Commonwealth v. Tisdall
| Decision Date | 22 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2071 EDA 2022,J-S11015-23 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MARTIN TISDALL Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 1, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0308871-1998
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
Appellant Martin Tisdall, appeals pro se from the order entered August 1, 2022, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On a previous appeal, a panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows.
Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2019 WL 1306411, at *1 (Pa. Super. Mar. 21, 2019). This Court affirmed the PCRA court's order dismissing Appellant's second PCRA petition on March 21, 2019. Id. Our Supreme Court denied allocator on September 24, 2019. Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 218 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2019).
On June 14, 2022, Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that, while the trial court ordered Appellant to undergo a mental health evaluation prior to sentencing, an evaluation was never conducted and, as such, the trial court's conclusions regarding Appellant's mental health at sentencing were unsupported. Appellant's Petition, 6/14/22, at 2. Thus, Appellant claimed "his sentencing proceeding violated due process," causing him to be "held in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." Id. at 3. The PCRA court treated Appellant's filing as a PCRA petition. See PCRA Court's 907 Notice, 7/5/22, at 1. On July 5, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice, citing the untimeliness of Appellant's petition. Id. Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court's notice. See Appellant's Response, 7/13/22, at 1-3. Thereafter, on August 1, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition. PCRA Court Order, 8/1/22, at 1. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's petition for habeas corpus relief [in which he alleged he was] illegally confined on the basis of [a] sentencing proceeding that violated due process[?]
"On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. 2003). The issue of timeliness is dispositive in this appeal. This Court previously stated:
It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief. [T]he PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction collateral relief. If an issue is cognizable under the PCRA, the issue must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In other words, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, regardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the PCRA.
Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994-995 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted).
Here, Appellant, on June 14, 2022, filed a petition titled "writ for habeas corpus relief," arguing that he is being held in custody in violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions due to an alleged trial court error during sentencing. Appellant's Petition, 6/14/22, at 2. Because Appellant's petition set forth an issue cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA court properly treated Appellant's filing as a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) (); see also Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 994-995; Commonwealth v. Hromek, 232 A.3d 881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2020) () (quotation and citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa. Super. 2019) () (citation omitted). Therefore, before considering the merits of Appellant's PCRA petition, we must first determine whether it is timely under the PCRA's jurisdictional time-bar.
A PCRA petition, "including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, "including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). In this instance, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on June 2, 2000, when the 30-day time period for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired after the trial court denied Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.[1] See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903 (). As such, Appellant had until June 5, 2001, or one-year after his judgment of sentence became final, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (). Appellant, however, did not file the current PCRA petition until June 14, 2022, more than 20 years after his judgment of sentence became final. Accordingly, Appellant's PCRA petition is patently untimely.
There are, however, three exceptions to the one-year PCRA time-bar, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Indeed, Section 9545(b) provides that, to escape the PCRA's timeliness requirements, a petitioner must allege and prove that:
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