Commonwealth v. Vaidulas

Decision Date06 November 2000
Docket NumberSJC-08250
Citation433 Mass. 247,741 N.E.2d 450
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
Parties(Mass. 2001) COMMONWEALTH vs. KENNETH A. VAIDULAS. Docket No.:

County: Franklin.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, & Sosman, JJ.

Summary:

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Motion in limine, Postconviction relief, Interlocutory appeal, Appeal. Public Officer. Police Officer. Municipal Corporations, Police.

Complaint received and sworn to in the Orange Division of the District Court Department on August 25, 1997.

The case was tried before W. Michael Ryan, J., and a motion in limine was considered posttrial by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Judith Ellen Pietras, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Steven W. Panagiotes for the defendant.

SPINA, J.

The Commonwealth appealed from the postconviction order of a judge in the District Court for a required finding of not guilty. The order was entered after the judge determined posttrial a motion in limine that he had taken under advisement before trial. Pursuant to the motion in limine, the judge struck

the testimony of a police officer who had arrested the defendant before the officer completed the training requirements set forth in G. L. c. 41, § 96B. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that (1) the officer was exempt from the requirements of the statute at the time of the defendant's arrest, (2) the defendant lacks standing to challenge the officer's authority, and (3) if the defendant has standing, the de facto officer doctrine applies. We vacate the judge's order and reinstate the jury's verdict because the officer's authority may not be attacked collaterally in a criminal proceeding.

On August 24, 1997, Officer Michael Willhite of the Athol police department was on routine patrol, in uniform, and driving a marked police cruiser. He stopped the defendant's vehicle for failure to dim the headlights, a civil motor vehicle infraction. 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.12 (1993). During the stop the officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath, and noticed his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. The officer asked the defendant to perform field sobriety tests. At the conclusion of these tests, the officer arrested the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24.

At the time of the arrest, the officer had not completed the training required by G. L. c. 41, § 96B.1 Earlier, on December 9, 1996, the chief of police of Athol, the officer's appointing authority, had made a request pursuant to 550 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.02 (8) (a) (1993) that the officer be exempted from the requirement of § 96B. He obtained a ninety-day exemption, the maximum allowed at that time.2

On September 15, 1998, eight days before trial, defense counsel moved in limine to exclude the officer's testimony on the ground that the officer was without authority to arrest the defendant because he failed to meet the requirements of G. L. c. 41, § 96B. The trial judge took the motion under advisement, then proceeded with the trial and permitted the officer to testify. Defense counsel did not object to the officer's taking the witness stand.

The jury of six returned a guilty verdict on September 24. After the judge dismissed the jury, defense counsel reminded the judge of the motion in limine and requested that the judge address the motion and set aside the verdict. The judge, noting that he had agreed earlier to resolve the issue before imposing any disposition, stated that, "based on the motion, and . . . the way the officer testified, I think that [defense counsel] certainly raised a prima facie case that there was no authority to arrest [the defendant]."

On January 8, 1999, after a hearing, the judge allowed the defendant's motion in limine, struck the arresting officer's testimony, and ordered that a required finding of not guilty be entered. On January 13, 1999, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal "pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2)," as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). On January 19, 1999, the Commonwealth filed in the county court an application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. A single justice of this court denied that application. There is no appeal from that decision. See Cowell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1028 (2000). We transferred the Commonwealth's appeal to this court on our own motion.

1. Procedural issues. The defendant argues that the only avenue of relief available to the Commonwealth is under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Such relief is only available where all other avenues of relief are foreclosed. See Costarelli v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 367 Mass. 35, 41 (1975), quoting G. L. c. 211, § 3 ("the statutory power of 'general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided' should be used sparingly, and should rarely be used in a case where some other practical remedy is available").

