Commonwealth v. Shelley

• Decision Date: 12 April 2022
• Docket Number: 1183 EDA 2021
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DANIEL SHELLEY Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DANIEL SHELLEY Appellant

No. 1183 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 12, 2022

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 28, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001363-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM

OLSON J.:

Appellant Daniel Shelley, appeals from the May 28, 2021 order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.^[1] We affirm.

The record demonstrates that, on April 3, 2013, Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to third-degree murder and firearms not to be carried without a license.^[2] N.T., 4/3/13, at 25-26. That same day, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 22½ to 45 years' incarceration.^[3] Sentencing Order, 4/3/13. On April 15, 2013, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and requested an evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 4/15/13. On April 17, 2013, the trial court denied Appellant's request for a hearing and denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Trial Court Order, 4/17/13. Appellant did not appeal his April 3, 2013 judgment of sentence.

On April 15, 2014, Appellant filed a PCRA petition asserting claims of: (1) a constitutional violation that so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) unlawful inducement of a guilty plea. Appellant's PCRA Petition, 4/15/14; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i-iii). In particular, Appellant asserted that trial counsel ignored his requests to file a direct appeal challenging the validity of his guilty plea and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file such an appeal. Appellant's PCRA Petition, 4/15/14, at ¶¶49-51. On September 22, 2014, the PCRA court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Appellant's PCRA petition and reinstated Appellant's direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. PCRA Court Order, 9/22/14.

On October 14, 2014, Appellant lodged a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc, from his April 3, 2013 judgment of sentence. Notice of Appeal, 10/14/14. On January 12, 2016, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence on the ground Appellant waived his appellate challenges to the validity of his guilty plea because he failed to properly preserve the issues by raising objections during his plea colloquy. Commonwealth v. Shelley, 2016 WL 128545, at *1 (Pa. Super. Filed January 12, 2016) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not seek discretionary review by our Supreme Court, and his judgment of sentence became final on February 11, 2016. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, "[a] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review"); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (requiring a petition for allowance of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an order of this Court sought to be reviewed).

On January 27, 2017, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition asserting claims of: (1) a constitutional violation that so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) unlawful inducement of a guilty plea. Appellant's PCRA Petition, 1/27/17; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i-iii). The Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's petition. Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss, 6/20/17. On June 29, 2017, the PCRA court notified Appellant pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition. On August 3, 2017, the PCRA court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition, and permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw.

On August 7, 2017, Appellant appealed from the August 3, 2017 order dismissing his PCRA petition.^[4] In an October 6, 2017 per curiam order, this Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for failure file a docketing statement. Per Curiam Order, 10/6/17; see also Pa.R.A.P. 3517 (requiring an appellant to file a docketing statement with this Court).

On February 12, 2018, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition asserting, inter alia, a claim of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel and a claim of after-discovered evidence. Appellant's Pro Se PCRA Petition, 2/12/18; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) and (vi). On February 28, 2018, counsel for Appellant, having been appointed by the PCRA court, filed an amended PCRA petition. On March 15, 2018, the PCRA court granted Appellant's request to reinstate his collateral appeal rights nunc pro tunc.^[5] On appeal, this Court affirmed the August 3, 2017 order dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition, and our Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Commonwealth v. Shelley, 2018 WL 5861636 (Pa. Super. Filed November 9, 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 207 A.3d 284 (Pa. 2019).

On May 3, 2019, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed to represent Appellant, and, on November 14, 2019, counsel filed an amended PCRA petition and requested an evidentiary hearing. Counsel supplemented the amended PCRA petition with filings on October 30, 2020, and November 14, 2020. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 8, 2021, March 26, 2021, and April 19, 2021. On May 28, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition. This appeal followed.^[6]

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether new evidence supports allowing [Appellant] to withdraw his guilty plea and allow this case [to] be scheduled for a trial because of "a violation of the constitution of this Commonwealth or the constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place[?"]

2. Whether new evidence supports allowing [Appellant] to withdraw his guilty plea and allow this case [to] be scheduled for a trial because of "a plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused [Appellant] to plead guilty and [Appellant] is innocent[?"]

3. Whether new evidence supports allowing [Appellant] to withdraw his guilty plea and allow this case [to] be scheduled for a trial because of "the unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced[?"]

Appellant's Brief at X-XI (extraneous capitalization and citations omitted).

Preliminarily, we must address the timeliness of Appellant's PCRA petition since this implicates this Court's jurisdiction. In re Payne, 129 A.3d 546, 555 n.12 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 167 (Pa. 2016). It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and that if a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the claims and cannot grant relief. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding, courts do not have jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA petition). To be timely filed, a PCRA petition, including second and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date a petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). "A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA's jurisdictional time restriction is constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 2004).

As discussed supra, upon reinstatement of Appellant's direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc in September 2014, this Court subsequently affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence on January 12, 2016. Shelley, 2016 WL 128545, at *1. Appellant did not seek discretionary review by our Supreme Court, and, as such, his judgment of sentence became final on February 11, 2016. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a).

Therefore, Appellant's instant PCRA petition filed on May 3, 2019, more than three years after his judgment of sentence became final, is patently untimely.

If a PCRA petition is untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time-bar are as follows: "(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right." Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented.^[7] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective December 24, 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.

Here Appellant asserts the newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar based, inter...