Commonwealth v. Snyder
Decision Date | 09 April 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 2060 EDA 2019,2060 EDA 2019 |
Citation | 251 A.3d 782 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Christopher SNYDER, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Lee B. Awbrey, Public Defender, Norristown, for appellant.
Robert M. Falin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Christopher Snyder appeals from his June 20, 2019 judgment of sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of corruption of minors, indecent assault without consent, indecent assault of person unconscious, and indecent assault with a person less than thirteen years of age. After careful review, we affirm Appellant's conviction, affirm in part and vacate in part Appellant's judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing.
The trial court provided the following factual summary of this case:
Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/19, at 1-2.
A jury trial commenced on March 12, 2019. At its conclusion, the jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned charges. On July 20, 2019, he was sentenced to nine to twenty months of imprisonment followed by eight years of probation. As part of his sentence, Appellant was ordered to pay $500 in non-mandatory fines along with the costs of prosecution.
Appellant was also found to be subject to lifetime tier-based registration under Subchapter H of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code as a consequence of his conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7). See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.14(d)(8), 9799.15(a)(3) ( ). Appellant was determined not to be a sexually violent predator ("SVP"), and he filed no post-sentence motions.
Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. Both he and the trial court timely complied with their obligations under Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:
Appellant's brief at 3.
Appellant's first issue concerns the dates listed on the information filed by the Commonwealth, which he characterizes as a claim arising under Commonwealth v. Devlin , 460 Pa. 508, 333 A.2d 888, 890 (1975) ( ). This claim concerns the sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth, over which our standard and scope of review is well-established:
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to accord each witness’ testimony and to believe all, part or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. As an appellate court, we may not re-weight the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.
Commonwealth v. Steele , 234 A.3d 840, 845 (Pa.Super. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Appellant's argument implicates the timeline presented in the Commonwealth's information, which he claims differed from the evidence at trial. See Appellant's brief at 11-12 (). In pertinent part, the information set forth allegations that Appellant committed these offenses within a date range of November 1, 2017 through March 6, 2018. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth misled Appellant by "abandoning" these dates at trial after Appellant presented an alleged alibi. Id . Thus, Appellant asserts that this purported chronological shift invalidated his alibi defense. See Appellant's brief at 14-15 (quoting Devlin , supra at 891 n.1 ) ("[A] variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof offered at trial will not be deemed fatal ‘unless it could mislead the defendant at trial, involves an element of surprise prejudicial to the defendant's efforts to prepare his defense, precludes the defendant from anticipating the prosecution's proof, or impairs a substantial right.’ ").
The content and function of criminal informations is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 560, which provides as follows with respect to allegations concerning the dates of charged offenses:
Pa.R.Crim.P. 560. Consistent with this statutory language, the dates set forth in an information do not inextricably bind the Commonwealth to that timeline:
[T]he date laid in the indictment is not controlling, but some other reasonably definite date must be established with sufficient particularity to advise the jury and the defendant of the time the Commonwealth alleges the offense was actually committed, and to enable the defendant to know what dates and period of time he must cover if his defense is an alibi[.]
We are also mindful of the following legal principles regarding the Commonwealth's burden to establish a reliable date as to the offense:
Commonwealth v. Brooks , 7 A.3d 852, 857-58 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal quotation marks and some citations omitted).
While acknowledging that the victim in this case was unable to provide a precise date for the assault, we also note that Commonwealth v. Jette , 818 A.2d 533, 535 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Groff , 378 Pa.Super. 353, 548 A.2d 1237, 1242 (1988) ). Thus, "for the purposes of a Devlin claim, the Commonwealth must be allowed a reasonable measure of flexibility when faced with the special difficulties involved in ascertaining the date of an assault upon a young child." Groff , supra at 1241.
Reviewing the certified record in this case, we cannot agree with Appellant's assertions that the Commonwealth's allegations at trial were fatally dissimilar from those contained in the information. While the Commonwealth could not provide a precise date, the victim averred that the assault took place in the fall of 201...
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