 1902

Argued February 10, 1902 [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter]

Appeal by defendant, from judgment of Q. S. Sullivan Co.-1900, No. 7, on verdict of guilty in case of Commonwealth v. J. G. Scouton.

Indictment for libel. Before Mitchell, P. J., specially presiding.

At the trial defendant made the following motion:

Now, February 26, 1901, counsel for defendant move the court to quash venire of jurors in this case because the Christian and surname of the jurors are not stated as required by law. J. T. Forbes, J. E. Borton, F. A. Behr and J. W. McCartney, the names of the said jurors, should have been written in full.

The Court: The motion to quash the array of petit jurors is similar to the motion made at the February term of 1900. It is stated by counsel for commonwealth that at that time the motion to quash the array of petit jurors was refused. The minutes of this case show that the array of grand jurors was quashed at that time, but do not show whether the array of petit jurors was quashed or not. The fact that the minutes do not note the quashing of the array would seem to indicate that the motion to quash the array of petit jurors was overruled. In the opinion of the court the stipulation that the Christian names of the jurors put into the wheel shall be used is for the purpose of identification. The general practice in this court, and elsewhere, seems to be to use indiscriminately the Christian names or the initials. Most people are identified quite as well by initials as by their entire Christian names. The court does not think that the motion is well founded, and it is overruled. To which the defendant excepts, and at his request an exception is noted and bill sealed.

Defendant also made the motion:

Now, February 26, 1901, counsel for the defendant object to the trial of this case, and most respectfully suggest the following:

1. That a proper certificate has not been filed setting forth the disqualification, and the call on the Honorable Max L. Mitchell, P. J., of the 29th judicial district of Pennsylvania, to hold the regular term or to try this cause.

2. That the Honorable Max L. Mitchell, president judge of the 29th judicial district of Pennsylvania, has no right, power, jurisdiction or authority to try said cause.

3. That no legal court has been convened or is in session for the trial of this cause.

The Court: This is a very embarrassing motion for the court to decide at this time. However, it being called to the attention of the court that the following certificate has been made and signed by Judge Dunham, to wit:

Commonwealth v. John G. Scouton.]

In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Sullivan County, No. 7, February Sessions, 1900. Charge, Libel.

the above cause is certified to Honorable Max L. Mitchell, president judge of the 29th district of Pennsylvania, for him to dispose of.

December 1, 1900. Edw. M. Dunham, P. J.

We think that the objection of the defendant to Judge Mitchell's proceeding with the case must be overruled. To which the defendant excepts, and at his request an exception is noted and bill sealed.

Max L. Mitchell, P. J. [Seal]

The court refused to continue the case upon application of counsel for defendant on account of absence of a material witness.

B. F. Babcock was asked the question:"

Q. Did you ever have any conversation with J. G. Scouton in which the name of Judge Kraus was mentioned?

A. Yes, sir, once."

Counsel for defendant object to the question as not cross-examination.

Counsel for commonwealth propose to ask this witness whether he didn't tell certain parties that Mr. Scouton had told him certain things (giving him the words) about Judge Kraus.

This for the purpose of giving the witness an opportunity to admit or deny whether he did tell certain parties certain things and if witness denies it to contradict him.

Counsel for defendant object that this witness cannot be contradicted on any matter that is not material and that does not pertain to the evidence given by him in chief, namely, the denial of the alleged conversation between Mr. Bovee and the defendant; that to contradict the witness on other matters is immaterial and irrelevant, and the offer is vague and indefinite.

The Court: The purpose of the question being to show the bias of the witness, if he has any, and for the purpose of contradicting him, in the opinion of the court, the question is competent. The objection is therefore overruled, and the evidence admitted; to which the defendant excepts and at his request an exception is noted and bill sealed.

" Q. You were asked upon a former trial of this case if you had had a conversation with Mr. Scouton in regard to Judge Kraus, were you not?"