We must first review the nature of the trial judge's postconviction order, as it necessarily determines the procedural posture of the Commonwealth's appeal. The purpose of a motion in limine is "to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial matters from being admitted in evidence." Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, 500 n.2 (1981). While these motions are typically filed prior to trial, we have previously held that they may be filed and heard during the course of a trial as unforeseen exigencies often arise. See Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 550, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). Regardless of when filed, we have frequently expressed our preference for early rulings on motions in limine. See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 383 Mass. 73, 81 (1981). This case, however, presents the unusual scenario where the motion was filed timely, the challenged witness testified, and the judge then granted the motion after the jury had returned a guilty verdict.

The judge acknowledged that the motion in limine was filed before trial, but despite the fact that the witness testified, the judge stated that the motion was not decided as of the time the jury returned their verdict. He determined that it could be treated as either a "renewed" pretrial motion and therefore properly before the court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim P. 13 (a) (5), 378 Mass. 871 (1979), or a postconviction motion and therefore subject to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), (b), 378 Mass. 900 (1979). We disagree. The only proper basis on which the judge could have granted the requested relief posttrial was through application of rule 30 (b).

Rule 13 (a) (5) states that "[u]pon a showing that substantial justice so requires, the judge or special magistrate may permit a pretrial motion which has been heard and denied to be renewed." Because the challenged witness testified, the motion in limine was, in substance, denied. It could not be renewed after trial because there is no mechanism to seek reconsideration after trial of a decision under rule 13 (a) (5). The only means of revisiting after trial a matter raised in a motion in limine is through a motion for postconviction relief under rule 30, or on appeal.

Rule 30 (a) cannot support the judge's action because by its express language, it is limited to providing relief for "confinement or restraint . . . imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." It is undisputed that the defendant was never sentenced. Absent a sentence that is somehow defective, rule 30 (a) has no application. See Commonwealth v. Christian, 429 Mass. 1022, 1023 (1999) (rule 30 [a] "was not intended to provide an avenue for plenary appellate review. Instead, it was designed to enable defendants to challenge the legality or the technical basis of a sentence").

Rule 30 (b) provides authority for a judge, on motion, to grant a "new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done." The judge's treatment of the defendant's motion most closely approximated that of a motion filed under rule 30 (b). In effect, the judge determined that justice had not been done because the officer should not have been allowed to testify. He implicitly granted the defendant a new trial on that basis, then dismissed the charge because the Commonwealth could not meet its burden of proof without the officer's testimony. The Commonwealth has a right of appeal, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (8), as appearing in 420 Mass. 1502 (1995), from an order granting postconviction relief under rule 30 (b). See Latimore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 805, 808 (1994) ("Rule 30 is the source of the Commonwealth's right to appeal from rulings on postconviction motions, a right the Commonwealth did not enjoy prior to the rule's adoption in 1979"). Additionally, we have construed a motion under rule 30 (b) as a "motion for appropriate relief under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure" and therefore the Commonwealth has a right to appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 28E. See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 114 (1993). Because the Commonwealth has an available means of appeal, review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not available.3

The single justice correctly denied the Commonwealth's application for leave to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (c), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). That rule provides that "[a]ny motion the determination of which may be appealed pursuant to this rule shall be decided by the judge before the defendant is placed in jeopardy under established rules of law." See Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure at 182 (Lexis 1997) ("In order to preserve the Commonwealth's right to appeal, the rule requires that the judge's ruling on the motion be...

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  • Com. v. Mattei
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • September 3, 2008
    ...Although courts "have frequently expressed [their] preference for early rulings on motions in limine," Commonwealth v. Vaidulas, 433 Mass. 247, 250, 741 N.E.2d 450 (2001), here the judge was faced with a question (what makes a report "testimonial"?) under the Crawford decision that was utte......
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    ...limine are meant "to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial matters from being admitted in evidence." Commonwealth v. Vaidulas, 433 Mass. 247, 249, 741 N.E.2d 450 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, 500 n.2, 420 N.E.2d 319 (1981). They "must not be used to choke o......
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    ...in limine are meant "to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial matters from being admitted in evidence." Commonwealth v. Vaidulas, 433 Mass. 247, 249 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, n.2 (1981). They "must not be used to choke off a valid defense in a criminal ......
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