Commonwealth v. Singletary

Decision Date17 December 2021
Docket Number2069 EDA 2020,J-A24005-21
Citation2021 PA Super 251
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. WAYNE SINGLETARY
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Appeal from the Order Entered September 24, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-23-CR-0006345-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. [*]

OPINION

LAZARUS, J.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, suppressing a firearm found as a result of a warrantless search of an automobile in which Wayne Singletary was a passenger.[1] After careful review, we affirm.

The court made the following findings of fact[2] after the suppression hearing:

On November 30, 2018, at approximately 12:30 p.m., in the vicinity of the 900 block of Lincoln [Street] in Chester City, Officer Terrence Taylor was on duty, in regular capacity, performing an area check [at] this location based on instruction to patrol the vicinity as a result of frequent nuisance calls for loitering-groups, loud noise, and open drug activity[.] Officer Taylor approached the area of the 800 block of Hughes Street and a large group of individuals began to disperse.
Officer Taylor parked and exited his vehicle to advise the group that loitering is not permitted in the area. Officer Taylor observed a Mercedes SUV, that was not running, parked in a legal parking spot, on the opposite side of the street [from where he parked his vehicle], [which had] two individuals sitting in the [front seats. Troy L. Harris was seated in the driver's seat and Singletary was seated in the front passenger seat.]
Officer Taylor approached the driver side of the vehicle and requested identification from both [Harris] and [Singletary]. [Harris] provided Officer Taylor with a passport and [Singletary] provided Officer Taylor with a [p]hoto ID. Officer Taylor, while still standing next to the driver side of the [Mercedes], radioed the information received from the identification provided, as well as the vehicle information [for confirmation and review of outstanding warrants]. Officer Taylor determined that [Harris'] driver's license was suspended, [] that the vehicle came back as ["no record found, "[3] listed no insurance, and that the documented owner was neither Harris nor Singletary].
Officer Taylor observed an empty pill bottle in [Harris'] lap[, which he determined-based on the label-might have, at some point, contained oxycodone prescribed to someone other than Harris or Singletary.] During this time, Officer Singleton[4] arrived on the scene at the passenger door [of the Mercedes]. Officer Taylor and Officer Singleton asked [Harris] and [Singletary] to exit the vehicle. As [Singletary] exited the vehicle, the officers heard a hard metal object hit the ground, at which point [Singletary] began to run from the officers. Officer Taylor gave chase, but did not apprehend [Singletary] at th[at] time.

Order, 9/24/20, at 1-2 (findings of fact paragraphs combined). The officers recovered a firearm with an obliterated serial number from the location where they heard the sound of a metal object striking the ground.

Later that day, Singletary was arrested and charged with one count each of: firearms not to be carried without a license;[5] altered or obliterated mark of identification;[6] flight to avoid apprehension or trial or punishment;[7]recklessly endangering another person;[8] and disorderly conduct.[9] On January 31, 2020, Singletary filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking to suppress the firearm. On July 31, 2020, the court held a hearing on Singletary's motion, where the court found the above facts, and the parties stipulated that, if called to testify at the suppression hearing, Officer Singleton would have testified that she saw the silver handgun fall from Singletary's lap as he got out of the car before he took off running. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/31/20, at 36-37. The court issued an order on September 25, 2020, granting suppression of the firearm. On October 23, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. The court did not order the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), [10] but the court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion nonetheless.

On appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Did the suppression court err by concluding that, at the time that [] Singletary was directed to exit the vehicle, the police lacked the legal authority to order [] Singletary to exit the vehicle?
2. Did the suppression court err by failing to conclude that the police interaction with the occupants of a parked vehicle, which began as a mere encounter, evolved into a lawful vehicle stop supported by reasonable suspicion and probable cause?

Appellant's Brief, at 1.

Our standard of review of a Commonwealth's appeal from a grant of a suppression order is well-settled:

[We] consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Richard, 238 A.3d 522, 525 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278-79 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Additionally, the appellate scope of review is limited to "only evidence presented at the suppression hearing." Commonwealth v. Moser, 188 A.3d 478, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085-87 (Pa. 2013)).

In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that it established reasonable suspicion sufficient to require Singletary to alight from the Mercedes because Officer Taylor articulated that: the pill bottle in Harris' lap clearly did not belong to either Harris or to Singletary; the pill bottle was recognized by the officers as immediately incriminating pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007) (plurality) (probable cause to search interior of vehicle existed based on limited automobile exception where, under totality of circumstances, officer observed pill bottle in plain view in vehicle stopped in area well-known for illegal prescription drug sales, officer was aware of other officer's pre-planned drug buy with passenger in defendant's vehicle, passenger agreed to procure additional drugs for officer, and there was no advanced warning that defendant or his car would be target of police investigation); the area where the vehicle was parked had a documented, on-going, open-air drug dealing problem; the Mercedes was uninsured and not properly registered; neither occupant had a valid driver's license; and, consistent with illegal drug activity, a large number of people fled the area surrounding the Mercedes just as Officer Taylor approached. The Commonwealth contends that, although these facts could have innocent explanations, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation, and that reasonable suspicion may nevertheless be established where suspicion of criminal conduct is reasonably based upon the facts of the matter. See Appellant's Brief, at 18-19 (citing Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004)).

In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues that reasonable suspicion and probable cause supported a vehicle stop, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b), because, pursuant to Richard, supra, once police learn that a vehicle is unregistered, probable cause sufficient to conduct a vehicle stop is established. Appellant's Brief, at 22. Moreover, the Commonwealth contends that, while investigating the scene further, police discovered that the occupants of the Mercedes seemed to have no lawful connection to it, the Mercedes was uninsured, the Mercedes had an improper registration attached to it, and the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Harris was driving with a suspended driver's license. Id. at 22-23. The Commonwealth concludes that "nothing in the Vehicle Code or in the appellate court decisions involving a vehicle stop says that a parked vehicle cannot be the subject of a lawful vehicle stop when the police have the requisite reasonable suspicion or probable cause to make a lawful vehicle stop." Appellant's brief, at 22-23 (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1106-07 (Pa. Super. 2019)). Finally, the Commonwealth relies on case law that permits the police to request a driver and passengers to alight from a lawfully stopped car, as a matter of right, without additional reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. Super. 1995). We disagree with both of the Commonwealth's claims.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543 550 (Pa. Super. 2008). A "warrantless search or seizure of evidence is . . . presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8, subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions." Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. Super. 2019). Courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate varying levels of suspicion to justify citizen interactions, which interactions have been organized into three...

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