Commonwealth v. Stumpo
| Decision Date | 29 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | 499-509 |
| Citation | 2 Phila. 202 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Frank Stumpo |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
(1) The judicial code mandates the trial judge to criticize and correct the conduct of a judicial officer where such conduct prejudiciously affects pending cases. Code of Judicial Conduct, Comment, 3(b)
(2) As an officer of the Court, the prosecutor is bound to maintain the utmost respect for the Court and its rulings; his disagreements with the Court during the pendency of a proceeding are to be aired only within the judicial system as prescribed by law since the ABA Standards and the Code of Professional Responsibility forbid the prosecutor from making public statements critical of a Court's ruling in a pending case. ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, § 5.10; Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(E)
(3) It is mandated that the prosecutor make no public statements to the news media attacking the Court's rulings or implying a defendant's guilt regarding a matter that is still before the Court
(4) All litigants are entitled to a hearing and determination by an impartial tribunal, and no judge should preside in a case where he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent of extraneous influences; a judge has an obligation to recuse himself if he cannot be impartial. Code of Judicial Conduct 3C(1); ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 1.7
(5) When considering a recusal motion, a trial judge has an obligation not to recuse himself when there is no reason for doing so. ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, Comment to § 1.7
(6) The trial judge to whom the petition for recusal is directed must pass on the legal sufficiency of such petition
(7) To guard against any frivolous and unfounded accusations of bias and to thwart " judge shopping" the party seeking to disqualify the trial judge for bias or the appearance of impropriety must state with particularity the facts upon which he seeks disqualification
(8) The alleged bias and prejudice in a petition for recusal must not arise out of evidence presented at trial or out of an earlier related proceeding, or from the judge's possession of definite views on the law, or from an impersonal prejudice which goes to the judge's background, associations learnings or experience
(9) It is incumbent on a trial judge to make statements and rulings for the guidance of counsel and the jury; these statements and rulings cannot be the basis of personal bias of the trial judge
(10) It is a most egregious error for the prosecutor to present evidence which he knows or has reason to know cannot be true; it is his affirmative duty to correct the testimony of any witness which he knows to be false
(11) Prosecuting attorney is an officer of the court and has a duty to see that justice is not compromised in an effort to seek convictions
(12) Prosecuting attorney enjoys an office of unusual responsibility; his trial conduct should never be vindictive or attempt in any manner to influence the jury by arousing their prejudices
(13) Where a prosecutor intends that non-probative evidence destroy the credibility of a defense witness who is the only disinterested witness to an incident, and whose testimony corroborates defendant's version as to what happened, the evidence is prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt and justifies the granting of a new trial
(14) A motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge who is in a position to more adequately assess the situation that caused it.
Nicolas J. Nastasi, Esquire, for Defendant Murphy
Lloyd George Parry, Esquire, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth
This matter is before the Court on the District Attorney's motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge because of alleged bias and prejudice. For reasons that hereinafter appear, the petition and evidence presented in support of same are insufficient as a matter of law to effect my disqualification and therefore must be denied.
The case sub judice was assigned to me by the Calendar Judge in September of 1978, and trial was tentatively scheduled for November 6, 1978. On October 11, 1978, I was assigned for immediate trial the case of Commonwealth v. Murphy [1] which, like the instant one, involved a policeman charged with assault and related crimes while acting in an official capacity. No objection to my impartiality was made by the prosecutor when these cases were first assigned to me or at any time during the Murphy trial. The Murphy case aborted in a mistrial on October 27, 1978. It was only then, after I was constrained to grant such mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct, that I was charged by the prosecutor with bias.
Availing himself of the public forum, Mr. Rendell himself unwarrantedly denounced me personally, the judiciary in general, and my ruling in particular. Then, after still another ex-parte statement to the press announcing that he would request that another judge try the Murphy case and seek my recusal in this case, on the afternoon of November 2, 1978, the Thursday before the Monday when the case was to be tried, the present petition [2] was filed.
This Court cannot permit to go unchallenged the District Attorney's public attack on the judicial proceeding before me, my judicial integrity, and the integrity of the judiciary in general. I would be remiss in my responsibility as a judge were I to suffer in silence. The judicial code mandates me to criticize and correct the conduct of a judicial officer where such conduct prejudiciously affects pending cases. Code of Judicial Conduct, Comment 3(b).
Both the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, § 5.10 (Approved Draft, 1971) and the Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-107(E) forbid the prosecutor from making public statements critical of a Court's ruling in a pending case. See Commonwealth v. Starks, 479 Pa. 51, 387 A.2d 829, 831 (1978); Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 411-12, 327 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1974). As an officer of the Court, he is bound to maintain the utmost respect for the Court and its rulings. His disagreements with the Court during the pendency of a proceeding are to be aired only within the judicial system as prescribed by law. It is highly improper that the District Attorney of Philadelphia exploit his public position by means of publicity connected with a pending case. ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, § 5.10.
As a quasi judicial official,[3] the prosecutor is subject to a higher ethical standard than defense counsel. By virtue of his position, the District Attorney wields awesome powers, which, if abused, will have a devastating effect on the rights of the accused and the judicial process. It is therefore mandated that he make no public statements to the news media attacking the Court's rulings or implying a defendant's guilt regarding a matter that is still before the Court. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 1 P.C.R. 440, 459-461 (1978).
Mr. Rendell's out-of-court appeal in the press, where his remarks could not be challenged by the Court or the defendant, were not made in the interest of justice. As suggested by defense counsel, the petitioner, had he been more interested in justice and less interested in publicity, would have been better advised to have presented this petition directly to the Court, in camera, with less public tumult and panache. [4] Such a course of action would not have allowed the District Attorney to project blame on the trial judge for his staff's prosecutorial shortcomings.
Mr. Rendell's thinly veiled disingenuous remarks were as much a continuation of prosecutorial abuse of discretion as they were a cover up for prosecutorial failures. His klaxon cry for the investigation of the trial judge [5] was particularly unfortunate since it could be interpreted as a calculated attempt to intimidate me, compromise my impartiality and affect the outcome of these two cases now pending before me. The implication is further buttressed by the seemingly insolent remark that he was putting all judges in Philadelphia " on notice" . Such " notice" had a particularly menacing quality: Do as I say or else suffer the consequence of being publicly pilloried. [6]
It is pertinent to reassert the obvious. The Court is a separate and independent branch of government solemnly charged with the adjudication of disputes that arise in the community. It must at all times remain the impartial arbiter, administering justice objectively between the state and the individual. The equanimity of the Court must be immunized from the passions and prejudices of the community. A public prosecutor clothed with the aura of respectability inherent with such office is obligated to assiduously protect the Court's integrity. Any conduct by such quasi judicial officer which would denigrate a member of the Court or disseminate information so as to infuse the judicial process with prejudice, or use a case for self promotion, is the very antithesis of the prosecutor's invested responsibility to the administration of justice. The prosecutor is jurisprudentially and statutorily bound to publicly display respect for the Courts and their verdicts, since, absent such respect, law enforcement becomes a travesty.
In the exercise of my judicial prerogative, I condemn the District Attorney's practice of commenting on and criticizing rulings of the Court in pending cases in the press, and reassert the principal that a prosecutor shall not engage in publicity in connection with a pending case.
There can be no argument with the legal maxim that all litigants are...
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