Commonwealth v. Walls, 2222 EDA 2014
| Decision Date | 19 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2222 EDA 2014,2222 EDA 2014 |
| Citation | 144 A.3d 926,2016 PA Super 156 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Salim WALLS, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Karl Baker, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, and Flynn P. Burke, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
BEFORE: OLSON and OTT, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
, J.:
Appellant, Salim Walls, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 1, 2014. In this case of first impression, we consider against whom retaliatory action must be taken in order for a defendant to be convicted of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official. We also consider for the first time the type of “harm” required to sustain a conviction of one accused of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official. After careful consideration, we hold that retaliatory action against any individual is sufficient so long as it is taken in retaliation for a lawful action taken by a prosecutor or judicial official in his or her official capacity. We further hold that the type of harm required for retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official is the same type of harm required for retaliating against a witness, victim, or party. In those cases, our Supreme Court requires the infliction of distinct harm. With these determinations in mind, we conclude that while the evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant took retaliatory action against an individual based upon the lawful conduct of a prosecutor undertaken in his or her official capacity, the evidence was not sufficient to establish the requisite element of harm. As such, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to convict Appellant of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official. We also conclude that there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of making terroristic threats; however, there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of harassment. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing.
The factual background of this case is undisputed. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on September 19, 2013, Philadelphia County Assistant District Attorney Kathryn Brown (“ADA Brown”) was shopping at a store located in Liberty Place Mall. At that time, she heard Appellant yell “Hey, ADA” from the store's entrance. Appellant then called ADA Brown, identified himself by name, and shouted that ADA Brown prosecuted him, and ultimately sent him to jail, for a crime he did not commit.1
Appellant then entered the store and threw his hat. He continued to yell that his incarceration caused his grandmother's death as he approached ADA Brown. Ultimately, Appellant got to within one foot of ADA Brown and his voice took on a more serious tone. ADA Brown stepped back and told Appellant to get away from her. Store employees and customers intervened and escorted Appellant from the store. As Appellant was escorted out of the store, he shouted at ADA Brown that she caused his grandmother's death and that she should be next. During the encounter, Appellant never made physical contact with ADA Brown and she sustained no injuries resulting from her interaction with Appellant.
The procedural history of this case is as follows. Appellant was charged2 with retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official,3 making terroristic threats,4 and harassment.5 On July 1, 2014, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Appellant guilty of all three charges and immediately sentenced him to an aggregate term of 11 ½ to 23 months' imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.6
Appellant presents four issues for our review:
Appellant's Brief at 3 (internal citations omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official. As we describe in greater detail below, there are three components of Appellant's sufficiency challenge. First, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he targeted the appropriate individual as required by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4953.1
. Second, Appellant asserts that the evidence did not demonstrate the harm contemplated by section 4953.1. Third, Appellant asserts that he did not commit an unlawful act as his conduct was a protected remonstrance under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
“Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792 (Pa.Super.2015)
, appeal denied, ––– Pa. ––––, 119 A.3d 351 (2015) (citation omitted). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is tasked with determining whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, are sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth [.]” Commonwealth v. Haney, ––– Pa. ––––, 131 A.3d 24, 33 (2015) (citation omitted). “The evidence need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 130 A.3d 38, 41 (Pa.Super.2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
No published opinion issued by this Court or our Supreme Court sets forth the elements necessary to convict a defendant of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official. The Crimes Code, however, defines the offense as follows: “A person commits an offense if he harms or attempts to harm another or the tangible property of another by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything lawfully done in the official capacity of a prosecutor or judicial official.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4953.1(a)
. Thus, the crime of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official has three elements. The Commonwealth must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant: (1) acted in retaliation for the lawful actions of a prosecutor or judicial official done in his or her official capacity, (2) harmed, or attempted to harm, any individual, or that individual's property, and (3) committed the harm, or committed the attempt to harm, via an unlawful action.
The parties agree that one element of the offense is that the defendant take some retaliatory action. The parties disagree, however, against whom that retaliatory action must be taken, what harm must be inflicted by a defendant's retaliatory action, and whether Appellant's conduct in the instant case amounted to an unlawful act. Specifically, Appellant argues that the retaliatory action must target the specific prosecutor or judicial official whose official conduct spurred the retaliatory action.7 In other words, Appellant argues that if a defendant retaliates because of a burglary prosecution, he must retaliate against the prosecutor or judicial official involved in the prosecution or adjudication of that offense. Appellant further argues that the word “harm,” as used in the statute, refers to a distinct harm. Finally, Appellant argues that his statement to ADA Brown was not a true threat, but was instead a protected remonstrance under Article I, Section 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
.
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that the requisite retaliatory action can be taken against any individual—not just the prosecutor or judicial official whose protected actions motivate the retaliatory action. It further argues that any type of harm is sufficient to support prosecution under section 4953.1
. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that emotional or psychological harm is sufficient to find a defendant guilty of retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official. The Commonwealth avers that, at the very minimum, Appellant attempted to harm ADA Brown. Lastly, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant's statement was a true threat and not protected speech.
This appeal requires us to interpret section 4953.1
. “When interpreting a statute, this Court is guided by the Statutory Construction Act [ ] of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501 –1991.” CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, 131 A.3d 65, 73 (Pa.Super.2016). “Our paramount interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular legislation under review.” Egan v. Egan, 125 A.3d 792, 795 (Pa.Super.2015) (internal alteration and citation omitted). “[T]he best indication of the General Assembly's intent in enacting a statute may be found in its plain language [.]” Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., ––– Pa. ––––, 121 A.3d 964, 979 (2015).
Appellant argues that “the plain language of the statute criminalizes an attempt to harm a prosecutor in retaliation for something that prosecutor has done, in her official capacity, to the defendant.”...
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