Commonwealth v. Taylor
| Citation | 283 A.3d 178 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 793 CAP |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Paul G. TAYLOR, Appellant |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
David Lee Zuckerman, Esq., Federal Community Defender Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, for Appellant.
Ronald Eisenberg, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Philadelphia, William Ross Stoycos, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, State College, for Appellee.
OPINION
In this capital case, Paul G. Taylor (Taylor) appeals from the denial of his fifth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541 - 9546. As we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (PCRA court) that Taylor untimely filed the petition, we affirm.
On May 18, 1991, Taylor brutally murdered his wife, two of his minor children, his mother-in-law, and his mother-in-law's minor son. On December 19, 1991, Taylor pled guilty to five counts of criminal homicide generally. On January 10, 1992, following a degree-of-guilt hearing, the trial court convicted Taylor of first-degree murder on all five counts. The matter proceeded to a penalty phase hearing, following which the trial court determined that the imposition of the death penalty was appropriate for four of Taylor's murder convictions and that a penalty of life imprisonment was appropriate for the remaining murder conviction. The trial court formally imposed Taylor's sentences on January 23, 1992. This Court affirmed Taylor's judgment of sentence on direct appeal on December 9, 1993. Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor , 535 Pa. 266, 634 A.2d 1106 (1993) ( Taylor I ). Taylor did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. On January 13, 1997, Taylor filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied the petition on the merits, and this Court affirmed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Taylor , 553 Pa. 144, 718 A.2d 743 (1998) ( Taylor II ). Taylor filed his second PCRA petition on February 5, 1999. The PCRA court dismissed Taylor's second petition as untimely filed, and this Court again affirmed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor , 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780 (2000) ( Taylor III ).
On January 28, 2008, Taylor filed a third PCRA petition, alleging that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest previously unknown to Taylor that adversely affected trial counsel's representation of Taylor. The PCRA court denied relief, and, once again, this Court affirmed on timeliness grounds. Commonwealth v. Taylor , 620 Pa. 429, 67 A.3d 1245 (2013) ( Taylor IV ), overruled by Commonwealth v. Small , ––– Pa. ––––, 238 A.3d 1267 (2020).1 Pertinent to the instant matter, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General (OAG) represented the Commonwealth in opposing Taylor's third PCRA petition. Additionally, Justice Eakin authored this Court's unanimous majority opinion in Taylor IV , in which Then-Chief Justice Castille, Justice Saylor, Then-Justice (Now-Chief Justice) Baer, Justice Todd, and Justice McCaffery also participated.
On December 8, 2014, Taylor filed a fourth PCRA petition, seeking a new appeal nunc pro tunc to this Court from the PCRA court's denial of his third PCRA petition which alleged trial counsel's conflict of interest. Petitioner premised his fourth PCRA petition upon the well-publicized scandal involving the exchange of inappropriate emails between employees of the OAG and members of the judiciary, including former Justices Eakin and McCaffery. Petitioner alleged that emails exchanged during the pendency of Taylor IV reflected partiality on the part of this Court in disposing of his appeal, in violation of Taylor's due process rights. Given that his fourth petition was facially untimely, Taylor relied upon two of the three statutory exceptions to the PCRA's one-year time-bar—i.e. , the "governmental interference" exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i) of the PCRA, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), and the "newly discovered facts" exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA.2 The PCRA court dismissed Taylor's fourth petition, concluding that the PCRA court lacked the authority to grant the relief that Taylor sought. Taylor then appealed. On November 6, 2019, with its participating members being equally divided on the matter, this Court affirmed the PCRA court's order by operation of law. Commonwealth v. Taylor , 655 Pa. 714, 218 A.3d 1275 (2019) (per curiam) ( Taylor V ). Then-Chief Justice Saylor, Then-Justice (Now-Chief Justice) Baer, and Justice Todd, all of whom participated in Taylor IV , did not participate in the decision. Justice Wecht issued an opinion in support of reversal (OISR), joined by Justice Donohue; Justice Dougherty issued an opinion in support of affirmance (OISA), joined by Justice Mundy.
