Commonwealth v. Soaris

• Decision Date: 06 April 1931
• Citation: 175 N.E. 491,275 Mass. 291
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. SOARIS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

275 Mass. 291

175 N.E. 491

COMMONWEALTH

v.SOARIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

April 6, 1931.

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County.

Joaquim Pita Soaris was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and he appeals on an assignment of errors.

Judgment on the verdict.

J. Linhares, of Cambridge, for appellant.

F. A. Crafts, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth.

PIERCE, J.

On May 22, 1930, after a trial on two indictments, the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree of Angelina Rodriques and Matilda Silva. The case is before this court under St. 1925, c. 279, as amended by St. 1926, c. 329, on an assignment of errors.

At the trial the evidence which was not in great dispute warranted the jury in finding as proved beyond a reasonable doubt the following facts: The defendant had met Angelina Rodriques at Christmas, 1928, and again in April, 1929. He lived in New York and she in Lowell. During the interval they corresponded. In April, 1929, the defendant visited Lowell, renewed his acquaintance with her, fell in love with her and she with him, and they entered into an engagement to be married. The defendant returned to New York and their correspondence was continued. He came to Lowell again in May, 1929, and visited her. He did not see her again until he made a visit in February or March, 1930. On this visit he learned that his friend, one Gomes, was to be married on March 1, 1930, to Mary Silva. He did not attend the wedding ceremony but visited the house in the evening. On the following day, after he had purchased a ticket for New York, he visited the Silva house and found some of the wedding festivities still in progress, and there met Angelina Rodriques. He said good-bye to her and started to go to the railroad station. At the station he was told that she the night before was dancing with a married man. When the train arrived he decided not to take it but to take a later train. He returned to the Silva house where the festivities were still going on, and after a while went into the front room where people were dancing. While in this room he saw Angelina Rodriques dancing with one arm on the top of a man and she mocked him with a gesture, which was illustrated to the jury. At about seven o'clock in the evening of March 2, 1930, she left the house and entered an automobile. The defendant followed her and asked her to talk with him. She left the automobile and he asked her what wrong he had done to her that she should mock him. She laughed and said ‘I got no time. I got to go back.’ He followed her back to the automobile, handed her the letter she had written him, and asked her why she had written him if she hadn't loved him, and she smiled, saying, ‘Everybody makes a mistake.’ As the driver was starting the car the defendant shot four bullets, these killed Angelina Rodriques and Matilda Silva who was seated between her and the driver, and wounded the driver.

On the day before and on the day of the shooting the defendant had drunk considerable wine and beer. He testified that he did not remember any of the details of the shooting, and that the first time he knew of it was when he was told about it by the nurse in answer to his questions. He also testified that as the automobile started to move away he thought it ‘was going in the river,’ which he said was forty-five or fifty feet away; that he became excited and then his mind went blank. It was agreed that there was no river at all in the immediate vicinity.

The defendant's assignment of errors numbered ‘1’ is based upon the contention that a compliance with St. 1929, c. 105, is a condition precedent to the placing of the defendant on trial for murder under these indictments, and that the report of the department of mental diseases filed by the two experts fails ‘to determine his mental condition and the existence of any mental disease or defect would would affect his criminal responsibility.’ The report of the experts contains the ‘Psychiatric findings. He [the defendant] is at present mentally depressed. Does not, however, present other evidence of mental disease. His depression seems to us to be related to the situation in which he now finds himself. He states that he does not want to live and it is stated by others that he has threatened to commit suicide.’ In answer to the question: ‘State definitely whether, in the opinion of the examiner, the prisoner is suffering from any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility,’ the experts replied: ‘In view of his general condition, we do not believe that he is fit to stand trial at the present time. We recommend that he be sent to some hospital until such time as he recovers from his present condition.’ On the filing of this report a judge of the superior court ordered the defendant be committed for observation to the Bridgewater State Hospital, ‘there to be confined and treated for a period of sixty days. Report to be made within thirty days.’ In accordance with the court order the medical director made a report to the court which ended with the summary of fact which follows: ‘In fact, beyond being depressed he showed nothing abnormal in his mental reactions. He has apparently recovered at this time, does not show any depression of any sort, takes an active interest in the things that are taking place in the ward, enjoys himself playing cards with other inmates, and I am sure he is well enough to be returned to your court and stand trial for the crime for which he is accused.’ It is plain the report of the experts, plus the report of the medical director of the Bridgewater State Hospital, is not obnoxious to the contention of the defendant that the examination of the defendant was perfunctory or incomplete, ‘so that it appeared that the defendant was as much sane as insane.’ It is obvious the reports of the official experts, plus the report of the medical director, is a compliance with the statute, and that the facts so found and reported justified the judge in directing that the defendant be put to trial upon the indictments. Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391, 396, 153 N. E. 881;Commonwealth v. Vallarelli (Mass.) 173 N. E. 582.

The assignment of errors numbered ‘2’ is based upon the refusal of the judge to allow a motion to continue the trial to permit one Dr. Larrabee to re-examine the defendant. In support of this motion the defendant's attorney stated, in substance, that Dr. Larrabee had examined the defendant at St. John's Hospital, soon after the shooting, and was at that time not satisfied as to his mental condition; and that the doctor's illness had prevented a re-examination before the trial. The allowance of the motion rested within the sound discretion of the trial judge, no abuse of which is here shown. Commonwealth v. Donovan, 99 Mass. 425, 96 Am. Dec. 765;Commonwealth v. Drake, 124 Mass. 21, 24;Commonwealth v. Hurley, 158 Mass. 159, 162, 33 N. E. 342;Commonwealth v. Brothers, 158 Mass. 200, 205, 33 N. E. 386;Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, 364, 153 N. E. 834. In his consideration of the motion the trial judge could give weight to the report of the medical director, above quoted. Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391, 395–397, 153 N. E. 881.

The assignments of errors numbered ‘3,’ ‘4’ and ‘5’ are based upon the contention that the statements made by the defendant to the captain of police in the city of Lowell and to the medical director at the Bridgewater hospital should have been excluded, because they were received without the defendant having been warned of his legal rights relative to answering questions. The statements above referred to related to events leading up to the shooting and to the shooting itself. Whether these statements be considered as an admission or confession, as to which see Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 18, 141 N. E. 571, they were not inadmissible because the defendant was not warned that anything he said might be used in evidence against him. Commonwealth v. Szczepanek, 235 Mass. 411, 413, 126 N. E. 847;Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 243 Mass. 519, 137 N. E. 879, 38 A. L. R. 113;Commonwealth v. Jokinen, 257 Mass. 429, 154 N. E. 189. The fact that the defendant was in custody and did not know it, and the fact, if it be one, that the medical examiner to test the defendant's mental capacity did not need to question him about the details of the crime, did not prove that the admissions of the defendant were procured by inducements engendering either hope or fear. Commonwealth v. Storti, 177 Mass. 339, 343, 58 N. E. 1021;Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090.

The assignments of errors numbered ‘6,’ ‘7,’ ‘9’ and ‘10’ relate to the judge's charge upon the contention that the defendant was of unsound mind at the time of the shooting. It is stated in the defendant's brief that the ‘actual physical fact that the defendant shot the two girls in question was not denied,’ and that the real defense was that ‘as the result of a...