Commonwealth v. Williams

• Decision Date: 08 December 2017
• Docket Number: No. 1692 MDA 2016,1692 MDA 2016
• Citation: 176 A.3d 298
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Rashawn J. WILLIAMS, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

176 A.3d 298

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Rashawn J. WILLIAMS, Appellant

No. 1692 MDA 2016

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted August 21, 2017

Filed December 8, 2017

Nicole J. Spring, Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant.

Eric R. Linhardt, Assistant District Attorney, Williamsport, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.:

Appellant, Rashawn J. Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County on May 5, 2016, following a six-day jury trial. We affirm.

The trial court briefly summarized the facts of the crime and initial procedural history as follows:

On June 1, 2014, Appellant Rashawn Williams shot and killed Aaron Lowry [ ("the victim") ] outside the Lamplight Hookah Lounge on West Fourth Street in Williamsport[,] Pennsylvania[,] and then fled to High Point North Carolina. On June 6, 2014, when law enforcement officers attempted to apprehend the Appellant in High Point, he fled from an apartment and was pursued into a wooded area by a law enforcement canine, which bit him and caused some injuries to his face and left ankle that were treated at a local hospital. Appellant was extradited back to Pennsylvania and charged with homicide, [two counts of] aggravated assault, possession of a firearm without a license, person not to possess a firearm, possession of an instrument of crime (firearm), simple assault, terroristic threats, and flight to avoid apprehension or prosecution.^{[1 ]}

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 2/6/17, at 1.

On November 12, 2014, the Commonwealth sought, and was granted, access to the medical records from High Point Regional Hospital, where Appellant was treated following his capture on June 6, 2014. On November 25, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to quash the November 12 order, asserting that disclosure of the records violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) ("HIPAA"). Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on January 2, 2015, asserting, inter alia , that the medical records should be suppressed. On December 23, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to quash and suppression of the medical records.

The Commonwealth filed multiple motions in limine on March 7, 2016, March 18, 2016, and March 22, 2016, seeking to preclude, inter alia , the testimony of Dr. Eric Vey, a defense expert. Also on March 22, 2016, and on March 30, 2016, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b), the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence including certified records of Appellant's prison telephone calls. Appellant also filed multiple motions in limine on April 4, 2016, and April 7, 2016, along with a motion to introduce certified police reports. On April 7 and 8, 2016, the trial court ruled on the various motions in limine and notices of intent. Order, 4/7/16; Order, 4/8/16.

A jury trial ensued on April 12–18, 2016, following which the jury convicted Appellant of all charges. On April 21, 2016, Appellant filed a Post Verdict Motion for Extraordinary Relief pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)(1),² which the trial court denied by opinion and order dated May 5, 2016, and filed on May 10, 2016. Also on May 5, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a concurrent aggregate sentence of twelve to twenty-four years of incarceration.³ Appellant filed post-sentence motions on May 9, 2016, which the trial court denied on October 6, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following eight issues on appeal, which we have reordered for purposes of clarity and ease of disposition:

I. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to prove that the Appellant had the specific intent to kill as required to support the guilty verdict for murder of the first degree?

II. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to prove malice as required to convict the Appellant of third degree murder and aggravated assault?

III. Did the Commonwealth fail to disprove the Appellant's self-defense claim where undisputed evidence established that the victim and at least one other individual jumped the Appellant?

IV. Was the first degree murder conviction so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock the conscience of the court and require that the Appellant be given a new opportunity to proceed to trial and prevail?

V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter?

VI. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to suppress the Appellant's medical records from North Carolina because the Commonwealth unlawfully obtained them?

VII. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence offered by the defense, including: precluding Dr. Vey's testimony that the victim could have folded a knife and put it in his pocket; excluding evidence of the victim's prior conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and excluding proffered testimony that it is not unusual for witnesses to be uncooperative?

VIII. Did the trial court err by admitting evidence offered by the Commonwealth, including: admitting the Appellant's intercepted telephone calls; admitting testimony that the Appellant's girlfriend phoned a friend to ask to borrow money; and admitting, in rebuttal, hearsay testimony that a witness had informed the Appellant's baby's mother when the victim died?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

We first address Appellant's arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated assault, along with his claim of unrebutted self-defense.⁴ Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 614 Pa. 1, 36 A.3d 24, 37 (2011). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Von Evans , 163 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. Super. 2017). "[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence." Commonwealth v. Colon–Plaza , 136 A.3d 521, 525–526 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robertson–Dewar , 829 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2003) ). It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness's testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada , 107 A.3d 788, 792–793 (Pa. Super. 2015). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Mucci , 143 A.3d 399, 409 (Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Rogal , 120 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Appellant first asserts that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed the specific intent to kill the victim. In support, Appellant presents a summary of the evidence in a light most favorable to him, rather than the Commonwealth, the verdict winner, as required by our case law. Von Evans , 163 A.3d at 983. Appellant's Brief at 9–13. Appellant argues that because the victim, Aaron Lowry, approached Appellant from behind while Appellant was engaged in a verbal confrontation with Shariah⁵ Worthy, the mother of Appellant's daughter, the victim clearly was the aggressor. Appellant asserts that he merely reacted and therefore, did not have the specific intent to kill the victim. Id. at 11–12. Appellant further argues that there can be no inference of specific intent in this case based upon Appellant's use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body due to "numerous factors [that] negate any permissible inference." Id. at 12.

We note initially that Appellant has failed to comply with our rules of appellate procedure. In three pages of asserted factual underpinnings to this argument, Appellant fails to make one reference to where in the record these facts are located. Appellant's Brief at 9–11. It is not this Court's responsibility to comb through the record seeking the factual underpinnings of Appellant's claim. Commonwealth v. Samuel , 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Mulholland , 549 Pa. 634, 702 A.2d 1027, 1034 n.5 (1997) ). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) ("If reference is made to ... any ... matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth ... a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears."). See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 393 (Pa. Super. 2009) ("When an allegation is unsupported by any citation to the record, such that this Court is prevented from assessing this issue and determining whether error exists, the allegation is waived for purposes of appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c)"); Commonwealth v. Einhorn , 911 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Super.2006) ("An appellate brief must provide citations to the record"). Nevertheless, we endeavor to locate support for Appellant's claims.

An individual commits first-degree murder when he intentionally kills another human being; an intentional killing is defined as a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing." 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501, 2502(a), (d). To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the accused was responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Ballard , 622 Pa. 177, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (2013). A jury may infer the...