Commonwealth v. Widovich

• Citation: 295 Pa. 311,145 A. 295
• Decision Date: 07 January 1929
• Docket Number: 130,129,128
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Widovich et al
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

145 A. 295

295 Pa. 311

Commonwealth v. Widovich et al

Nos. 128, 129, 130

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 7, 1929

Argued October 2, 1928

Appeals, Nos. 128, 129 and 130, March T., 1928, by the defendants, from the judgment of the Superior Court, April T., 1928, Nos. 1506-9, affirming judgments of Q.S. Beaver Co., June T., 1927, No. 163, in case of Commonwealth v Philip Widovich et al. Affirmed.

Appeal from judgments of Superior Court.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Judgments affirmed.

Errors assigned were, inter alia, judgments of Superior Court.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and the record is remitted so that the sentence of the court below may be complied with.

Henry H. Wilson, for appellants. -- Sections 2, 7, 9, 10, 13 and 26, of article I of the state Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of the federal Constitution are violated by the Sedition Act: Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa 67; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18; Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652.

W. D. Craig, with him J. Blaine McGoun, District Attorney, for appellee. -- The Sedition Acts are constitutional: Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273; Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47; Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325; Com. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 247 U.S. 402.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

Four defendants were convicted of violations of the Sedition Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 639, as amended by the Act of May 10, 1921, P.L. 435. The act defines sedition as follows: "The word 'sedition,' as used in this act, shall mean: Any writing, publication, printing, cut, cartoon, utterance, or conduct, either individually or in connection or combination with any other person or persons, the intent of which is: (a) To make or cause to be made any outbreak or demonstration of violence against this State or against the United States. (b) To encourage any person or persons to take any measures or engage in any conduct with a view of overthrowing or destroying or attempting to overthrow or destroy, by any force or show or threat of force, the Government of this State or of the United States. (c) To incite or encourage any person or persons to commit any overt act with a view to bringing the Government of this State or of the United States into hatred or contempt. (d) To incite any person or persons to do or attempt to do personal injury or harm to any officer of this State or of the United States, or to damage or destroy any public property or the property of any public official because of his official position. It shall also include: (e) The actual damage to, or destruction of, any public property, or the property of any public official, perpetrated because the owner or occupant is in official position. (f) Any writing, publication, printing, cut, cartoon, or utterance which advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of engaging in crime, violence, or any form of terrorism, as a means of accomplishing political reform or change in government. (g) The sale, gift, or distribution of any prints, publications, books, papers, documents, or written matter in any form, which advocates, furthers, or teaches sedition as hereinbefore defined. (h) Organizing or helping to organize or becoming a member of an assembly, society, or group, where any of the policies or purposes thereof are seditious as hereinbefore defined." Our immediate discussion will deal with all the foregoing paragraphs, with the exception of paragraph (c); no charge was laid thereunder, and it will not be considered.

The indictment charged that defendants "urged upon each other and upon other persons to acquire arms, ammunition and dynamite, to band themselves together to organize and drill, and to overthrow and destroy the government of this Commonwealth and of the United States by force, arms and bloodshed"; that defendants organized and became members of an association that had for its purpose the overthrow of the government by force of arms, and the creation in this country of a Soviet republic; that defendants sold books and pamphlets that advocated and taught the overthrow of the government by force.

On appeal to the Superior Court, one of the defendants was discharged because of insufficient evidence, and the conviction of the others sustained on at least one count of the indictment, the sentence of all convicted not exceeding the maximum for that count. In the petition for allowance of an appeal, they did not claim the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, and, we understand, no such question was raised in the Superior Court. The questions presented there, and in the application for an appeal to this court, pertained to trial errors, abuse of discretion and the constitutional question. Accordingly, we allowed an appeal on the constitutional question only.

We may, in passing, note that in appellants' history of the case it is admitted that defendants were members of the Workers (Communist) Party of America, and may be considered as having been members up until the 11th of November, 1926, the date of arrest. The party is affiliated with the "Third International" of Moscow, which is a world-wide revolutionary organization, and it is admitted that a literal interpretation of Communism, as taught by Marx, Lenin, and their school, includes a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, to be consummated by force. The real issue is thus stated: "Is it sedition to belong to an organization that teaches and advocates this extreme doctrine of Communism?" "As to the other [these] defendants there was some evidence that they took part in the various activities of the party; that Muselin, Zima and Resetar [defendants here] taught and spoke at the meetings, advocating the violent overthrow of government"; and that they solicited persons to join the organization which taught the principles of the overthrow of government by force, as found by the Superior Court.

Appellants urge the Sedition Act violates sections 2, 7, 9, 10, 13 and 26 of article I of the Constitution of this State, and article XIV of the amendment of the federal Constitution. The sections of our Constitution chiefly relied on are parts of the second section, which reads: "The people . . . have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper"; and part of section 7: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."

Whatever may have been the understanding of section 2, the Civil War definitely decided that no change in the form of government can come about through secession or the withdrawal of a part of the people from our scheme of government. That effort to separate was met with successful armed resistance. The established government is the government of all the people; any change in its form should come from the majority, and the Constitution points the way to effect such a change. Whether, under extreme circumstances, a condition may arise justifying other procedure of a more violent nature (Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39), we will not decide or discuss; however, section 20 would seem to furnish means to secure satisfactory redress. The legislature, under the police power, to preserve the State's republican form of government, to suppress insurrection and to maintain the safety, peace and order of its citizens, may enact laws to suppress acts or attempts to commit acts of violence toward the government; it may prohibit the teaching or advocacy of a revolution or force as a means of redressing supposed injuries, or effecting a change in government. See Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger, 250 Pa. 225; White's App., 287 Pa. 259, and cases there referred to. It is true that section 7 is a part of the Bill of Rights, but overshadowing these rights is the authority of the government to preserve its existence under the police power. Article XVI of the Constitution says "the police power shall never be abridged." This relates to all phases of its exercise. The police power is the greatest and most powerful attribute of government; on it the very existence of the state depends: 6 R.C.L. 183; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138; Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137. If the exercise of the police power should be in irreconcilable opposition to a constitutional provision or right, the police power would prevail: Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 26; Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger, supra, 234; Leiper v. Baltimore & P.R.R. Co., 262 Pa. 328; Scranton v. Pub. Ser. Com., 268 Pa. 192; Springfield Water Co. v. Phila., 285 Pa. 172.

Appellants, by invoking section 7 of our Constitution and article XIV of the federal Constitution, raise three questions: (1) May the legislature define the constitutional limitations on the freedom of speech and the liberty of the press in matters touching the government, or is that solely for the judiciary? (2) What, if any, are the constitutional limitations? (3) Does the Sedition Act offend against the right of free speech?

It may be well at the outset to understand just what the legislature intended. The act makes sedition a felony, and names situations that warrant a conviction of it. The burden of the act is an effort to preserve the State, and it should...