Commonwealth v. Stanley

• Decision Date: 12 November 2019
• Docket Number: Record No. 0962-19-3
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. JARED WILLIAM STANLEY

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. JARED WILLIAM STANLEY

Record No. 0962-19-3

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

NOVEMBER 12, 2019

UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges O'Brien, Russell and Senior Judge Clements

Argued by teleconference

MEMORANDUM OPINION^* BY JUDGE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY

Chadwick S. Dotson, Judge

Victoria Johnson, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General; Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.

C. Adam Kinser (Kinser Law PLC, on brief), for appellee.

Pursuant to Code § 19.2-398(A)(2), the Commonwealth of Virginia appeals the circuit court's pretrial order granting Jared William Stanley's motion to suppress certain evidence that was discovered in the course of examining Stanley's electronic devices, which were seized by police subsequent to an unrelated arrest of Stanley.

Based on evidence found on the electronic devices, Stanley is charged with ninety-nine counts of possession of child pornography in violation of Code § 18.2-374.1:1.¹ Despite the fact that the seizure and examination of the electronic devices occurred after police had obtained search warrants authorizing the same, the circuit court granted Stanley's motion to suppress thedigital evidence that was recovered from the devices. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the circuit court erred in suppressing the evidence, reverse the judgment of the circuit court regarding the evidence discovered as a result of the May 10, 2018 search warrants, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

When reviewing a circuit court's decision to grant a motion to suppress evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case Stanley, and grant him all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067 (1991).

On May 8, 2018, officers with the Big Stone Gap Police Department served a warrant and protective order on Stanley, who was staying in a hotel room. Officers knocked on his door, and, when Stanley opened the door, Officer Robert Smith immediately detected "a strong odor of marijuana coming from the room" and observed a "very large amount of marijuana" on the bed inside the room.² Officers then detained Stanley, handcuffed him, and placed him in a chair inside the room. Stanley was read his Miranda rights and gave the officers consent to search his room. Smith located various smoking devices and methamphetamine inside a backpack. He also saw "dolls and little girls' stuff everywhere in the room." Also located in the room were several electronic devices, including phones, laptops, and several thumb drives (collectively the "electronic devices").

According to Smith, Stanley claimed all the marijuana in the room and the backpack were his, but the methamphetamine inside the backpack was not. He stated that none of theelectronic devices belonged to him. He also advised that "none of the dolls or baby stuff was his. It was all from friends from a rave party."

Lieutenant Mark Jones arrived to assist in processing the scene. He testified that he observed several electronic devices such as thumb drives and laptops. He also saw "baby doll heads with panties pulled over them, children's clothes, toys, things like that."

After his arrest, and as officers were transporting Stanley to the magistrate's office, Stanley expressed concern to Smith regarding the seizure of the electronic devices and "kept asking over and over if [Jones] [was] taking his electronic devices . . . ." Stanley informed Smith that "if [Jones] gets a hold of those devices, I'm done, so if I get bond, I'm running." He also stated, "I know what's on them, but they're not mine."

On May 10, 2018, Jones sought and obtained eighteen search warrants, one for each device, for the various electronic devices found in Stanley's hotel room. He described the items sought to include "[p]ictures, stored data, to include video of drug transactions, names and addresses of customers, contacts and data related to children - nude, semi nude or engaging in sexual acts[.]" Jones provided the following averment in support of each of the eighteen search warrant applications:

I am a [lieutenant] with the Big Stone Gap Police [Department with] 28 [years] of [experience] working numerous fraud, theft and drug cases. During those years it has become clear that persons who buy, [sell,] and traffic in illegal substances keep calendars, names and addresses of those customers on their cell phones and often record and photograph those sales. They also use [cell] phones as the primary tool in communicating with their suppliers, customers and other drug dealers. They also use other types [of] electronic media to save contacts and drug sales and inventory. Statements made by Jared William Stanley indicated that the dolls dressed as little girls and bottles and pacifiers were used for sexual gratification involving a sexual [fantasy involving] small children. He stated that he and his friends would get high at "rave parties" and just stare at the dolls dressed in little girl panties for sexual reasons. He stated if he was given a bond he would disappearbecause of what we would find on the cell phones, thumb drives, and computers.³

