Commonwealth v. Tejada

• Decision Date: 23 January 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-11951
• Citation: 484 Mass. 1,143 N.E.3d 397
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Jose TEJADA.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

484 Mass. 1

143 N.E.3d 397

COMMONWEALTH

v.Jose TEJADA.

SJC-11951

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex..

Argued October 7, 2019

Decided January 23, 2020

David H. Mirsky (Joanne T. Petito also present) for the defendant.

David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ.

LENK, J.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, he argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions; (2) his statements to police on the night of his arrest should have been suppressed; and (3) the trial judge erred by declining to ask a requested question about anti-Hispanic juror bias during voir dire. Separately, the defendant asks us to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We affirm the convictions and decline to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant the requested relief.

Background. We recite the facts as the jury could have found them, reserving certain details for subsequent discussion. In the early morning hours of September 5, 2011, Lawrence police arrested the defendant after he said that he had killed his wife and her two teenage children. At approximately 2 A.M. that morning, a neighbor was returning home with his family when the defendant approached him in a parking lot and asked to be taken to the police station because "he had just killed three people." The neighbor (who did not know the defendant) agreed to telephone the police, and waited with the defendant until they arrived. When the neighbor asked the defendant what had happened, the defendant responded that he had killed his family because they were "talking down to him." The neighbor was unsure whether to believe the defendant, who was shaking and whose eyes were "bugging out."

When the police arrived, the neighbor remained to translate for the defendant, whose native language is Spanish and who did not speak English. Police asked the defendant what had happened; through the neighbor's efforts at translation, the defendant repeated the substance of what he had told the neighbor, and provided an address to a nearby apartment building where he said the shootings had taken place. He also told the officers that he had tried to shoot himself, but had run out of bullets. When officers asked the defendant what he had done with the weapon, the defendant told them that he had discarded it after leaving the house to go for a walk. Although the defendant seemed anxious, he was cooperative and calm, and he maintained an even tone throughout the conversation.

Officers eventually decided to investigate the accuracy of the defendant's statements; they pat frisked and handcuffed him, placed him in the back seat of a police cruiser, and drove the few blocks to the address the defendant had provided. After knocking on the apartment door and receiving no response, police broke down the door. Inside the apartment, they found the three victims, all deceased, in an upstairs bedroom.

Police recovered a variety of forensic evidence from the scene and the defendant's person. First, officers observed bloody footprints on the stairs, going through the kitchen, and heading toward the back door; forensic analysis later determined that the footprints were consistent with the type of shoes the defendant had been wearing.¹ In addition, the defendant's hands tested positive for gunshot residue, and there were traces of the victims' blood on the defendant's clothing. In the grass behind the apartment building, police found a revolver containing six spent shell casings that matched bullets recovered from the scene. The revolver had traces of blood on it from at least two people. The defendant's wife's blood matched the major female profile.

Prior proceedings. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements to police. The motion was denied with respect to the defendant's statements while he was seated on the curb speaking with police; the motion was allowed with respect to statements made once the defendant was handcuffed and seated in the police cruiser.

Following the partial denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, a Superior Court jury convicted him of three counts of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.

Discussion. On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions of murder in the first degree. The defendant contends also that his motion to suppress should have been allowed, because his statements to police were inadmissible as the product of a custodial interrogation where no Miranda warnings were given, and because his statements to police were involuntary. He argues further that the judge's decision not to ask the venire a requested question concerning juror bias constituted reversible error. In addition, the defendant asks that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of murder in the first degree under either a theory of deliberate premeditation or a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Where, as here, a trial judge denies a defendant's motion for a required finding, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979). As long as there is sufficient evidence of one theory, the convictions remain undisturbed on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220, 859 N.E.2d 843 (2007).

We turn to consider whether there was sufficient evidence to establish murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation.² To sustain the convictions under this theory, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant (1) caused the death of the victims; (2) intended to kill the victims; and (3) acted with deliberate premeditation. See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 44 (2018); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 37 (2013). As there is no claim that the defendant did not cause the death of the victims, what remains is to consider whether the defendant intended to kill them, and whether he acted with deliberate premeditation.

The defendant's neighbor testified that the defendant told him that he had shot the victims because he had grown tired of them "talking down to him." Another witness testified that the defendant and his wife had argued in the hours prior to her death, when she insisted on taking the defendant's keys to prevent him from drinking and driving. The jury also heard evidence that the victims were shot at close range, and that the victims were found lying in close proximity to one another, in a single bedroom.³

To establish the intent to kill, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant "consciously and purposefully intended" to kill the victims. See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 44; Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 37. Here, the jury could infer from the neighbor's testimony that the defendant shot his family because he had grown tired of them criticizing him or "talking down to him." Moreover, as we previously have held, the use of a firearm at close range provides strong evidence of an intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 427 Mass. 434, 440, 694 N.E.2d 329 (1998) (shooting victim at close range warranted finding of intent to kill). Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant intended to kill his victims.

The defendant contends, however, relying upon Commonwealth v. Mills, 400 Mass. 626, 627, 511 N.E.2d 572 (1987), that the evidence was insufficient because his intoxication and his mental state indicate that he lacked the mental capacity to form the intent to kill. The defendant's reliance on Mills is misplaced. Unlike Mills, supra, where the defendant sought, and was denied, an instruction on criminal responsibility, the defendant in this case did not pursue a defense of criminal responsibility or diminished capacity, nor did he seek an instruction on criminal responsibility.⁴ Compare id. at 627, 630, 511 N.E.2d 572.

Moreover, the jury in fact were instructed to consider whether the defendant's intoxication and his mental state would have prevented him from forming the intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 470-471, 505 N.E.2d 171 (1987) (evidence of intoxication and mental impairment

relevant to question whether defendant formed intent to kill); Commonwealth v. Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 592, 476 N.E.2d 947 (1985) (if there is evidence that defendant was under influence of alcohol or drugs at time of crime, judge should instruct jury to consider that evidence on question whether Commonwealth has proved specific intent beyond reasonable doubt). While there was conflicting evidence as to the defendant's condition, the jury were free to weigh that evidence as they saw fit.⁵ See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 419 Mass. 350, 352-353, 644 N.E.2d 978 (1995) (specific intent to kill, as demonstrated by defendant's repeated infliction of serious injuries, was not negated by evidence of voluntary intoxication). Notwithstanding the evidence of the defendant's intoxication, the jury could have concluded that the defendant's statements and his use of a firearm at close range established an intent to kill.

To establish that a defendant acted with deliberate premeditation, the Commonwealth must show that "the plan to kill was formed after deliberation and reflection" (citation omitted). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 118-119, 754 N.E.2d 685 (...