Commonwealth v. Tanner
Decision Date | 27 February 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 211 WDA 2018,211 WDA 2018 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Brian D. TANNER, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Christopher P. Lacich, Youngstown, OH, for appellant.
Jonathan R. Miller, Assistant District Attorney, New Castle, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Brian D. Tanner (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 - 9546. After careful review, we affirm in part, and reverse and vacate in part.
In January 2015, Appellant, the former secretary-treasurer of Shenango Township (Township), Lawrence County, was charged with dealing with proceeds of unlawful activities, conspiracy to commit dealing with proceeds of unlawful activities, forgery, corrupt organizations, access device fraud, and theft by unlawful taking or disposition. The charges arose from Appellant's alleged receipt of unauthorized compensation in the amount of $ 650,000, in addition to his W-2 salary, as well as his alleged unauthorized credit card purchases using the Township's credit card. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion for change of venue, claiming that because of the immense media coverage, he would be denied a fair and impartial trial in Lawrence County. After a hearing held on July 9, 2015,1 the court denied Appellant's motion without prejudice.
The case proceeded to trial, and following direct examination of the Commonwealth's third witness, affiant Lawrence County Detective Vincent Martwinski, Appellant decided to enter a negotiated guilty plea to seven counts of forgery,2 three counts of theft by unlawful taking or disposition,3 and two counts of access device fraud.4 On April 6, 2016, the Honorable Dominick Motto, sitting as the trial court, accepted the Commonwealth's recommendation, and imposed a sentence of 2½ to 5 years of incarceration, five years of probation, and $ 449,000 in restitution ($ 330,000 to be paid to Shenango Township and $ 119,000 to be paid to Selective Insurance Company, the Township's bonding company).
Appellant neither filed post-sentence motions nor a direct appeal. On April 12, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition; counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. On September 26, 2017, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, and on November 1, 2017, held oral argument on the petition. On January 23, 2018, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:
Appellant's Amended5 Brief at 4.
The standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears , 624 Pa. 446, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). "To be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, [that his] conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) [.]" Id.
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in failing to grant him a new trial, where counsel was ineffective for: inducing him to plead guilty; failing to prepare him and witnesses for trial; never hiring investigators or reviewing the video/audio recordings of the Commonwealth's potential witnesses; and advising him that his wife's arrest was imminent if he did not plead guilty. Appellant claims that he "was ready and willing to prove his innocence at trial through cross-examination, third-party witnesses, documents, and his own testimony, but was thwarted by his own counsel's failure to adequately investigate and prepare for his trial and/or to properly advise/strategize with him pre-trial." Appellant's Amended Brief at 27. Succinctly stated, Appellant asserts that "counsel's lack of investigation, preparation and coherent strategy clearly led to [his] abrupt guilty plea, mid-trial."Id. at 29. After careful review of the parties' briefs, the relevant case law and the certified record, we agree with the PCRA court's determination that counsel was not ineffective for the above-enumerated reasons. We rely upon the opinion, authored by Judge Motto, in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief on these ineffectiveness of counsel issues. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/23/18, at 29-33 ( ); id. at 42-45 ( ).
In his next issue, Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the court's decision to deny, without prejudice, his request to transfer venue due to negative pre-trial publicity, or to request a change of venire.
We first note that the mere existence of pre-trial publicity does not warrant a presumption of prejudice. Commonwealth v. Chambers , 546 Pa. 370, 685 A.2d 96, 103 (1996). "Our inquiry must focus upon whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of the defendant's guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity." Commonwealth v. Marinelli , 547 Pa. 294, 690 A.2d 203, 213 (1997) (quotation omitted). Normally, what prospective jurors tell us about their ability to be impartial will be a reliable guide to whether the publicity is still so fresh in their minds that it has removed their ability to be objective. Commonwealth v. Briggs , 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 314 (2011). The discretion of the trial judge is given wide latitude in this area. Id.
For pre-trial publicity to be presumptively prejudicial, a defendant must prove, inter alia, "that the publicity [was] so extensive, sustained, and pervasive without sufficient time between publication and trial for the prejudice to dissipate, that the community must be deemed to have been saturated." Commonwealth v. Rucci , 543 Pa. 261, 670 A.2d 1129, 1141 (1996). The publicity must be so inflammatory and slanted toward conviction "rather than factual and objective." Marinelli , 690 A.2d at 213 (quotation omitted). "Finally, even if there has been inherently prejudicial publicity which has saturated the community, no change of venue is warranted if the passage of time has sufficiently dissipated the prejudicial effects of the publicity." Chambers , 685 A.2d at 103.
With regard to the denial of Appellant's pre-trial motion to change venue, we note that the trial court's denial was entered without prejudice with a right to re-file in the event that the selection of the jury revealed a difficulty or impossibility to seat a fair and impartial jury. Thus, whether counsel was ineffective for failing to file an interlocutory appeal of the denial of Appellant's motion must be viewed in light of the entire procedural backdrop of the case—namely, the fact that the court left open the option for Appellant to re-file his motion if an impartial jury became an impossibility at the time of voir dire.
Appellant specifically alleges that the pre-trial publicity in the local ...
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