Commonwealth v. Stahl

• Decision Date: 07 February 2023
• Docket Number: 1522 WDA 2021,J-S36034-22
• Citation: 2023 PA Super 17
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID FRANK STAHL Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

2023 PA Super 17

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
DAVID FRANK STAHL Appellant

No. 1522 WDA 2021

No. J-S36034-22

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

February 7, 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 7, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001233-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J. ^[*]

OPINION

COLINS, J.:

Appellant, David Frank Stahl, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas (trial court), which dismissed his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)^[1] without a hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

On June 27, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder for strangling his wife to death and the trial court the same day sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without parole. Following the trial court's imposition of restitution and denial of Appellant's timely post sentence motion, Appellant timely appealed, and this Court on November 29, 2016 affirmed his

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judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Stahl, 159 A.3d 601 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on May 31, 2017. Commonwealth v. Stahl, 169 A.3d 554 (Pa. 2017).

On August 9, 2017, Appellant filed a "Petition for Release of Notes of Testimony and All Other Related Documents," which the trial court treated as a timely first PCRA petition. The trial court appointed PCRA counsel to represent Appellant and Appellant's PCRA counsel on December 8, 2017 filed a PCRA petition raising the claim that Appellant's two trial counsel were ineffective for failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense. 2017 PCRA Petition at 7-12. Following a hearing, the trial court on December 6, 2018 denied that PCRA petition. Appellant timely appealed, and this Court on October 8, 2019 affirmed. Commonwealth v. Stahl (Stahl III), 222 A.3d 818, No. 35 WDA 2019 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on May 13, 2020. Commonwealth v. Stahl, 233 A.3d 678 (Pa. 2020).

On July 22, 2020, Appellant filed the instant second PCRA petition in which he asserted that his PCRA counsel was ineffective in representing him with respect to his first PCRA petition and for failing to pursue claims that he asked her to assert. 2020 PCRA Petition at 4. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Appellant on this PCRA petition and that second PCRA

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counsel on November 23, 2020 filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). On February 17, 2021, the trial court entered a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss this PCRA petition without a hearing both on the ground that it was time-barred and on the ground that Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel were without merit.

Appellant filed a pro se response to the trial court's Rule 907 notice addressing both the timeliness issue and the nature of the claims that he sought to assert. In this response, Appellant contended that his 2020 PCRA petition was timely under the government interference and newly discovered facts exceptions to the PCRA's time bar, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii), and that he should be allowed to assert a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel promptly after the completion of appeals from the denial of his first PCRA petition because he had no other opportunity to do so. Response to Rule 907 Notice at 1-10. Appellant also stated in his response that he was asserting the following three claims of ineffective assistance of the PCRA counsel appointed to represent him on his first PCRA petition: 1) failure to pursue a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not asserting a challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) to the selection of an all-female jury; 2) failure to pursue a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking a change of venue;

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and 3) ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel in investigating and litigating the voluntary intoxication ineffectiveness claim that she did pursue. Response to Rule 907 Notice at 11-19.

On November 17, 2021, the trial court issued an order dismissing Appellant's second PCRA petition without a hearing and granting second PCRA counsel's motion to withdraw. Trial Court Order, 11/17/21. This order, however, was not delivered to Appellant, as the copy sent to Appellant was returned to the trial court as undeliverable. Trial Court Order, 12/7/21. On December 7, 2021, the trial court accordingly entered an amended order served on Appellant with a copy of the November 17, 2021 order, stating that the November 17, 2021 order remained in effect and advising Appellant that he had thirty days from December 7, 2021 to appeal. Id. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant argues in this appeal both that his 2020 PCRA petition is not time-barred and his three claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel are meritorious. We conclude that Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel are barred by the PCRA's time limit and therefore affirm the dismissal of his 2020 PCRA petition without considering whether the trial court was also correct in ruling that those claims could be dismissed on the merits without a hearing.

The PCRA provides that "[a]ny petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the

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judgment becomes final." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A PCRA petition may be filed beyond the one-year time period only if the convicted defendant pleads and proves one of the following three exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. In addition, these exceptions can apply...