Commonwealth v. Stevenson
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21 WAP 2021 |
| Citation | 283 A.3d 196 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Viktor L. STEVENSON, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Brandon Paul Ging, Esq., Allegheny County Public Defender's Office, for Appellant.
Keaton Carr, Esq., Michael Wayne Streily, Esq., Allegheny County District Attorney's Office, Paul R. Scholle, Esq., for Appellee
OPINION
A trial court found Victor Stevenson ("Appellant") guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating a final order issued pursuant to the Protection from Abuse ("PFA") Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101 - 6122. On appeal to the Superior Court, Appellant argued that the evidence of record was insufficient to support his conviction because the Commonwealth failed to present adequate proof that he received proper notice of the final PFA order from a member of law enforcement or a person tasked by the trial court to provide such notice. The Superior Court rejected this argument, holding that the subject of a final PFA order must have notice of the order to be found guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating the order but that it is unnecessary for a member of law enforcement or a person designated by the court to provide that notice.
We granted allowance of appeal to review the intermediate court's decision. For the reasons that follow, we hold that, to convict a defendant of indirect criminal contempt for violating a PFA order, the Commonwealth must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time of the violation, the defendant had actual knowledge of the PFA order, regardless of how the defendant gained this knowledge. Here, the Commonwealth met that burden; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
On August 23, 2019, Ashley Yates ("Yates"), Appellant's former fiancé with whom he had resided, filed an ex parte petition seeking the issuance of a temporary PFA order against Appellant. It is undisputed that a temporary PFA order was issued and served on Appellant on that date. Appellant was advised that a hearing to adjudicate a final PFA order was scheduled for September 9, 2019. Appellant, however, failed to appear at the hearing. After the hearing, the trial court entered a final PFA order that was to be in effect until September 9, 2021. Among other things, the order directed that Appellant was evicted and excluded from Yates’ home.
On September 12, 2019, Yates filed a complaint charging Appellant with indirect criminal contempt for violating the final PFA order. Appellant's non-jury trial for that charge occurred on October 25, 2019. Yates was the first witness to testify at the trial. She stated that her video cameras captured Appellant outside of her home in the early morning hours of September 12, 2019.
The only other witness to testify at Appellant's trial was Danielle Sutton ("Sutton"), Yates’ cousin. Sutton testified that, at 3:30 a.m. on September 12, 2019, she was sleeping at Yates’ home when she was alerted that someone was in the basement of the home. Sutton went to the basement, where she discovered Appellant. Sutton informed Appellant, "You can't be here." N.T., 10/25/2019, at 15. According to Sutton, Appellant told her that he was leaving, and he asked her not to call the police. Sutton responded, Id. at 16. Appellant then left with a fan and heater. Notably, when the prosecutor directly asked Sutton whether she informed Appellant "that there was a PFA in effect," she said, "Yes ... [a]t 3:30 in the morning." Id. at 17.
Sutton testified that, when she woke up the next morning, she noticed that video surveillance cameras at the home were turned up toward the ceiling. Consequently, she called the police, who came to the home and observed the cameras. Sutton informed the police of what had occurred in the early morning hours when she encountered Appellant. She also indicated that the family dog was missing. The police then left Yates’ home.
Sutton further testified that, approximately 30 to 45 minutes after the police left Yates’ home, Appellant walked up to the front of Yates’ home with the family dog, causing Sutton to state once more that Appellant could not be there. She also informed Appellant that the police had just left and that she was going to call them again. Appellant then stated, Id. at 16.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of indirect criminal contempt. On January 31, 2020, the court sentenced Appellant to six months of probation. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
In the Superior Court, Appellant argued that, to prove him guilty of indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth had to establish the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: "(1) the order in question must be definite, clear, specific and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor must have had notice of the specific order or decree; (3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent." Appellant's Superior Court Brief at 14 (citations omitted).