After executing the search warrants on May 10, 2018, Jones began to review the data on Item 10, a thumb drive.⁴ He noted that "[d]uring the search of Item 10, a USB thumb drive, it showed that the suspect is wearing female undergarments and his penis covered in a child[']s sock." Coupled with what Jones previously had observed in Stanley's hotel room, this new information led Jones to seek yet another search warrant for the hotel room. The warrant application sought permission to search the hotel room again and allow for the seizure and inspection of "clothing of a child, toys that a child would play with, items of clothing or devices to restrain a child, drugs used to sedate a child, [and] any device that can store, record, or copy images of child porn." In the affidavit supporting the new warrant application, Jones averred that he previously had

executed 18 search warr[a]nts on a Jared William Stanley for various electronic devices. During the search of Item 10[,] a USB thumb drive[,] it showed the suspect wearing female undergarments and his penis cover[e]d in a child[']s sock. . . . I had [previously] observed these clothing items lying around Room 32 Country Inn. Based on the search of the thumb drive I believe that there are more devices hid away in the room that contain child porn. During the [previous] search of the room . . . I observed and photographed children[']s toys, bottles and clothing that at the time didn't seem criminal, until I viewed Item 10, thumb drive, that displayed the suspect wearing these items and [thought] of his sexual fanta[s]y about children.

The new search warrant was issued on May 11, 2018 and was executed in the normal course.

Stanley moved to suppress the evidence discovered and seized pursuant to the warrants. In his written motion, he sought suppression of

all evidence seized, both oral and physical, and any property seized as a result of the arrest, detention, or interrogation of [Stanley] and in the search of [his hotel room] and the seized electronic devices . . . and . . . the fruits of such searches and seizures, including but not limited to an[y] statements made by [Stanley].

In his motion, Stanley asserted suppression was appropriate because the affidavits supporting the warrants failed to establish probable cause, the warrants failed to sufficiently specify the items to be seized, the affidavits contained assertions by Jones that Stanley alleged were unknown to Jones at the time he made the affidavits, and that an insufficient inventory of what was seized was filed regarding the initial warrants.⁵

During the hearing on his motion to suppress, Stanley argued that nothing in Jones' affidavits supporting the May 10 and 11 warrants provided a basis for concluding that there was probable cause to search either the electronic devices or the room for child pornography; however, he appeared to concede that there was probable cause to allow the officers to search the room and electronic devices for evidence related to drug crimes. Specifically, after noting that "[t]he motion to suppress only encompasses the child pornography charges[,]" Stanleyacknowledged that the officers "did have probable cause to search for the drugs." Then, referring to his statement "that if . . . given a bond he would disappear because" of what would be found on the electronic devices, Stanley argued the statement "doesn't give you probable cause to search for pornography that you never had probable cause to search for to begin with, especially in light of the fact the reason you got the warrants was to search for the drugs and the calendars, names, addresses, videos, photographs, drugs, and inventories" associated with drug transactions. (Emphasis added).

In response, the Commonwealth argued that the affidavits for the May 10 search warrants provided probable cause "under two separate theories at the same time, one for the drugs and one for the child pornography." Although it argued that the affidavits supplied sufficient probable cause under the child pornography theory, the Commonwealth noted that the eighteen search warrants and subsequent seizure and examination of the electronic devices would be legitimate even if there were insufficient probable cause under the child pornography theory so long as there was probable cause under the drug theory. The Commonwealth, relying on the affidavits and what it characterized as the issue having been "conceded by" Stanley, argued that the warrant applications provided probable cause for the electronic devices to be searched for photographic and other files related to drug transactions. As the Commonwealth explained, if the officers were...