Commonwealth v. Updegrove

• Decision Date: 17 March 1964
• Citation: Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1964)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Miriam D. UPDEGROVE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

198 A.2d 534

413 Pa. 599

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Miriam D. UPDEGROVE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 17, 1964.

Alvin A. Woerle, John E. Ruth, Ruth, Weidner, Woerle &amp Yoder, Reading, for appellant.

Peter F. Cianci, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Frederick O. Brubaker, Dist. Atty., Reading, for appellee.

Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

EAGEN Justice.

The appellant, Miriam D. Updegrove, was indicted and tried for the murder of her husband. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and fixed the punishment at life imprisonment. A motion for a new trial was dismissed and sentence imposed in accordance with the verdict. From the judgment, this appeal is prosecuted.

While the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is not questioned, we have carefully studied the record and determined that the necessary ingredients of murder in the first degree were established beyond a reasonable doubt. From the testimony, the jury was warranted in finding that the defendant intentionally fired two shots into vital parts of her husband's body from a .22 calibre revolver, of single action, which had to be cocked each time it was fired, and that the decedent was lying flat in a prone position in his bed, covered with a sheet, when the shots were fired, and that one of the bullets entering the body caused wounds resulting in death.

At the trial commencing on June 12, 1961, the defense was based soley on insanity. The defendant testified that she remembered nothing about the shooting. Other witnesses called on her behalf described her conduct and appearance for a period of time before and after the occurrence, which tended to show a highly emotional and upset individual. Two medical doctors who specialize in the field of psychiatry, stated that in their opinion the defendant was legally insane at the time of the shooting, did not know the nature or quality of her act and did not realize she was doing wrong. A psychologist testified that as a result of certain tests administered to the defendant, it was his conclusion that she was not malingering.

The Commonwealth offered no medical testimony in refutation of that submitted by the defense. Counsel for the appellant, stressing the above fact and nothing that post trial, the court had found on the basis of a report submitted by a psychiatrist that the defendant was mentally ill and required hospitalization, ^[1] strenuously argues that the totality of the evidence manifests that the verdict of the jury was arbitrary and contrary to the weight of the testimony, requiring the grant of a new trial.

In resolving the merit of this contention, we must necessarily review the entire record and not confine our attention to the testimony that is favorable to the defendant: Commonwealth v. Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728 (1962). While the Commonwealth did not offer medical opinion testimony as to the defendant's mental condition at the relevant time, it did submit substantial evidence through multiple witnesses strongly indicating that before the shooting and immediately thereafter, the defendant was in control of her senses and fully conscious of her acts. Further, her own spontaneous statements immediately following the occurrence manifest an individual consciously remorseful of what she had done. Quite significantly, when questioned shortly after the shooting by an investigating police officer, she stated that the gun discharged accidentally while she and her husband were struggling for possession of it. When pressed for further details she declined to answer additional questions before talking to her lawyer. In view of the whole record, the issue of the defendant's mental competency at the time of the homicide was properly for the jury's determination.

Since the sanity of an individual is always presumed, one who asserts insanity in defense of the commission of a crime has the burden of proving its existence by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A.2d 391 (1952). As stated in Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, at 68, 178 A. 823, at 825 (1935), 'The presumption of sanity, which is the normal condition of man, 'holds good, and is the full equivalent of express proof, until it is sucessfully rebutted'': (Citing cases); and again, 319 Pa. at 69, 178 A. at 826, 'Where mental capacity at the time of the act is an issue, the commonwealth is aided by the presumption of sanity; it is not required to prove affirmatively mental capacity to commit the act.'

Aside from the presumption, the Commonwealth, as noted before, offered convincing proof as to the defendant's conduct and condition before and immediately after the occurrence, which justified the jury's conclusion that she was legally sane at the time. See, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Tyrrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1916). The fact that she needed post trial mental care does not rebut the presumption of sanity at the time of the criminal offense: Commonwealth ex rel. Hudson v. Burke, 175 Pa.Super. 241, 103 A.2d 279 (1954), allocatur denied, cert. denied, Hudson v. Day, 348 U.S. 844, 75 S.Ct. 67, 99 L.Ed. 666 (1954). See also, Commonwealth ex rel. Leon v. Martin, 184 Pa.Super. 236, 132 A.2d 774 (1957).

Before the trial, upon request of her counsel, a sanity commission consisting of two physicians and a lawyer was appointed by the court to inquire into defendant's sanity under the Mental Health Act of June 12, 1951, P.L. 533, as amended, 50 P.S. §§ 1071-1622. Following a complete hearing held on February 8, 1961, the commission reported its conclusion that the defendant was not suffering from a mental illness, 'which so lessens her capacity to use her customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of her affairs and social relations as to make is necessary or advisable for her to be under care.'

At this hearing, the defendant personally testified and voluntarily detailed her personal relationship with her deceased husband. The hearing was public and the defendant was represented by counsel. She then stated, inter alia, that her husband was 'a...