Commonwealth v. Spurgeon

• Decision Date: 03 April 1981
• Citation: 428 A.2d 189,285 Pa.Super. 563
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. McDuffy SPURGEON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

428 A.2d 189

285 Pa.Super. 563

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. McDuffy SPURGEON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

April 3, 1981

Argued Dec. 1, 1980.

Mabel Ditter-Sellers, Ambler, for appellant.

Ronald T. Williamson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Norristown, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before PRICE WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

WATKINS Judge:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, by the defendant-appellant, McDuffey Spurgeon, which dismissed the defendant's pre-trial motion requesting the court to quash certain criminal informations brought against him.

On July 22 1979 one Jeffrey Benton was struck and killed by a motor vehicle while he was walking along a roadway. On August 23 1979 the defendant was arrested and charged with Homicide by Vehicle (75 Pa.C.S.A. 3732 ), which is a misdemeanor of the first degree, Reckless Driving (75 Pa.C.S.A. 3714 ), a summary offense, Failure to Stop Vehicle at the Scene of an Accident where death or personal injury occurs, (75 Pa.C.S.A. 3742 ), a misdemeanor of the third degree, and Unsworn Falsification to Authorities (18 Pa.C.S.A. 4904 ), a misdemeanor defined under the crimes code and graded pursuant thereto, in connection with Benton's death. A preliminary hearing was held on August 30, 1979 before a District Justice. After the hearing the District Justice dismissed the reckless driving charge on the grounds that the Commonwealth had not proved a "prima facie" case against the defendant. The other charges were held for court. The defendant then filed his Motion to Quash the other charges claiming that: (1) he is subject to double jeopardy as a result of the other charges being held for court; (2) the principle of collateral estoppel should be applied to the Commonwealth relative to the charges bound over for court; and (3) Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code (18 Pa.C.S.A. 110 ) bars prosecution on the charges held for court. On January 14, 1980 the court below issued an order refusing defendant's Motion to Quash and defendant appealed therefrom.

Once again we are confronted with a situation wherein several offenses arising from a series of incidents, some summaries and some criminal, are brought against a defendant. The difficulty with such cases is that summary cases are tried before the District Justice and his rulings with regard thereto are final unless an appeal is taken to the Common Pleas Court ^[1] while in the case of criminal charges (felonies and misdemeanors) the District Justice merely determines whether sufficient evidence exists to hold the defendant for court, in other words, whether the Commonwealth has proved a "prima facie" case against the defendant. In the instant case the District Justice held that the Commonwealth had failed to prove a "prima facie" case against the defendant on the reckless driving charge which is a summary offense. This ruling constitutes an acquittal of the defendant on that charge since the standards for proving a "prima facie" case are less than are the standards for obtaining a final conviction. Thus, where the Commonwealth failed to prove even a "prima facie" case against the defendant on that summary charge it surely failed to present enough evidence to convict the defendant and the District Justice's ruling, despite the nomenclature he gave to it, constitutes an acquittal of the defendant on the reckless driving charge and he cannot be tried subsequently for that offense. The issue before us is whether the District Justice's acquittal of the defendant on the reckless driving charge bars any further prosecution of the defendant on the other charges.

The offense of Homicide by Vehicle is defined in 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3732 as follows:

"Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death."

Thus, in order to prove this offense the Commonwealth must show that: (1) the defendant unintentionally caused the death of another person; (2) while engaged in the violation of any law of the Commonwealth or municipal ordinance which pertains to the operation or use of a vehicle as to the regulation of traffic; and (3) that the said violation was the cause of the person's death. Since the offense of reckless driving constitutes a violation of the law of the Commonwealth and pertains to the use of a motor vehicle element two of the above tests would be met if the defendant were convicted of reckless driving. The defendant argues, in effect, that since he was acquitted of this charge the Commonwealth is precluded from prosecuting the defendant on the Homicide by Vehicle charge because the reckless driving conviction is a necessary element of the Homicide by Vehicle charge. The difficulty with this argument is that the statute does not establish reckless driving as a necessary prerequisite (and therefore a necessary element) of the crime of Homicide by Vehicle. The statute states that element two of the above test is met if it is established that the defendant violated any law of the Commonwealth or municipal ordinance pertaining to the use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic. (Emphasis-ours) Thus, if the Commonwealth were to prove that the defendant violated a law pertaining to vehicles other than the reckless driving provision and that said violation caused the death of a person the defendant could still be convicted of the Homicide by Vehicle charge. In the instant case, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with two violations pertaining to the use of vehicles, reckless driving, and failure to drive at a safe speed. While defendant was acquitted of the reckless driving charge he was bound over for court on the speeding charge. It would, therefore, be possible for the Commonwealth to prove defendant's guilt by proving, at trial, that he violated the speeding statute with which he was charged. Such a situation would not involve the re-litigation of the reckless driving charge which has been decided in defendant's favor and thus would not subject him to being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. This is so because the elements of the speeding statute are different from the elements of the reckless driving statute.

In Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980), the lead opinion of this court held that the legislature, in adopting The Homicide By Vehicle statute intended to establish culpable negligence as a necessary element of the crime of Homicide by Vehicle. The lead opinion reasoned that the use of the word "homicide" in the nomenclature of the offense necessitates a finding that the voluntary act of the defendant which caused the death be done ...