Commonwealth v. Sepulveda

• Decision Date: 28 November 2012
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Manuel Marcus SEPULVEDA, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

55 A.3d 1108

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee,

v.Manuel Marcus SEPULVEDA, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted July 25, 2008.

Decided Nov. 28, 2012.

Keisha Nicole Hudson, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Elizabeth Ann Larin, Federal Community Defender Office, Eastern District of PA, Michael Wiseman, Philadelphia, for Manuel Marcus Sepulveda.

Mark S. Matthews, Monroe County District Attorney's Office, Amy Zapp, PA Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CASTILLE.¹

This is a capital appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County denying appellant Manuel Marcus Sepulveda's petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. For the reasons that follow, we remand for further, limited proceedings before the PCRA court.

A. BACKGROUND

The facts underlying appellant's sentences of death are discussed more fully in appellant's direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 579 Pa. 217, 855 A.2d 783, 786–89 (2004) (plurality), cert. denied,546 U.S. 1169, 126 S.Ct. 1330, 164 L.Ed.2d 47 (2006). However, in order to adequately review appellant's claims herein, some background is required.

The evidence adduced at trial and summarized in Sepulveda established that on November 26, 2001, appellant was at the home of Daniel Heleva and Robyn Otto in Polk Township, Monroe County, where he resided with the couple and their two children. At approximately 6:30 p.m., John Mendez and Ricardo Lopez arrived at the house to recover two guns that Mendez claimed belonged to him. Appellant retrieved the guns and gave them to Mendez. Mendez and Lopez then left.

Later that night, Heleva returned to the house with Richard Boyko and discovered that the guns were missing. Another man, Jimmy Frey, was sitting in the living room watching television. Appellant explained to Heleva what happened with the guns and Heleva instructed Boyko to call Mendez. Mendez and Lopez returned to the house, but Heleva did not initially permit Lopez to enter. Heleva and Mendez had words and the two men began fighting in the kitchen. The fight was resolved and Lopez and appellant joined Mendez and Heleva in the kitchen. Boyko left the house to run an errand for Robyn Otto. Robyn Otto was upstairs in the house with her two children.

As the four men were sitting around the kitchen table, another argument erupted, at which point appellant grabbed a .12 gauge shotgun and shot Mendez in the stomach. He then shot Lopez in the side. Lopez collapsed on the floor. Appellant then placed the gun on Lopez's back and fired, killing him. Mendez escaped from the kitchen and ran upstairs. Appellant then chased him upstairs where he shot him a second time. Mendez was able to exit the house and flee to a neighbor's house. Appellant and Heleva followed him, entered the neighbor's property, seized Mendez, and dragged him back to Heleva's house. Meanwhile, Frey, who had been watching the incident, hid the shotgun in a sofa. After the men dragged Mendez back to the house, appellant struck him with a hatchet type of weapon, killing him. There was no evidence that either victim had, or displayed, a firearm when appellant murdered them.

In the interim, police received a 911 call from Heleva's neighbor, reporting a domestic disturbance. When the police arrived at Heleva's home, appellant initially denied knowledge of the incident, but then said he was assaulted by two men. The police placed appellant in the back of a police car, handcuffed him, and asked him where the woman was, since they still believed it was a domestic disturbance. Appellant responded: “There is no she. They are in the basement. I shot them.” Police found the dead bodies of Lopez and Mendez in the basement. The police found Lopez beneath slabs of insulation and dry wall material, with his pants pulled to his ankles. They found Mendez beneath a pile of laundry, stripped naked with his thumb in his mouth and with a rubber bungee cord wrapped tightly around his neck. See Sepulveda, 855 A.2d at 787, n. 6.

Police brought appellant to the State Police Barracks in Lehighton, at which time appellant gave multiple statements. The statements were inconsistent. Appellant initially accepted responsibility for the killings, but in a written statement he admitted to shooting Lopez only one time, placing blame for the second shot on Heleva. Appellant also admitted to shooting Mendez, but again placed the blame for the blows to Mendez's head on Heleva. These statements will be discussed in more detail infra, as they are relevant to one of appellant's PCRA issues.

At trial, appellant took the stand and testified to a version of events that was mostly consistent with his written police statement, with two notable exceptions.² Appellant also presented evidence supporting the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, suggesting that he was acting in defense of Heleva and Heleva's children at the time of the killings.

After the close of the guilt phase of appellant's capital trial, a jury sitting before the Honorable Ronald E. Vican convicted appellant of two counts of first-degree murder for the shooting deaths of Ricardo Lopez and John Mendez.³ Following a penalty hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance at each count, which it determined outweighed the two mitigating circumstances it found at each count, and returned two sentences of death. ⁴See42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)(“[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death ... if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.”). This Court affirmed on direct appeal. Sepulveda, 855 A.2d at 794.

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on August 9, 2006, and President Judge Vican appointed new counsel. This appointment was rescinded after the Philadelphia-based Federal Community Defender Office (“FCDO”), Capital Habeas Unit unilaterally entered its appearance.⁵ Federal counsel then filed a lengthy amended petition, alleging numerous claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing over four separate days. Following the hearing, the court denied relief. Appellant appealed to this Court.⁶

We summarize appellant's prolix issues as follows: (1) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present mental health evidence to support claims of diminished mental capacity, imperfect belief of defense of others, and mitigating evidence; (2) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of potential jurors; (3) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to properly question potential jurors who were excused because they expressed doubts about imposingthe death penalty; (4) whether counsel was ineffective in challenging appellant's inculpatory statements; (5) whether the jury was presented with materially false evidence by the Commonwealth and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert to dispute this evidence; (6) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to victim impact evidence; (7) whether error in the guilt phase jury instructions violated appellant's due process rights; (8) whether counsel had a conflict of interest; (9) whether appellant's rights were violated because no transcript exists of portions of his trial; and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the alleged errors warrants relief.⁷

In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court's determination “is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 593 Pa. 67, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (2007). To be entitled to PCRA relief, appellant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2), his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, and “the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial ... or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3), (a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the highest appellate court in which [appellant] could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(2). An issue is waived if appellant “could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, ... on appeal or in a prior state post conviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).

In order to obtain relief on a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Pennsylvania, we have applied the Strickland test by looking to three elements: the petitioner must establish that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error such that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987). Additionally, we note, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is recognized “not for its own sake,” but because of the effect it has on the accused's right to a fair trial. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For these reasons, counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance. Finally, both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that a court is not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of priority; instead, if a claim fails under any...