Commonwealth v. Yong

• Decision Date: 18 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 19 EAP 2016,19 EAP 2016
• Citation: 177 A.3d 876
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Alwasi YONG, Appellee
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

177 A.3d 876

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Alwasi YONG, Appellee

No. 19 EAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: March 7, 2017

Decided: January 18, 2018

Branden James Albaugh, Esq., Ronald Eisenberg, Esq., Lawrence Jonathan Goode, Esq., Edward F. McCann Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant.

Daniel John O'Riordan, Esq., for Alwasi Yong, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

We granted review to consider the parameters of what has been termed the collective knowledge doctrine.¹ The specific issue presented in this case is whether an investigating officer's knowledge of facts sufficient to create probable cause to arrest may be imputed to a second officer, who arrests the suspect, when the two officers are working as a team, but there is no evidence the investigating officer with probable cause directed the arresting officer to act. Under the version of the collective knowledge doctrine we adopt today, we conclude Yong's arrest was constitutional. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.

I.

The following factual account was developed at the suppression hearing held on April 17, 2013. On September 21, 2011, at approximately 1:25 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Joseph McCook and his partner, Officer Israel Morales, of the Narcotics Field Unit were conducting surveillance in the vicinity of the 3200 block of North Fairhill Street in Philadelphia. N.T. Suppression Hr'g, 4/17/13, at 4–5. Officer McCook observed Officer Morales hand $120.00 of pre-recorded buy money to a confidential informant (CI). Id. at 5. The CI approached Yong, who was standing in front of 3202 North Fairhill Street, engaged in a brief conversation with him, and handed Yong the money. Id. After accepting the money, Yong walked over to Samuel Vega and gave it to him. Id. at 5–6. Vega then entered 3202 North Fairhill Street and emerged approximately two minutes later. Id. at 6. Vega handed the CI a small object. Id. Following the exchange, the CI returned to where Officers McCook and Morales were located. Id. He provided the officers with 12 clear, plastic packets, each with a "money symbol" stamped on it. Id. Officer McCook field-tested the packets' contents and determined they contained marijuana. Id. Officer McCook had worked in the Narcotics Field Unit for the previous 12 to 13 of his 18 years as a Philadelphia police officer. Id. at 13. He had been involved in "probably thousands" of narcotics investigations using confidential informants generally, and specifically, he had observed "hundreds" of transactions similar to the one observed on September 21, 2011, "[w]here one person would be the person accepting the money[.]" Id. at 12.

The following day, September 22, 2011, Officer Morales conducted surveillance of 3202, 3204, and 3213 North Fairhill Street without Officer McCook. Id. at 7–8. Officer Morales did not see Yong; however, 25 clear packets of marijuana were turned over to Officer McCook as a result of Officer Morales' investigation that day. Id. at 7–8. The packets were similar to the ones that were recovered the previous day. Id. at 7. On September 23, 2011, Officer McCook returned to the area of 3202 North Fairhill Street. Id. at 8. At approximately 1:15 p.m., he witnessed Officer Linwood Fairbanks, acting undercover, provide $40.00 of pre-recorded buy money to Vega. Id. at 9–10. Vega accepted the money, walked over to a lot situated at 3204 North Fairhill Street, retrieved an object from the dirt, and delivered it to Officer Fairbanks. Id. at 9. Yong was in the front of the property during the encounter between Officer Fairbanks and Vega, but he was not observed to be involved with this transaction. Id. at 10. Officer Fairbanks delivered to Officer McCook the items Vega had given him: eight packets with the same money symbols stamped on them. Id. at 9. Officer McCook field-tested the contents of the packets, and they were determined to contain marijuana. Id. at 10.

Following this transaction, Officer McCook left and "met up with the other officers to get ready to execute [and] to brief them on the execution of the search warrant" for 3202 North Fairhill Street. Id. at 17. The team of approximately six to eight officers entered the residence at 1:25 p.m. with Officer McCook toward the rear of the group. Id. at 10, 17. Yong was standing in the living room. Id. at 10, 17–18. As Officer McCook was entering the residence, Officer Gerald Gibson seized Yong, patted him down, and recovered a .38 caliber revolver from Yong's waistband. Id. at 17–18. A search of the shed on the property yielded 100 clear, plastic bags, each stamped with a money symbol and containing marijuana.² Id. at 11–12.

