Commonwealth v. Stanley S.
| Citation | 100 Mass.App.Ct. 298,177 N.E.3d 926 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-P-1324,19-P-1324 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. STANLEY S., a juvenile. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Elena M. Rosnov, Saugus, for the juvenile.
F. McDonald Wakeford, IV, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Wolohojian, Desmond, & Grant, JJ.
This case raises the question whether a seventeen year old who gives an incomplete name to police and does not answer when asked his date of birth is entitled to the benefit of the Massachusetts doctrine that precludes custodial interrogation of a juvenile who has not had the opportunity to consult with an "interested adult." On these facts, we hold that the juvenile should not have been subjected to custodial interrogation and that his statements to police must be suppressed. We vacate the adjudication of delinquency and remand for further proceedings.
Background. Charged with receiving a stolen motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a ), the juvenile filed a motion to suppress his statements, which the motion judge denied. After a jury found the juvenile delinquent, the trial judge continued the case without a finding. See Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 464, 961 N.E.2d 581 (2012). The juvenile now appeals. See Commonwealth v. Oswaldo O., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 553, 116 N.E.3d 35 (2018). He argues that (1) the motion judge erred in denying the motion to suppress; (2) the trial judge should have excluded his statements as involuntary, based on his trial testimony that he had smoked marijuana; and (3) the trial judge should have allowed his required finding motion because there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the stolen motor vehicle.
Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. a. Evidence at suppression hearing. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the motion judge's findings of fact absent clear error and "make an independent determination as to the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205, 950 N.E.2d 421 (2011). We summarize the facts found by the motion judge, supplemented by undisputed details adduced at the suppression hearing.
At about 11 P.M. on Tuesday, February 14, 2017, a State police trooper was alerted by a LoJack1 device to the presence of a stolen Toyota Corolla (Toyota or car) in a hotel parking lot in Boston. The trooper drove his marked cruiser past the car, walked near it, and saw two people inside. The trooper returned to his cruiser and called for backup. Just then, the two people got out of the car and ran, jumping over a snowbank. The trooper drove after them and apprehended them; they were the juvenile and another youth.2 The trooper handcuffed them and placed them in separate police vehicles. After the trooper read him the Miranda warnings, the other youth said he did not know anything about the car and had been only sitting in it.
Then the trooper spoke to the juvenile, reading him the Miranda warnings. When the trooper asked his name, the juvenile replied with his first and middle names, spelling the first name and stating that the middle name was his surname. Asked for his date of birth, the juvenile did not respond. The trooper then asked who owned the car, and the juvenile replied that he had bought it for $100. When the trooper expressed doubt about that, the juvenile admitted to seeing the car parked on the street and taking the car. Asked where the ignition key was, the juvenile said he did not know.
The trooper entered the juvenile's first and middle names into a computer database, on the understanding that the middle name was a surname. The search yielded no data about any such person. The trooper then searched the juvenile's backpack and found school papers bearing the juvenile's first name and true surname.3 Entering that first name and surname in the database, the trooper learned that the juvenile was seventeen years old and had been charged with other crimes. After learning that the juvenile was seventeen years old, the trooper ceased questioning, told him that he would be summonsed to appear in court, and released him.
At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth argued that by failing to tell the trooper his surname or date of birth, the juvenile "engage[d] in deceit as to his identity," and "los[t] his privilege to the presence of an interested adult during questioning." The juvenile argued that the interested adult doctrine is a "bright-line" rule, so absent information as to his age, the trooper should have refrained from questioning him without his having had an opportunity to consult with an interested adult. The motion judge credited the trooper's testimony, including that he did not know that the juvenile was under the age of eighteen. The judge ruled that the trooper was not required to have "the skill of a carnival showman in guessing ages," and that the juvenile "gave false information to the [t]rooper about his identity and refused to give the [t]rooper his date of birth when asked to provide one," which "remove[d] this case from the analysis required by the interested adult rule."
b. The "interested adult" rule. The Commonwealth bears the "heavy burden" to prove that a criminal defendant waived constitutional rights against self-incrimination before being subjected to custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 800, 54 N.E.3d 495 (2016), aff'd, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017). That "burden grows heavier still" in a case like this one, involving custodial interrogation of a juvenile. Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 164, 28 N.E.3d 385 (2015). General Laws c. 119, § 53, requires that children in court are "treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." See Commonwealth v. Ulani U., 487 Mass. 203, 207, 166 N.E.3d 430 (2021) ; Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575-576, 998 N.E.2d 1003 (2013). See generally R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.3 (2d ed. 2006).
The Massachusetts "interested adult" rule is a common-law doctrine, created in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 131-135, 449 N.E.2d 654 (1983), as applying to juveniles between fourteen and sixteen years old, and extended to apply to seventeen year olds in Smith, 471 Mass. at 162, 166-167, 28 N.E.3d 385. The rule requires that, prior to waiving constitutional rights, a juvenile be given a " ‘genuine opportunity’ to consult with an ‘interested adult.’ "4 Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 438 Mass. 372, 384, 780 N.E.2d 1244 (2003). See id. at 380-384, 780 N.E.2d 1244 (). See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 786-787, 170 N.E.3d 286 (2021). See also J.A. Grasso, Jr., & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 18-6[a] (2020 ed.).
"The ... purpose of our rules pertaining to the opportunity for consultation with an adult is because ‘most juveniles do not understand the significance and protective function of these rights even when they are read the standard Miranda warnings,’ they ‘frequently lack the capacity to appreciate the consequences of their actions,’ and the opportunity for consultation with an adult ‘prevent[s] the warnings from becoming merely a ritualistic recitation wherein the effect of actual comprehension by the juvenile is ignored.’ " Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 382, 780 N.E.2d 1244, quoting A Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 131, 132, 449 N.E.2d 654. "[T]he naïveté, immaturity, and vulnerability of a child will imbue the objective communications of a police officer with greater coercive power." Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 699, 152 N.E.3d 108 (2020). In Commonwealth v. Lopez, 485 Mass. 471, 482 & n.12, 151 N.E.3d 367 (2020), the court expressed "concern" about the validity of the Miranda waiver of a seventeen year old, although that interrogation occurred prior to Smith, 471 Mass. at 162, 28 N.E.3d 385, and so the interested adult rule did not apply.
Where police did not give a juvenile the opportunity to consult with an interested adult, the Commonwealth may make an "alternative showing of ‘circumstances [demonstrating] a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the juvenile.’ " Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 384, 780 N.E.2d 1244, quoting A Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 134, 449 N.E.2d 654. Before the motion judge, the Commonwealth argued that it had made that showing based on the trooper's testimony that the database yielded information that the juvenile had previously "been charged with other crimes." However, the Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence of what crime or crimes those were, or the outcomes of those cases. Contrast Alfonso A., supra at 384-385, 780 N.E.2d 1244 (). Where the Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence to support that alternative showing, we decline to remand the case for it to have another opportunity to attempt to do so. Contrast id. at 385-386, 780 N.E.2d 1244 ().
The Commonwealth argues that in this case the police should be excused from adherence to the interested adult rule because the juvenile gave a "false name and refused to give his date of birth" to police. In some circumstances, a juvenile's evasiveness may be some evidence of "a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication," Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 380, 780 N.E.2d 1244, quoting A Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 134, 449 N.E.2d 654, demonstrating that the juvenile could waive the Miranda rights without consulting an interested adult. That was not shown here. To begin with, it is not at all clear to us that the juvenile gave a "false" ...
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