Francis South (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We affirm.
The trial court provided a summary of the facts and procedural history of this case:
On March 1, 2019, Lijera (sp) Glass ( [ ] Ms. Glass) was working at McDonald's [Restaurant], located at 1576 Chester Pike, Eddystone, Delaware County. During her shift, Ms. Glass called 911 and [reported that an adult white male was passed out in the restaurant, and during the call, he got up and proceeded to exit the building and stumble through the parking lot.] ...
As a result of the call, the following dispatch was put out by [the 911 Dispatcher]: "1576 Chester Pike, one five seven six, the Mcdonalds. Ill older white male in the parking lot, wearing a gray coat." Officer Ryan Sweet, while on patrol for the Eddystone Police Department, received the dispatch and drove to the McDonalds.
Upon arrival, Officer Sweet located the individual, later identified as Appellant, outside by the exit, crouched down, nodding in and out of sleep. He made contact with Appellant and asked if he was alright. Appellant did not seem to comprehend what Officer Sweet was saying and just kept telling Officer Sweet that he was about to go home on the bus. When Officer Sweet asked Appellant where he lived, Appellant gave him three different addresses. During their interaction, Officer Sweet observed Appellant's pupils to be constricted and his demeanor to be disoriented; Appellant appeared to be under the influence. Officer Sweet observed an orange syringe and a silver spoon in Appellant's front, left coat pocket, items commonly associated with drug use.
Appellant refused any medical treatment, despite its availability. Officer Sweet placed Appellant into custody and a search incident [to] arrest yielded six, blue wax paper baggies stamped "lightening hit" which were filled with a white powder. The substance contained within the baggies was sent to the lab for testing and positively identified as heroin. Appellant was arrested and charged with [possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and public drunkenness.]
On June 20, 2019, Appellant waived his preliminary hearing ... and all charges were bound over to the [trial court].
On July 19, 2019, a status hearing was held where counsel for Appellant advised that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-113.7. Specifically, the [m]otion alleged that Ms. Glass reported a potential overdose to 911, in good faith, on the reasonable belief that Appellant was in need of immediate medical attention in order to prevent his death or serious bodily injury due to a drug overdose, and that she provided her name and location and remained with Appellant until the police arrived; therefore, satisfying the elements of the statute and making Appellant immune from prosecution. The Commonwealth told [the trial court] that it would provide a disc containing the audio recording of the 911 call for its review. In support of his [m]otion, counsel for Appellant attached the Affidavit of Probable Cause, the transcript of the 911 call, the 911 event information[,] and a 911 event chronology. The [m]otion was taken under advisement.
On August 26, 2019, a status hearing was conducted; wherein [the trial c]ourt told the parties that the [m]otion was being denied, placing its reasoning on the record. [ ] Specifically, [the trial c]ourt explained that, based upon the language of the statute, and the audio/transcript of the call, Ms. Glass did not call 911 because she reasonably believed that Appellant was in need of medical attention in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury due to a drug overdose event; and [ ] Ms. Glass remained at the location solely because she was working, and more importantly, did not actually remain with Appellant as he was outside, and unattended when Officer Sweet arrived. Counsel for Appellant asked [the trial c]ourt to reconsider denying the [m]otion and to review [ Commonwealth v. Carontenuto , 148 A.3d 448 (Pa. Super. 2016) and Commonwealth v. Lewis , 180 A.3d 786 (Pa. Super. 2018) ]. The [c]ourt agreed to do so.
On September 5, 2019, another status hearing was held. [The trial c]ourt told the parties that it was constrained by the strict interpretation of the statute to deny the motion. [The trial c]ourt codified its decision via [o]rder, with the following footnote: "to achieve its interest in saving lives, the act provides immunity from prosecution for persons who call authorities to seek medical care for a suspected overdose victim. Here, the caller did not suspect an overdose; rather, the caller thought it was a syncopal episode, which takes it outside the clear language of the statute." ...
On October 8, 2019, a stipulated bench trial was conducted wherein the parties agreed to forego testimony and rely upon the Affidavit of Probable Cause [ ], the Incident Report [ ], the written record of the CAD report from the 911 call [ ], the lab results[,] the audio recording of the 911 call [ ], and the transcript of the 911 call [ ]. [ ] Based upon the exhibits, [the trial c]ourt entered a verdict of guilty [for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia]. Appellant was found not guilty of [public drunkenness].
Appellant elected to proceed to immediate sentencing and was sentenced to [an aggregate of 2 years of probation].
On November 6, 2019, counsel for Appellant filed a timely appeal, challenging the denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-113.7.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/20, at 1-5 (footnotes and italics omitted). Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
Appellant presents a single issue for our review:
Whether the [trial] court lacked authority to convict and sentence [Appellant], because he was immune from prosecution pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-113.7 ("Drug Overdose Response Immunity")?
Appellant's Brief at 4 (italics omitted).
Appellant's issue involves the interpretation and application of the Drug Overdose Response Immunity Act (the Act). Our standard of review is well settled:
A trial court's application of a statute is a question of law, and our standard of review is plenary. Moreover, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law. ... In interpreting any statute, appellate courts must take note of the principles of statutory interpretation and construction. The principal objective of interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intention of the legislature and give effect to all of the provisions of the statute. In construing a statute to determine its meaning, courts must first determine whether the issue may be resolved by reference to the express language of the statute, which is to be read according to the plain meaning of the words. When analyzing particular words or phrases, we must construe them according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. Words of a statute are to be considered in their grammatical context. Furthermore, we may not add provisions that the General Assembly has omitted unless the phrase is necessary to the construction of the statute. A presumption also exists that the legislature placed every word, sentence and provision in the statute for some purpose and therefore courts must give effect to every word.
Commonwealth v. Lewis , 180 A.3d 786, 788 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).
Appellant argues that he was entitled to immunity under the Act because "Ms. Glass called 911 in good faith to report [Appellant's] ‘drug overdose event’ believing immediate medical attention was necessary to prevent his death or serious bodily injury." Appellant's Brief at 10. Appellant avers that Ms. Glass "cooperated with the 911 Dispatcher, provided her name and location, and remained with [Appellant] until emergency personnel arrived." Id. at 10. Accordingly, Appellant asserts that because "Ms. Glass is immune, [Appellant] is entitled to derivative immunity" pursuant to Section 780-113.7(c). Id. at 10-11.
In response, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court correctly denied Appellant immunity under the Act because: (1) Appellant failed to prove that Ms. Glass reasonably believed that he was overdosing and needed immediate medical attention to prevent death or serious bodily injury; and (2) Appellant failed to prove that Ms. Glass remained with him until Officer Sweet arrived. Commonwealth's Brief at 6.
"In an effort to prevent overdose deaths, the Legislature provided for immunity from prosecution for certain crimes when a person has a reasonable belief someone is suffering from an overdose and contacts local authorities. The Act provides this immunity to both the reporter and the victim, so long as several conditions are met." Lewis , 180 A.3d 786, 787-88 (Pa. Super. 2018).
The Act, in relevant part, provides:
(a) A person may not be charged and shall be immune from prosecution for any offense listed in subsection (b) ... if the person can establish the following:
(1) law enforcement officers only became aware of the person's commission of an offense listed in subsection (b) because ...
(2) all of the following apply:
(i) the person reported, in good faith, a drug overdose event to a law enforcement officer, the 911 system, a
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