Commonwealth v. Womack
| Docket Number | 110 MAP 2022 |
| Decision Date | 31 May 2024 |
| Citation | 315 A.3d 1229 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Marcus WOMACK, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 445 MDA 2021 dated April 29, 2022 Affirming the Judgment of Sentence of the Huntingdon County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-31-CR-0000851-2018 entered November 12, 2020. George N. Zanic, President Judge
Kenneth Wesley Mishoe, Esq., James Andrew Salemme, Esq., Tucker Arensberg PC, for Appellant.
Ronald Eisenberg, Esq., Michelle Ann Henry, Esq., Christopher Joseph Schmidt, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Appellee.
OPINION
In this discretionary appeal, we consider the computation of time for the purposes of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints against a defendant arising out of the same criminal episode. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s order denying relief.
On October 6, 2017, law enforcement officers, including Pennsylvania State Trooper Andrew Corl, executed a search warrant at the home of Tyler and Bobbi Martin in Huntingdon County. The search followed a year-long investigation, which revealed that Appellant, Marcus Womack, had been selling drugs from that location. During the search, law enforcement officers recovered from Appellant’s person a large sum of money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. They also found an additional stolen firearm elsewhere in the residence. Appellant was placed under arrest. That same day, Trooper Corl filed a criminal complaint ("first complaint"), charging Appellant with nine offenses, including possession with intent to deliver ("PWID"), conspiracy to commit PWID, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The trial court set Appellant’s bail at $250,000.00. Unable to post bail, Appellant remained in custody.
Following the execution of the search warrant, Trooper Corl learned from the Martins and other arrestees more information about the scope of Appellant’s drug enterprise, which extended to both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Law enforcement officers executed additional search warrants. Trooper Corl also reviewed data from Appellant’s cell phone, which had been seized during the search that took place on October 6, 2017. His preliminary review of this information revealed the possibility of a more sophisticated operation than originally anticipated. Based on the foregoing, the Huntingdon County District Attorney’s Office sought the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") in pursuing additional charges.
The OAG accepted jurisdiction and submitted the case to a statewide investigating grand jury. During this time, at the request of the OAG, the Huntingdon County District Attorney's Office placed the first complaint on hold. The grand jury investigation commenced in late 2017 and ended on October 23, 2018.1 On October 31, 2018, the Commonwealth filed another criminal complaint ("second complaint"), charging Appellant with a total of twentyeight offenses including four counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit PWID, and two counts of corrupt organizations. The charges alleged in the second complaint were not identical to the first complaint but were based upon evidence gathered by law enforcement before, during, and shortly after Appellant’s arrest and the filing of charges in the first complaint. The OAG’s grand jury investigation also led to the arrest of over thirty other individuals for drug-related criminal activity.
On February 13, 2019, Appellant moved to dismiss the second complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).2 After a hear- ing, the trial court denied the motion. On March 13, 2019, Appellant similarly moved to dismiss the first complaint on Rule 600 grounds. The trial court granted this motion on May 9, 2019, and the Commonwealth did not appeal. Soon thereafter, the OAG filed an amended second complaint, reducing the number of charges from twenty-eight to thirteen and providing date ranges, some of which were after the filing of the initial complaint for the remaining counts of PWID.
On September 6, 2019, at a pre-trial conference, Appellant rejected the Commonwealth’s plea offer of 11½ to 23 years’ imprisonment, asserting the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the second complaint under Rule 600. In light of this, Appellant asked the trial court to certify the issue for an interlocutory appeal nunc pro tunc. Though the trial court granted this request, Appellant failed to file such appeal and instead filed another Rule 600 motion alleging the Commonwealth attempted to circumvent Rule 600 by filing two criminal complaints based on the same criminal conduct. The trial court similarly denied this motion on August 11, 2020.3
On October 8, 2020, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on the second complaint. The trial court found Appellant guilty of the following offenses: three counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit PWID, dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity, corrupt organizations, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, carrying a firearm without a license, and criminal use of a communication facility. He was acquitted of the remaining charges. On November 12, 2020, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39 to 90 years’ imprisonment. He received 224 days of credit for time served from October 6, 2017 to April 10, 2018. This spanned the period of time between Appellant’s arrest on the first complaint and the date the state parole detainer was lodged. He timely appealed to the Superior Court, maintaining the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the second complaint and asserting that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint.
The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous, unpublished memorandum decision. See Commonwealth v. Womack, 445 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 1284618 (Pa. Super. filed April 29, 2022). The court recognized that "Rule 600 does not specify which start date to use when two complaints are filed against one defendant," but explained that "the second complaint generally provides the starting point for the calculation" where "the first complaint was properly dismissed." Id. at *6 (citing Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 425 A.2d 367, 370 (1981)). It noted, however, that if the Commonwealth attempts to circumvent Rule 600, then the first complaint becomes the starting point for calculation purposes. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 467 Pa. 436, 359 A.2d 174, 177 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The court also noted that the Commonwealth "does not get the benefit of the filing date of an identical second complaint" where it fails to exercise due diligence in "prosecuting its first com- plaint." Id. (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808).
The court then discussed two cases it found particularly instructive. It first recounted this Court’s decision in Commonwealth. v. Earp, 476 Pa. 369, 382 A.2d 1215 (1978). Id. Earp was charged with murder, conspiracy, and other offenses. Both the murder and conspiracy charges were dismissed after a preliminary hearing, while the remaining offenses were held for court. The Commonwealth subsequently arrested Earp for the same murder and conspiracy, which kept him confined between his first arrest and trial. Id. (citing Earp, 382 A.2d at 1216). A plurality of this Court determined that the speedy trial period "begins to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction." Id. (quoting Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217). It also found instructive Commonwealth v. Simms, 509 Pa. 11, 500 A.2d 801 (1985), which involved a two-complaint scenario with different charges.4 Id. There, the Commonwealth initially filed a complaint charging Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim’s death, filed a second complaint charging Simms with criminal homicide. Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802). In finding that the date of the second complaint controlled, this Court held that "[i]n cases where an aggravated assault charge is filed, the victim later dies, and, thereafter, a homicide complaint is filed, the [speedy trial] period for trial on the homicide charge should be deemed to commence with the filing of the latter complaint."5 Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 804).
Based on the foregoing, the court discerned no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s decision denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the second complaint. In its view, based on Simms, "[t]he difference between the offenses charged in the complaints demonstrates that the Commonwealth did not try to circumvent Rule 600." Id. at *7 (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 803-04). As the second complaint was filed on October 31, 2018, the court used this as the starting point for its Rule 600 calculations. It explained that approximately 230 days of pre-trial delay were caused by Appellant. The court also recognized that Rule 600 was suspended from March 16, 2020 through October 8, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and thus time excludable. Even so, the court highlighted its skepticism concerning "the Commonwealth’s tactics in leaving [the first complaint] open despite not intending to prosecute it." Id. at *8. It nevertheless concluded that the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint was "irrelevant [to] the Rule 600 calculation of [the second complaint]." Id. The court therefore affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this Court granted to consider the following question:
Does Rule 600 run from the first or second criminal complaint when the first complaint is still pending...
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