The Commonwealth charged Yong with a number of drug and firearms offenses including possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance (PWID), firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess a firearm, and criminal conspiracy to commit PWID.³

On September 7, 2012, Yong filed an omnibus pretrial motion in which he sought the suppression of physical evidence resulting from his seizure and arrest. Specifically, Yong argued his mere presence at the subject residence of the search warrant was insufficient to justify a protective pat-down or Terry⁴ frisk. Yong further argued police lacked probable cause to arrest him.⁵ The trial court held a suppression hearing at which Officer McCook testified to the above facts regarding the three-day surveillance of the property and the execution of the search warrant. The Commonwealth did not introduce the search warrant into evidence.

Counsel for Yong argued that there was no probable cause to arrest Yong because "[t]here was no evidence presented that Officer Gibson had any knowledge about what Mr. Young [sic] may have done. And such knowledge cannot be inferred from the evidence presented. There is nothing to show that anyone spoke to Officer Gibson and told him what they had seen on the 21st." Id. at 19–20. Counsel further argued that even if Officer Gibson had knowledge of the transaction involving Yong that occurred two days prior, such information did not establish probable cause for his arrest. Finally, counsel argued mere presence on the premises at the time police were executing a search warrant was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Yong was armed and dangerous, relying on In re J.V. , 762 A.2d 376 (Pa. Super. 2000).⁶ Thus, a protective-pat down of Yong was impermissible under Terry. Id. at 20–23.

The Commonwealth highlighted that this arrest was the product of an ongoing, three-day investigation during which Yong was observed on the first and third days in the area from where drugs were obtained. See id. at 27. It argued that there was "more than enough" for police to have searched Yong because the information about Yong's activity was known by "the arresting authority" which was "the Narcotics Field Unit." Id. at 27–28. The trial court credited the testimony of Officer McCook, and agreed with the Commonwealth. Id. at 25. Specifically, the court concluded as follows.

Okay. I agree with the Commonwealth. I think I've stated my reasons on the record, that what is in the mind of the observer is imputed to that of all those who served the warrant. With the warrant, there was enough to search [Yong].^[7] Even if they were searching for dope and they happened to find guns, it was a search incident to something that was found reasonable by a magistrate for them to go in there, and it was reasonable for them to go in there based on what they saw. [Yong] was in there, and he got searched. I believe it is different from the mere presence piece.

So I will deny the motion to suppress.

Id. at 28–29.

On April 24, 2013, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, a jury convicted Yong of carrying a firearm without a license and conspiracy to commit PWID.⁸ In a separate proceeding, the trial court found Yong guilty of persons not to possess a firearm. On June 12, 2013, the trial court sentenced Yong to an aggregate term of five to ten years' imprisonment.⁹ On July 8, 2013, Yong filed a timely notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence.¹⁰

On appeal, Yong argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer, Officer Gibson, had neither probable cause to arrest Yong nor reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk. However, he did not dispute that Officer McCook's first-hand knowledge of Yong's activity gave rise to sufficient probable cause to arrest. The Commonwealth countered that when a close group of officers are functioning as a team, the probable cause inquiry is based on an assessment of the collective knowledge of the team as a whole. Therefore, because the collective knowledge of the team amounted to probable cause to arrest Yong, the trial court did not err in denying Yong's suppression motion.

The Superior Court, in a published, majority opinion authored by now-Justice Wecht, began its analysis of this issue by outlining its standard of review in suppression matters, i.e., that appellate review is limited to determining whether the record supports the factual findings of the trial court and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are correct. See Commonwealth v. Yong , 120 A.3d 299, 304 (Pa. Super. 2015). With respect to its scope of review, the court explained that it is confined to review "only the suppression hearing record, and [its review] excludes any evidence elicited at trial," relying on this Court's decision in In re L.J. , 622 Pa. 126,79 A.3d 1073 (2013).¹¹ Yong , 120 A.3d at 304.

The court traced the origin of the collective knowledge doctrine to Williams v. United States , 308 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Yong , 120 A.3d at 305. The appellant in Williams challenged the constitutionality of his arrest because the arresting officer knew "the appellant was wanted by the...