The opinions authored in Taylor V addressed, in relevant part, whether Taylor's fourth PCRA petition was timely filed, whether his constitutional claim of appellate court error was cognizable under the PCRA, and whether the PCRA court could afford him the relief he sought—i.e. , reinstatement of the right to appeal anew to this Court nunc pro tunc . In the OISR, Justice Wecht concluded that Taylor's claim was cognizable under the PCRA and that the PCRA court had the authority to order the relief Taylor requested, if warranted on the merits.
Taylor V , 218 A.3d at 1275, 1279-83, 1285 (Wecht, J., OISR). Justice Wecht further opined that any determination as to the timeliness of Taylor's petition was premature, notwithstanding its jurisdictional nature, as the PCRA court did not dispose of the petition on timeliness grounds and the record was undeveloped as to that issue. Id. at 1283 n.9. Justice Wecht, therefore, would have reversed the PCRA court's order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at 1275, 1283, 1285. In contrast, Justice Dougherty concluded in the OISA that, while Taylor's claim was cognizable under the PCRA, the only constitutionally permissible remedy the PCRA court could afford as to such a claim was the reinstatement of the right to seek reargument of the original appellate decision nunc pro tunc . Id. at 1289, 1292 (Dougherty, J., OISA). Additionally, Justice Dougherty's review of the record led him to conclude that Taylor's fourth PCRA petition was untimely filed. Id. at 1293-95. As such, he opined that a remand to the PCRA court was unwarranted and that, instead, he would affirm the order of that court. Id. at 1286, 1293, 1295.
On November 20, 2019, Taylor filed an application for reargument (Application) with this Court, including a request that the Court appoint additional jurists to hear the matter. See generally Pa.R.J.A. 701(C) ; Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures § 13, 210 Pa. Code § 63.13. During the pendency of Taylor's Application, on April 24, 2020, the Court impaneled a special complement of jurists consisting of Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, and Mundy, and Judges King, Kunselman, and Nichols of the Superior Court, and decided Commonwealth v. Koehler , 658 Pa. 658, 229 A.3d 915 (2020) —i.e. , a separate case that was substantially similar to, and which extensively referenced, Taylor V . Like Taylor in Taylor V , John Koehler (Koehler) filed a serial, facially untimely PCRA petition in his capital case that: (1) was premised on the same email scandal and a violation of his due process and other constitutional rights arising out of this Court's alleged partiality in adjudicating his appeal in his prior PCRA matter; and (2) sought reinstatement of his appellate rights to this Court nunc pro tunc from the PCRA court's denial of his previously filed PCRA petition. Koehler , 229 A.3d at 922-24. Just as the PCRA court did in Taylor V , the PCRA court in Koehler ultimately dismissed Koehler's serial petition, concluding that it lacked the authority to grant the relief Koehler sought. Id. at 922.
In contrast to Taylor V , however, the seven-member special complement of this Court in Koehler reversed the PCRA court's dismissal in a divided opinion. Id. Justice Wecht wrote the majority opinion, which Justice Donohue and Judges King, Kunselman, and Nichols joined. Specifically, the majority concluded that "a due process challenge to the impartiality of an appellate jurist is cognizable under" the PCRA and that the PCRA court has the authority to grant relief in the form of reinstatement of a PCRA petitioner's right to appeal anew to the appellate tribunal nunc pro tunc . Id. at 922, 931, 942. Observing that the PCRA court dismissed Koehler's serial PCRA petition based on the mistaken belief that it lacked the authority to afford Koehler the relief requested—a matter separate from the jurisdictional question of timeliness and the merits of the underlying claim, neither of which the PCRA court had yet addressed—the majority remanded the matter to the PCRA court for further proceedings to address such issues and others in the normal course. Id. at 939-43.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Dougherty, again joined by Justice Mundy, concluded that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the "unripe question" regarding the authority of the PCRA court to grant Koehler's requested relief, given that the PCRA court erroneously failed to determine first whether Koehler timely filed his serial petition and then whether he was entitled to relief on the merits. Id. at 946, 964 (Dougherty, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Dougherty concluded that, as such, there was "no present case and controversy regarding the proper relief that may be afforded to a hypothetical petitioner who presents a meritorious judicial bias-based due process claim in a timely PCRA petition." Id. at 946. Justice Dougherty, thus, opined that "the only option [wa]s to reverse and remand with instructions for the PCRA court to determine whether [Koehler's] petition [wa]s timely" and his...
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