Counsel for the defendant object to the question as immaterial and incompetent.

The Court: I think it is competent, and the objection is therefore overruled. To which the defendant excepts and at his request an exception is noted and bill sealed.

" Q. You were asked upon the former trial of this case the question if you had a conversation with Mr. Scouton in regard to Judge Kraus, were you not?

A. I don't think I was asked on the other trial whether I had talked with Mr. Scouton about him or not. If I was I don't remember it.

Q. If you were asked that question, what was your answer?

A. I don't think I was asked it.

Q. Is it not a fact that your answer was, No, sir.

A. If I was asked it that was may answer, yes, sir. If I was asked that question on the other term of court that was my answer, No, sir, that I did not.

Q. Your answer is now that you did?

A. I did, yes, sir.

Q. Then you have changed your opinion since?"

The Court: Was this conversation since the last term of court?

A. No, sir."

" Q. (Mr. Mullen) Then your answer at this time is different from what it was the last time?

A. I might have made a mistake. A person is liable to make a mistake once in a while.

Q. Are you acquainted with James Thall of Cherry township?

A. Yes, sir."

Counsel for the commonwealth propose to ask the witness on the stand whether or not he had a conversation with John G. Scouton in the spring of 1898 in which John G. Scouton told him that he was going to ruin Judge Kraus, and whether or not he communicated this conversation to James Thall and John Yonkin of Cherry township on or shortly after the time in which the alleged conversation between himself and Scouton took place.

This for the purpose of showing the bias of the witness in this transaction and as affecting his credibility.

Counsel for the defendant object to the offer for the reason that it has no relation to the subject-matter to which the attention of the witness was called in chief; that the witness cannot be impeached or his testimony discredited by matters irrelevant to that in reference to which he was examined in chief; that this is not the proper method of impeaching the credibility of a witness offered by the defendant for the purpose of contradicting the evidence of a witness called on behalf of the commonwealth in regard to a statement alleged by said witness to have been made by Mr. Scouton, the defendant, to Mr. Bovee, in the presence of the witness on the stand.

The Court: In the opinion of the court the witness may be asked whether he had a conversation with Mr. Scouton in which Mr. Scouton said he would ruin Judge Kraus; but when counsel for commonwealth propose to follow that with proof that the witness made this statement to other people it certainly is not competent evidence.

Counsel for commonwealth propose to ask the witness whether or not he had a conversation with John G. Scouton in the spring of 1899, in which John G. Scouton stated to him that he was going to ruin Judge Kraus, or words to that effect.

Counsel for the defendant object to this offer for the reasons stated in their objections to the two last preceding offers on the part of the commonwealth; and for the additional reason that this is a part of the commonwealth's case in chief, and the attention of the witness was not called to this subject-matter by the counsel for the defendant in his examination in chief; that it is an indirect way of getting from this witness testimony for the purpose of discrediting him, which, if true, should be offered by the commonwealth in rebuttal or in its case in chief.

The Court: I am very doubtful whether it is competent, but I will overrule the objection and admit the evidence. To which defendant excepts and at his request an exception is noted and bill sealed.

" Q. State whether or not you had a conversation with John G. Scouton in the spring of 1899, or thereabouts, in which he told you he was going to ruin Judge Kraus?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you at any time, before or after this time, have such conversation?

A. No, sir."

Counsel for defendant desire the court to grant them an exception to these questions.

The Court: The defendant excepts to the last two questions asked witness and at his request an exception is noted and bill sealed.

Counsel for commonwealth now propose to ask this witness whether or not in the spring of 1898 he told James Thall and John Yonkin that John G. Scouton had told him that he would ruin Judge Kraus. This to be followed by evidence of James Thall and John Yonkin that he did so state to them, that Mr. Scouton had told him he was going to ruin Judge Kraus.

For the purpose of affecting the credibility of this witness.

Counsel for defendant object to the offer for the reason that it is not the proper way...