Commonwealth v. Zaledzieski

• Decision Date: 22 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 325 EDA 2014,J-S62043-14,325 EDA 2014
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. MATTHEW ZALEDZIESKI Appellant

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
MATTHEW ZALEDZIESKI Appellant

J-S62043-14
No. 325 EDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 22, 2015

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 9, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000678-1992

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:

Matthew Zaledzieski¹ appeals from the order entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, dated January 9, 2014, dismissing his first petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA")."² Zaledzieski seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of life imprisonment imposed on May 2, 1994, following his jury conviction of first-degree murder, aggravated

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assault, and reckless endangerment of a person ("REAP").³ On appeal, Zaledzieski raised a plethora of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Based on the following, we affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the underlying facts of this case as follows:

On July 15, 1992, in the early morning hours, [Zaledzieski], Todd Mastrobuoni, and John Lynch were driving through East Stroudsburg. Lynch drove the car, while [Zaledzieski] was seated in the rear of the car, and Mastrobuoni was asleep in the front passenger seat after excessive drinking. Lynch stopped the car in response to the hails of Neil Rappley, who asked for a ride. Lynch refused. An argument ensued with Mr. Rappley, at the end of which [Zaledzieski] stabbed Mr. Rappley with a punch dagger. As the victim attempted to flee, [Zaledzieski] chased Mr. Rappley and stabbed him seven more times. Mastrobuoni was asleep throughout the entire incident. Fleeing the scene, Lynch drove [Zaledzieski] home. On the way they picked up Tina Worth, who saw [Zaledzieski] place what looked like a knife into his pocket. [Zaledzieski] also stated how he had just stabbed a homeless man. [Zaledzieski] discussed the incident with Lynch and Mastrobuoni, telling them to keep quiet about it.

[Zaledzieski], Lynch, and Mastrobuoni were all members of the 'skinheads organization.' The Commonwealth never identified the murder weapon and no physical evidence linked [Zaledzieski] to the victim or the scene.

[Zaledzieski]'s version of the story is that he is actually innocent, that he was not present at the stabbing, and that it was mostly likely Lynch who committed the stabbing and implicated [Zaledzieski] to prevent his own prosecution.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/9/2014, at 5-6.

On May 26, 1993, a jury convicted Zaledzieski of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and REAP.⁴ He was found not guilty of criminal

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conspiracy.⁵ On May 2, 1994, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Zaledzieski's judgment of sentence was affirmed on January 15, 1995, and his petition for allowance of appeal was denied on July 25, 1995. See Commonwealth v. Zeledjieski, 660 A.2d 126 (Pa. Super. 1995) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 663 A.2d 691 (Pa. 1995).

On June 12, 1995, while the petition for allowance of appeal was still pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Zaledzieski filed a pro se PCRA petition. That same day, counsel, E. David Christine, Esq., was appointed to represent him. On September 18, 1995, Zaledzieski filed a petition for appointment of a private investigator in aid of his PCRA petition, which was granted the same day.

On January 22, 1998, Christine filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which was granted on January 30, 1998. Stephen M. Higgins, Esq., then entered his appearance. One year later, Higgins entered a praecipe to withdraw as counsel and J. Michael Farrell, Esq., entered his appearance the same day.

On July 14, 2003, Zaledzieski, with the assistance of Farrell, filed an amended PCRA petition. On October 7, 2003, the Commonwealth filed its

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response to the amended petition. From this date until July of 2006, no other filings, hearings, or actions were taken by counsel or the PCRA court.

On July 6, 2006, Zaledzieski filed a reply to the Commonwealth's response. Almost one year later, on June 8, 2007, Farrell submitted a letter to the PCRA judge, asking the court to proceed with the matter. "No action was taken by the Court. At some point between this time and July 2012, [Zaledzieski]'s case was marked by the Clerk of Courts as closed on the docket. The reason the case was closed is not reflected in the record." PCRA Court Opinion, 1/9/2014, at 3.

On July 17, 2012, Zaledzieski filed a motion to reopen the case and the PCRA court scheduled a hearing for August 24, 2012. The Commonwealth filed a motion for continuance, which was granted, and the hearing was rescheduled for, and held on, September 24, 2012.

On October 16, 2012, the court granted Zaledzieski's motion to reopen the case, "holding that [Zaledzieski]'s petition was timely under the prior version of the Post-Conviction Relief Act in effect at the time of filing." Id. at 4. The PCRA evidentiary hearing was ultimately scheduled for May 28, 2013.

Prior to the hearing, on March 7, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration of the timeliness of Zaledzieski's PCRA petition. Four days later, the Commonwealth also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant

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to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b).⁶ A hearing was held on March 18, 2013, with respect to the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration. On May 9, 2013, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion, denying the Commonwealth's motion.

On May 28, 2013, the court held a hearing on the PCRA petition and the motion to dismiss. The court held a second hearing on June 28, 2013, for further testimony on the issues. On January 9, 2014, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion, denying both Zaledzieski's PCRA petition and the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. This timely appeal followed.⁷

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Preliminarily, we must determine if this appeal is properly before us. "Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant PCRA petition was timely filed." Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 A.3d 766, 768 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 757 (Pa. 2012).

The PCRA timeliness requirement ... is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 715, 951 A.2d 1163 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000)). The court cannot ignore a petition's untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition. Id.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013). A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final "at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

Here, Zaledzieski's petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied on July 25, 1995. Therefore, under the current version of the Act, Zaledzieski's sentence became final on October 23, 1995, when his time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See Sup. Ct. R. 13. Moreover, pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1), Zaledzieski had one year from the date his

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judgment of sentence became final to file a PCRA petition. See Taylor, supra.⁸ As noted above, on June 12, 1995, while the petition for allowance of appeal was still pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Zaledzieski filed a pro se PCRA petition. His appointed counsel did not file an amended PCRA petition until July 14, 2003.

The Commonwealth submits that because Zaledzieski filed his pro se petition while his petition for allowance of appeal was still pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it was premature and therefore, did not constitute a first PCRA petition.⁹ See Commonwealth's Brief at 10. Moreover, according to the Commonwealth, the PCRA court was required to consider the amended PCRA petition as Zaledzieski's first petition. Further, because the amended petition was not filed until July of 2003, the Commonwealth states the petition was patently untimely and Zaledzieski failed to allege that any of the enumerated exceptions to the timeliness requirement applied. Id.

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The PCRA court has thoroughly analyzed this issue in its October 16, 2012, opinion, finding the following:

Under the 1995 PCRA, a PCRA Petition is untimely if it is filed during direct appeal, i.e. if the petition is premature. Com. v. Seay, 814 A.2d 1240, 1241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding premature PCRA Petition is untimely); Com v. Kubis, 808 A.2d 196, 198 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding same).

However, under the Post Conviction Relief Act of 1988 ("1988 PCRA"), the jurisdictional time bar did not exist. Postconviction Relief, Capital Unitary Review, 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. Sp. Sess. No. 1 Act 1995-32 (S.B. 81) (SS1) (SS1) (Purdon's).⁸

From 1982 to 1995, the legislature tinkered with Pennsylvania's system for post conviction relief. From 1982 until 1988, the Post Conviction Hearings Act of 1982 ("1982 PCHA") contemplated that petitioners would raise their claims

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