Appellant averred that the Commonwealth's evidence failed to meet the second of these four elements, as it allegedly did not demonstrate that Appellant had notice of the final PFA order when he went to Yates’ home on September 12, 2019. Relevant to the instant appeal, Appellant took the position that, to prove that he received notice of the final PFA order, the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that this notice was provided to him by a member of law enforcement or by someone designated by the trial court. Because the Commonwealth did not present any such evidence at his trial, Appellant insisted that the Superior Court should reverse his sentence and conviction for indirect criminal contempt. In support of this position, Appellant relied primarily upon the Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Padilla , 885 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. 2005), which we now briefly summarize.
On the afternoon of November 12, 2004, Padilla's victim received an emergency PFA order stating that Padilla was to have no contact with the victim for 18 months. Approximately two days later, the victim informed the police of the PFA order and the fact that Padilla had threatened her over the phone and attempted to enter her home. When police arrived at the victim's home, she handed an officer her phone, stating that Padilla was on the line. The caller denied that he was Padilla and hung up. The officer called Padilla's cell phone number, leaving a message that the victim had obtained a PFA order against him and that he was to have no contact with her.
Soon thereafter, Padilla returned the officer's call. During that conversation, the officer again informed Padilla of the no-contact order and the consequences of violating it. However, Padilla continued to call, threaten, and harass the victim. Padilla was then served with a copy of the order, and the calls ended. A trial court subsequently found Padilla guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating the PFA order and sentenced him.
On appeal to the Superior Court, Padilla argued that the telephone conversation that he had with the police officer was insufficient to prove that he received notice of the PFA order. In response, the Superior Court acknowledged that, to establish that Padilla committed indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia , that Padilla had notice of the PFA order. However, discussing this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Stallworth , 566 Pa. 349, 781 A.2d 110 (2001), the intermediate court explained that, for purposes of the aggravating circumstance related to the death penalty found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(18),1 this Court held that "a person who has killed the subject of a protective order becomes death penalty eligible by having actual notice of the order or the constructive equivalent." Padilla , 885 A.2d at 997. Applying that holding, the Padilla court concluded that "the telephone conversations during which [Padilla] was informed of the emergency order and the repercussions of violating it constitute actual notice or its equivalent even in the absence of personal service." Id. Notably, the intermediate court in Padilla found support for this conclusion in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6106(g), which concerns the service of PFA orders and specifically provides, "Failure to serve shall not stay the effect of a valid order." Id. (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 6106(g) ).
Turning back to the instant matter, the Superior Court rejected Appellant's argument that the Padilla court held that notice of a PFA order must be provided by a member of law enforcement or a person designated by the court. In so doing, the intermediate court stated that "Pennsylvania law makes clear that the Commonwealth may establish the notice element of indirect criminal contempt with evidence showing the defendant received actual notice or possessed equivalent knowledge of a PFA order."2 Superior Court Memorandum ("Memorandum") at 5 (). Along these same lines, the Superior Court observed that "Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that, for purposes of proving indirect criminal contempt, verbal communications can adequately convey notice that a PFA order has been entered against the defendant and that a violation of that order places the defendant at risk of criminal sanctions." Id. (...
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Commonwealth v. Brock
... ... "the Commonwealth must demonstrate beyond a reasonable ... doubt that, at the time of the violation, the defendant had ... actual knowledge of ... the PFA order, regardless of how the defendant gained this ... knowledge." Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 283 A.3d ... 196, 199 (Pa. 2022) ... In his ... first issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient ... to support his convictions ... In reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to support ... the conviction, we must determine ... ...
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Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol 53, No. 05. February 4, 2023
...The object of the Protection From Abuse (‘‘PFA’’) Act is self-evident—to protect PFA plaintiffs from abuse. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 283 A.3d 196, 205 (Pa. 2022). A similar statutory scheme exists for victims of sexual violence and intimidation. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 62A01—62A20. A plaintiff ......