Commonwealth v. Young
| Decision Date | 25 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 30 EAP 2015,No. 29 EAP 2015,29 EAP 2015,30 EAP 2015 |
| Citation | 160 A.3d 153 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. 1997 CHEVROLET AND CONTENTS SEIZED FROM James YOUNG [Elizabeth Young], Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. The Real Property and Improvements Known as 416 S. 62nd Street, Philadelphia, PA 19143 [Elizabeth Young], Appellee |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Ronald Eisenberg, Esq., Jonathan Michael Levy, Esq., Edward F. McCann Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, Rufus Seth Williams, Esq., Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant.
Heather F. Gallagher, Esq., Lehigh County District Attorney's Office, for Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, Appellant Amicus Curiae.
Jennifer Anne Peterson, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for Office of Attorney General, Appellant Amicus Curiae.
Ellen C. Brotman, Esq., Griesing Law, LLC, Elayne Bryn, Esq., for Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Appellee Amicus Curiae.
Susanna Rachel Greenberg, Esq., Louis S. Rulli, Esq., Penn Legal Assistance Office, Martha Meredith Tack-Hooper, Esq., for ACLU of PA, CLS, Philadelphia NAACP, PLA, Philadelphia VIP, SeniorLAW Center, Appellee Amicus Curiae.
Matthew David Lee, Esq., Blank Rome LLP, for Phila Bar Ass'n, Hispanic Bar Ass'n of PA, Barristers' Ass'n of Philadelphia, Appellee Amicus Curiae.
Susan Mon-Yi Lin, Esq., David Rudovsky, Esq., Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP, for Institute for Justice, Appellee Amicus Curiae.
OPINION
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens protection against the government by limiting its power to punish. In this appeal by allowance, we consider, inter alia , the constitutional limitations on civil in rem forfeiture in Pennsylvania under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,1 where the government attempts to seize through forfeiture a home and vehicle not based on any criminal conduct by the property owner—here, a 71–year–old grandmother—but upon the illegal conduct of a third party—her adult son. In doing so, we attempt to reconcile the uncertain constitutional jurisprudence underlying civil in rem forfeiture and provide clarity and uniformity regarding the appropriate constitutional standard to be applied to excessive fines challenges to civil in rem forfeitures in our Commonwealth.
As more fully explained below, we find the proper constitutional construct in determining whether an in rem forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment requires an initial determination regarding the relationship between the forfeited property and the underlying offense—the instrumentality prong. If this threshold prong is satisfied, the next step of the analysis is a proportionality inquiry in which the value of the property sought to be forfeited is compared to the gravity of the underlying offense to determine whether the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court, which remanded the matter to the trial court, for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
Appellee Elizabeth Young is a 71–year–old grandmother who owned and resided at a house at 416 South 62nd Street in West Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.2 Appellee owned her house for four decades, since the 1970s. In 2006, Appellee purchased a 1997 Chevrolet Venture minivan to meet her transportation needs. In October 2009, Appellee suffered two blood clots
in her lungs and was hospitalized through November 2009. Upon her release, Appellee was placed on bedrest and prescribed several medications. During this time, Donald Graham, Appellee's son, then age 50, and two of her grandchildren, resided with her at the house.
On November 10, 2009, Officer Robert Billups, a member of the Narcotics North Division of the Philadelphia Police Department, was conducting an investigation in relation to illegal drug sales from Appellee's house. On that date, Officer Billups and his partner, Officer Kevin Williams, met with a confidential informant who subsequently was observed giving Graham, who was exiting the house, $40 in pre-recorded money in exchange for a small bag of marijuana. Four days later, on November 14, 2009, the officers, with the confidential informant, observed Graham arrive at the house in a grey Chevrolet vehicle, later determined to be Appellee's minivan. After exiting the vehicle, Graham gave the informant another small bag of marijuana in exchange for $40. A similar transaction occurred two days later on November 16, 2009.
On November 19, 2009, members of the Narcotics North Division served and executed a search warrant on the house. During the course of their search of the premises, the officers confiscated a letter addressed to Graham, a scale, numerous new and used plastic packets, and six baggies of marijuana. While Graham was not present at the house when the search was executed, Appellee was present. The officers explained to Appellee, who was provided with a copy of the search warrant, that her son had sold drugs from the house and used a vehicle in connection with the sales on several occasions. The officers did not, however, arrest Graham on that date, and he was not charged with a crime based upon these sales.
On December 4, 2009, Officer Nathan London was conducting an investigation of drug dealings from the house and observed an informant approach it. The informant met with Graham at the door of the house, where the informant provided Graham an unknown amount of currency. Graham momentarily re-entered the house, and then handed the informant certain small objects, which later tested positive for marijuana. Approximately one month later, on January 5, 2010, a similar transaction occurred: after an informant met with Officers McClain and Coaxum, he went to the house, Graham exited the side door of the residence, and both men entered Appellee's vehicle. Thereafter, the informant exited the van with a small item which contained a green weed substance. The next day, Officer London returned to the house with Officer Coaxum and observed a similar transaction take place. Specifically, an informant knocked on the door of the house, Graham answered, and allowed the informant to come into the house. Graham exited the house, went to Appellee's van, remained in the vehicle for several minutes, then exited and returned to the house. Shortly thereafter, the informant left the house and provided the officers with a baggie containing small objects which testing later identified as marijuana.
The next day, January 7, 2010, at approximately 4:40 p.m., Officer McClain met with an informant who approached the house, and a similar drug transaction occurred resulting in the informant providing officers with two baggies containing marijuana. Immediately thereafter, at 4:45 p.m., Officer Robinson approached Graham and arrested him. Officer Robinson recovered a sandwich bag containing 4.6 grams of marijuana, one cellular telephone, $176.00 in unmarked currency, and $60.00 in pre-recorded currency. The police also took from Graham the keys to Appellee's van. The officers then executed a search warrant on the house and recovered 1.3 grams of marijuana from the living room and 8.5 grams from the van. Graham pled guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and was sentenced to 11 to 23 months house arrest. 35 P.S. §§ 780–113(a)(16), (30).3 The trial court imposed no fine on Graham.4
While the Commonwealth never charged Appellee with any crime, on October 20, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a petition for the forfeiture of Appellee's house and her vehicle under the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act ("Forfeiture Act"). 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6801 –6802. On May 1, 2012, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas held a hearing, and ultimately ordered the forfeiture of Appellee's house and vehicle.
The trial court determined that the Commonwealth established a nexus between the seized house and the violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act ("Drug Act").5 In doing so, the court reasoned that, in determining whether a nexus existed, forfeitures are allowed where the Commonwealth demonstrates that the property owner facilitated the sale of drugs or stored the drugs and paraphernalia on his or her property. The court found that Appellee's house and vehicle were used to facilitate illegal drug sales, as the police had observed several drug transactions inside or around Appellee's house and van, and Appellee's son Graham was selling illegal drugs on a regular basis, and, thus, forfeiture of the property was proper.
The trial court also rejected Appellee's statutory innocent owner defense afforded by the Forfeiture Act because, after the police notified Appellee of Graham's drug activities, through the service of search warrants on the property and personally informing Appellee of the activities, she "refused to take any proactive measures or steps to demonstrate her lack of consent to this illegal activity." Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/2013, at 11–12. Further, the trial court offered that Appellee did not leave or vacate the property, or restrict her son's access to her property. Moreover, the court concluded that Appellee ...
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