Commonwealth v. Wooden
| Decision Date | 23 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2241 EDA 2021,J-A20044-22 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. STEVE WOODEN Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 19, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009452-2007
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI J.[*]
Steve Wooden (Wooden) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA court) granting in part and denying in part his petition for relief filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we affirm.
In 2008, Wooden entered an open guilty plea to one count each of attempted rape and robbery.[1] Because he had a prior robbery conviction, Wooden was told during his on-record colloquy that he was a second-strike offender facing 10 to 20 years' imprisonment on each offense. After Wooden acknowledged he understood, the trial court accepted his plea and deferred sentencing for a presentence investigation (PSI) and a mental health evaluation. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Wooden was a sexually violent predator (SVP) and sentenced him to consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment for each offense, giving him an aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Wooden, 38 A.3d 911 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). Wooden did not seek discretionary review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Wooden timely filed this, his first, PCRA petition in November 2012. For reasons not germane here, his petition dragged on for several years until the PCRA court dismissed it without hearing in February 2018. This Court, however, reversed because Wooden was never given notice of the intent to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Commonwealth v. Wooden, 215 A.3d 997, 1000-01 (Pa. Super. 2019).
After the case was remanded, Wooden filed an amended petition raising three issues. First, he asserted that he pleaded guilty involuntarily because plea counsel misadvised him that he would be sentenced to 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. Second, he alleged that plea counsel failed to investigate mitigating evidence about his mental health issues and the medication that he was taking. Third, he complained that he was designated an SVP and ordered to comply with the registration requirements under Megan's Law III, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later struck down as unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 616 (Pa. 2013).
The Commonwealth responded that Wooden's ineffectiveness claim about his plea was belied by not only his written guilty colloquy setting out the possible maximum sentences, but also his on-record colloquy in which he was told he faced a minimum 10 to 20 years' imprisonment. Next, addressing plea counsel's alleged failure to present mitigating mental health evidence at sentencing, the Commonwealth argued that the trial court was aware of Wooden's mental health and medications. Finally, on the sentencing claim, the Commonwealth did not object to a limited resentencing on his reporting requirements under Subchapter I of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. On this final point, Wooden replied that, given that the Commonwealth conceded that he was entitled to relief on the reporting requirements aspects of his sentence, he should receive a new sentencing hearing.
The PCRA court disagreed and issued Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without hearing. After receiving Wooden's response, the PCRA court entered its final order on October 19, 2021, formally dismissing his two ineffectiveness claims but granting relief on the sentencing claim by reclassifying him as a non-SVP and lowering his reporting requirement to ten years under Subchapter I of SORNA.[2] Wooden timely filed this appeal and now raises three issues for our review, which we have reordered:
In the first two issues, Wooden contends that he pleaded and proved meritorious claims of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning his plea counsel. "To prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result." Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 452 (Pa. Super. 2018). "Prejudice, in this context, has been repeatedly stated as requiring proof that but for counsel's action or inaction, there was a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have had a different outcome." Commonwealth v. Diaz, 226 A.3d 995, 1007 (Pa. 2020). The "reasonable probability" test is "less demanding than the preponderance standard." Commonwealth v. Little, 246 A.3d 312, 326 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quotations omitted).
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)).
When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "failure to prove any of these prongs is sufficient to warrant dismissal of the claim without discussion of the other two." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433, 439 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. See Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012). Finally, we presume that counsel has rendered effective assistance. See Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015).
Wooden argues that he should have been given an evidentiary hearing on his ineffectiveness claim about the voluntariness of his plea. As discussed, Wooden alleged in his amended petition that plea counsel led him to believe that he would likely receive a sentence of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment, rather than consecutive sentences of 10 to 20 years on each offense. See Amended PCRA Petition, 8/13/20, at ¶¶ 5-7.
"Under the PCRA, allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the petitioner to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Brown, 235 A.3d 387, 391 (Pa. Super. 2020) (). "Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established. A defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.
Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations omitted). To determine whether a plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered, the court must inquire into six areas. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt (plea court must question the defendant regarding whether he understands the nature of the charges, the factual basis for the plea, his right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, the permissible sentencing ranges, and that the court has the right to reject the agreement).
After reviewing the record, we find the PCRA court correctly dismissed Wooden's claim without hearing. First, as the PCRA court highlighted, Wooden completed a written guilty plea colloquy in which the cover sheet listed the permissible range of sentences. Under the section for incarceration, both offenses list the permissible minimum and maximum as 10 to 20 years. Additionally, under the section for the plea and whether there was any agreement as to sentence, both offenses are listed as "open," meaning that there was no agreement between Wooden and the Commonwealth as to what the sentence would be. The cover sheet to the plea colloquy appears below, showing that Wooden was warned of the minimum sentence:
(Image Omitted)
Guilty Plea Colloquy, 4/14/18, at 1.
Second at the guilty plea hearing, plea counsel reviewed the...
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