Commonwealth v. Vallarelli

Decision Date25 November 1930
Citation273 Mass. 240
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. PASQUALLE VALLARELLI & others.

October 10, 1930.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., CROSBY, PIERCE SANDERSON, & FIELD, JJ.

Practice, Criminal Examination of defendant by department of mental diseases Exceptions: allowance and establishment; New trial.

The design of G.L.c. 123, Section 100A, as amended by St. 1927, c. 59, is to forward the administration of public justice, not to put into the hands of those charged with crime a new weapon of defence; and failure by the officials mentioned therein to comply with it previous to the trial of an indictment does not invalidate that trial as a matter of law.

Where a petition to establish the truth of exceptions alleged to have been saved by the petitioner at the hearing of a motion for a new trial of an indictment, contained no allegation to the effect that the trial by order of a judge of the Superior Court was had under the provisions of Sections 33A-33G, added to G.L.c. 278 by St. 1925, c.

279, Section 1, and amended by St. 1926, c. 329, Sections 1-6, it was assumed by this court in favor of the petitioners that the filing of a bill of exceptions was proper procedure and that the provisions of

G.L.c. 278, Section 31, in the amended form appearing in St. 1926, c. 329, Section 6; and c. 231, Section 117, were applicable.

A motion, filed in the Superior Court on March 12, 1930, for a new trial of an indictment upon which a verdict of guilty was returned on March

8, 1929, and the defendant was sentenced on March 13, 1929, was filed within the time allowed by St. 1922, c. 508.

It is good reason for dismissing a petition by the defendant in an indictment for the establishment of exceptions that, even if the truth of the exceptions were established, no question of law of such gravity as properly to call for consideration of this court would be presented.

Four defendants were convicted after trial together upon an indictment and thereafter were sentenced. The day before sentence was imposed, the probation officer notified the clerk that three of the defendants previously had been convicted of a felony. On the same day the clerk notified the department of mental diseases that the three defendants were under indictment and in custody. On the day of sentence the department filed with the clerk a report that the three defendants were "not suffering from any mental disease or defect which would affect" their "criminal responsibility"; and that the fourth defendant showed sufficient evidence of mental disease to require further observation. The fact of the previous convictions of the three defendants was called to the attention of the trial judge before the imposition of sentence. Neither the probation officer nor the clerk knew of the previous convictions until the day before sentence. There was nothing in the appearance of the fourth defendant at the trial to indicate that he was defective mentally. Nearly a year after sentence, each of the four defendants filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that a failure to comply with G.L.c. 123, Section 100A, in the amended form appearing in St. 1927, c. 59, required the granting of a new trial as a matter of law. Following a denial of the motions by the trial judge, the defendants filed a petition in this court for the establishment of exceptions to such denial. Held, that

(1) The question of law, so sought to be raised by the three defendants who previously had been convicted of a felony, was one which they might have raised at the trial, since they must be presumed to have known of their convictions; and, therefore, they could not raise that question as of right on a motion for a new trial;

(2) The report of the department of mental diseases concerning the fourth defendant fell far short of indicating that he was of unsound mind when the crime was alleged to have been committed, or when the trial took place, or even at any time thereafter;

(3) There was no presumption of irresponsibility of the fourth defendant for criminal conduct, or of his insanity at the trial;

(4) If the fourth defendant had knowledge at the time of the trial of the previous convictions of the other three defendants, he was not entitled as of right to raise such question of law on the motion for a new trial, because he might have raised it at the trial;

(5) Even if the fourth defendant had no knowledge at the time of the trial of the previous convictions of the three defendants, noncompliance with said Section 100A, as amended, did not invalidate the trial as a matter of law;

(6) There was no merit in the exceptions sought to be established, and the petition must be dismissed.

PETITION, filed in this court on August 4, 1930, for the establishment of exceptions alleged to have been saved by the petitioners at the hearing by Broadhurst, J., in the Superior Court, of motions for a new trial of an indictment for robbery.

Material allegations by the petitioners and the circumstances of the petition are described in the opinion.

J.H. Backus, for the petitioners. F.T. Doyle, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

RUGG, C.J. This is a petition to establish the truth of exceptions. The relevant facts either stated at the bar or disclosed on the face of the petition are these: Five defendants were tried together upon a joint indictment charging them with robbery and on March 8, 1929, verdicts were returned. The four petitioners were found guilty. A verdict of not guilty was returned against the fifth defendant. No exceptions appear to have been filed with respect to the trial. Each petitioner was sentenced to the State prison on March 13, 1929. The further allegations of the petition in substance are that on February 1, 1930, the four petitioners filed separate motions for a new trial, copies of which are annexed. These several motions, identical in form, were based upon the contention that the defendant was entitled to a new trial as matter of law. The ground alleged was that, although belonging to the class of persons entitled to its benefits, he had been denied the rights secured by a governing statute, St. 1927, c. 59 being the form then in force of the final amendment of Section 100A, added to G.L.c. 123. On March 12, 1930 "supplementary motions" for a new trial were filed in behalf of the defendants. Copies of these are annexed to the petition; each is entitled "Motion for a New Trial." One motion was filed in the names of the petitioners Vallarelli, Ventola and Tetula, wherein the ground was stated that it appeared from the report of the department of mental diseases that Polcarri, jointly indicted and tried with them, was of unsound mind and that therefore they had been deprived of a fair trial; another motion was filed by Vallarelli reciting the trial and his earlier motion for a new trial and setting out as a ground for new trial that if it should appear that any of the convicted defendants had been deprived of the benefits of said Section 100A and that he had not been so deprived, nevertheless he had been denied a fair trial by being compelled to be associated in the trial with such other defendants and was entitled to a new trial. A motion the same in substance was filed by Ventola. A motion was filed by Angelo Polcarri through his attorney and next friend setting out that since his sentence a report of the department of mental diseases signed by two physicians appears of record in the case, of this tenor: "The prisoner states that he sees visions and hears imaginary voices. He has had syphilis. In our opinion he shows sufficient evidence of mental disease to require further observation under Section 100 at Bridgewater." This report was filed on March 13, 1929. Additional allegations of the petition are that hearing on all these several motions for new trial was had on June 18, 1930, when the defendants filed requests for rulings, copy of which is annexed to the petition, and that on July 7, 1930, the requests for rulings and the several motions were denied, the judge filing at the same time his findings and rulings, copy of which is annexed. Material parts of these findings are: that throughout the trial and subsequent proceedings the four defendants who are petitioners were represented by one counsel; that another counsel also appeared for the defendants Tetula and Ventola; that a different counsel appeared for the defendant who was acquitted; that after the trial "motions for new trials on the usual grounds" were made by those petitioners and were denied; that the defendants were sentenced on March 13, 1929; and that at a hearing on that day "for the first time it was brought to my attention that defendants Polcarri, Vallarelli and Tetula had each previously been convicted of a felony. The fact was then mentioned by the probation officer and the district attorney for its bearing on the sentence to be imposed. At no time previously, nor then, was any question raised by any defendant as to the possible right of the three previously convicted" defendants to examination before trial under the present indictment, "as provided by St. 1927, c. 59, or as to the validity of trial of any defendant without such examination. On March 12, 1929, the chief probation officer for Suffolk County notified the clerk of the criminal section of this court in Suffolk that defendants Polcarri, Vallarelli and Tetula had previously been convicted of a felony. On the same day the clerk notified the department of mental diseases" that the same three defendants were under indictment for robbery and were in custody in the common jail in Boston. On March 13, 1929, the department of mental diseases filed with the clerk a separate report as to each defendant. ...

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